An analysis of the sense-data theories of Moore, Russell, and Broad by Schlagel, Richard Harold
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1955
An analysis of the sense-data
theories of Moore, Russell, and
Broad
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/8091
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
GRADUATE SCHOOL 
Dissertation 
~N ANALYSIS OF THE SENSE-DATA THEORIES 
OF MOORE, RUSSELL, AND BROAD 
by 
~ichard Harold Schlagel 
(B.S., Springfield Collage, 1949) 
(A.M., Boston University, 1952) 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Boctor of Philosophy 
1955 
'"? ~]) 
J 1' ..:!)-s 
sc. 
Approvad 
by 
First Reader ••• r~ cz . -n.v.:I~ . . .. . . .. . . . . . .  . . . .. . . . 
Second Readar •• ~: .-.-;. ~-~ ~ ( ~ . . . . . . .... .~ . .. . .. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I NTRODUCTION . • 
CH.4.PTER I 
J: .. 'lQOHE ' S DEFENCE OF C 0 vL: .. 1QN SENSE • 
1. Int roducti')n • • • • • 
2 . Moore ' s List of Truis m's • • • • 
3· The Justificati')n of Moore ' s Claim . 
4 . Are Co mm on Sense Propositions Kn own 
5. Ar e Common Sense Propositions True ? 
6 . Propositions Other People Know to be 
7. The Comm on Sensa View of the World. 
8 •. Summary and Conclusion . • 
CHAPT ER II 
• 
to be True? • 
• • 
True 
• 
• 
~OORE ' S ANA LYSI S OF CO~E~ON SENSE PROPOS ITIONS . • • • 
1 •. Introducti on • • 
2~ Sensa-data as the Subjects of Propositi')ns • • 
3 • . Direc tions for P ickin g Out Sense -data . 
4. Delus ive Percept ion the Basis of Reflection . • 
5. The Relation of Sense -data to Physica l Surf aces 
6 . Summary and Conclusion. • . • 
CH.4.PT ER III 
RUSSELL ' S THEORY OF NEUTP~L MON I SM • 
1. Introduction • • 
2 . The Sense-data Theory in the Problems . 
3 . Eliminat i on of t he Phys ica l Obj ect . 
4 . Rus s ell' s Elimination of Consciousness 
5. Critica l Analys i s and Eva l uation 
• 
• 
page 
1 
1 
1 
3 
7 
11 
13 
16 
19 
24 
28 
28 
29 
30 
38 
40 
45 
65 
65 
68 
77 
87 
96 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER IV 
BROAD' S ANA LYSI S OF PERCEPT I ON·. 
1. Introduction • 
2. Perce ptua l Situati~ns . 
3· Ana lysis of Perceptual Situations • 
4. The Sensible Ap pearance of Physical Obj ects. 
CHAPTER V 
THP~E THEORI ZS OF PERCEPT ION 
1. Introduction • 
2. The Theory of Multiple Inhere nce • • 
3· The Multiple Relation Theory of Appearing 
4. The Sensa Theory of Perce ption • • 
CONCLUSION 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
AB STRA CT • 
AUTOBIOGRA PHY 
• 
page 
117 
117 
119 
129 
143 
149 
149 
150 
181 
192 
204 
214 
223 
231 
INTRODUCTION 
Do material objects exist? This is a question which has 
been asked throughout the history of philosophy. One is in-
clined to cut the question off by waving his hand, hitting a 
table, or kicking a stone, and yet this kind of answer has 
never satisfied the sceptic. What is implied in this overt 
response is that tables and stones are the kinds of things 
included in the class of physical objects, so that their ex-
istence is evidence, a fortiori, for the class. 
The persistent sceptic, however, has challenged the as-
sumptions of this demonstration in at least two ways: (1) he 
has asked whether such objects as stones and desks are 'really' 
material objects; and (2) he has asked whether the belief in 
the existence of such objects is justified. Thus the analysis 
of the original question breaks down into at least these two 
forms: How do we know that physical objects ex~st? And what 
kinds of things are stones and sticks? 
Again, stock answers to these questions are near at hand. 
We know that material objects exist because we perceive such 
things as hands and stones. And we call such objects as these 
physical, because they have certain characteristics identical 
with the connotation of "physical"; that is, persistence, in-
dependence, causal efficacy, inherent qualities or character-
istics, and publicity. And yet these answers hint bf circu-
larity, for it is the very possession by physical objects of 
the characteristics connoted by 11 phys1eal 11 that the sceptic 
·, . 
11. 
questions. 
Were it not for illusions, hallucinations, delusive per-
captions, and dreams one could pack the sceptic off to an in-
stitution reserved for people of marginal sanity, and forget 
his troublesome questions. But everyone has been too often 
deluded to take such an indifferent attitude. "Is it really 
-
hot in here, or do I have a fever?" "Is it getting dark, or 
is it my ayes?'' "Are there twins over there or am I seeing 
double?" ui must pinch myself to see if I am dreaming." "Is 
it really you, Harriet, or am I seeing an illusion?" All 
these expressions are familiar and testify to the duplicity 
of ordinary perception. 
History has conferred the name "Cartesian doubt" on one 
of the most famous instances of philosophical dubiety. Des-
cartes, first doubting everything, and then doubting whether 
he could dou bt everything, came to the conclusion that he 
could not doubt his own existence. Philosophers since Dee-
cartes have usually taken this subjectivistic position as 
their starting point, but have also extended to the immediate 
data of expe r ience--the given--the sa me surety Descartes at-
tributed to his know ledge of his ·own existence. That is, 
even though one can doubt whether he is actually perceiving 
a physical object, or that physic~l objects exist, he can not 
doubt that he is having an experience of some kind, or that 
he is perceiving something. Throughout the history of phi-
losophy various names have been given to the indubitable data 
or contents of experience, but the acknowledg-ment of stich ~ 
,, 
. ~ . ~ . " 
data has been common. H.H. Price asserts that 
all past theories have in fact started with sense-
data. The Ancients and the Schoolmen called them 
sensible soecies. Locke and Berkeley called them 
ideas of sensation, Hume impressions, Kant Vor-
stellungeri. In the nineteenth century they were 
usually known as sensations, and people spoke of 
visual and auditory sensations when they meant 
colouriRtches and noises; while many contemporary 
writers, following £r· C.D. Broad, have preferred 
to call them sensa. 
Indubitable sensory data, therefore, have formed the 
1.11. 
basis of most philosophical interpretations of the external 
world. That is, philosophers have believed that the occur-
renee of discrepant or delusive perceptions r aquires a theory 
of perception based on the indubitable contents of experi-
ence. In The Problems of Philosophy (1912), Russell ga.ve 
"the name of sense-data to the things that are immed i a tely 
- 2 
known in sensation." From Descartes to the beginning of 
the twentieth century it was generally assumed that these 
indubitable contents of experi ence were also contents of 
conscioushes e. . However, in his famous article 11 The Refutation 
of Idealism," Moore pointed out that one could at least con-
ceive of the given contents of experience as not being a con-
tent of consci~usness, and therefore possibly being able to 
exist independently of perception. 
This insight initiated the realistic revolt in both 
British and American philosophy. At first the revolt took 
the form of "neo-realism,"3 a sophisticated form of na'!.ve re-
1. Price, Perception, 19. 
2. Russell, The Problems of Philosoohy, 12. 
3. Cf. The New Realism, ed. W.P. Montague. 
' . . , 
I • 
1 v. 
alism. The difficulty in accounting for error by the nee-
realists, however, led to the "critical realistic"1 movement. 
For the critical realists perception of the physical or onto-
logical object is mediated by a sense-datum or "essence." 
Thus basing one's epistemology on indubitable sanae-data, and 
including in one's metaphysics a "realm of essences" or "e-
ternal objects" became a common proceedure. 
However, Moore's writings set in motion more than one 
current of thought in philosophy. Along with stimulating a 
realistic movemant, Moore's defence of common propositions 
as well as hie critical analysis of philosophical propositions 
led to a sceptical attitude toward the notion and language 
of sense-data. The classic expression of this new attitude 
is G.A. Paul's "Is There a Problem About Sense-Data? 112 Paul's 
essential thesis is that the term "sense-datum" injected into 
a physical object language is used in the way in which physical 
object terms such as chairs and tables are used (i.e., as if 
sense-data were physical objects), which raises peculiar prob-
lems. Whereas the use of "sense-data" is intended to resem-
ble the use of such ordinary terms as "after-images, 11 "ap-
pearances," and "hallucinations" it seems inevitable that one 
should fall into the habit of construing sense-data as lin-
guistic or epistemic surrogates for physical objects. This, 
according to Paul, is the basic difficulty in adopting the 
1. Cf. ~ssays in Critical Realism, ed. Eurant Drake. 
2. Reprinted in Logic and Language, 1st series, A .G.N. Flew, 
ed., 101-116. 
language of nsense-data". He says, 
My intention has not been to deny that there are 
sense-data, if by that is meant that (1) we can 
understand, to some extent at least, how people 
wish to use the word 'sense-datum' who have in-
troduced it in philosophy, and that ~2) sometimes 
statements of a certain form containing the word 
'sense-datum' are true, e~g., 'I am seeing an el-
liptical sense-datum "of"- a round penny.' Nor do 
I wish to deny that the introduction of this term-
inology may be useful in helping to solve some 
philosophical problems about perception; but I do 
wish to deny that there is any sense in which this 
terminology is nearer to reality than any other 
which may be used to express the same facts; in 
particular I wish to deny that in order to give a 
complete and accurate account of ady perceptual 
situation it is necessary to use a noun in the way 
in which 'sense-datum' is used, for this leads to 
the notion that there are entities of a curious 
sort over and above physical objects which can 
'have' sensible proparties but cannot 'appear to 1 have' sensible properties which they hava not got. 
.. ;, 
v. 
This long passage has been quoted because it sets the 
problem of this dissertation. The purpose of this disserta-
tion is to determine, by a close analysis of three of the most 
influential theories of sense-data, whether a theory of sense-
data is necessary to account for discrepant, or delusive per-
captions. Do discrepant or delusive perceptions, in other 
words, require an explanatiJn incorporating the concept or 
terminology of sense-data? To decide this question is the 
purpose of this dissertation. 
The sense-data theories of Moore, Russell, and Broad 
were selected for analysis for several reasons. In the first 
place, their theories of sense-data have had the greatest in-
1. Op. Cit., 108-109. 
vt. 
fluence on the recent treatment of the problem of perception. 
As has already bean pointed out, Moore:!$ s 11 The Refutation of 
Idaalism111 opened the way for treating objects of sensation 
as independent entities, and Russell coined the term "sense-
data" to designate such entities. Broad's analysis of per-
ceptual situations was the most comprehensive analysis up to 
that time, and in many respects still remains so. Secondly, 
an insight can be gained by studying the early approach to 
a problem and the methods of solution which is obscured by 
studying later theories which rely on accepted arguments and 
in which terminology has become embedded. Thirdly, each of 
the philosophers approached the problems of perception in a 
somewhat different way. And finally, the intellectual as 
wall as academic association of Moore, Russell, and Broad was 
so close that their treatment as a group was natural as wall 
as anl ightening. As : one moves from Moore, to Russell, to 
Broad one can trace the influence each has had on the other. 
The r e search originally began with an analysis of Moore's 
"The Refutation of Idealism" (1903) and W.T. Stace's later 
rejoinder uTbe Refutation of Realism" (1934) •2 But since 
Moore bas repudiated the conclusions of his earlier articla,3 
it was decided to omit discussion of it in favor of his later 
views which he has not denied, and which often ar~ still re-
1. Reprinted in Moore, Philosophical Studies, 1-30. 
2. Reprinted in Readin~s in PHilosobhical Analysis, ed. H. 
Feigl and w. Sellars, 3 4-372. 
3. Cf. "A Reply to My .Cr1t1cs, 11 in The Philosophy of G.E. 
Moore, 2nd ad., ad. Paul A. Schilpp, 653. 
vii. 
ferred to. The article which forms the basis of the discus-
sion of Moore's notion of sense-data is his "A Defence of 
Common Sense" . (1925) 1 , and the articles "The Status of Sense-
Data" (1914) 2 and "Some Judgments of Perception" (1919) 3 are 
used as supplementary material. The articles in The Philos-
ophy of G.E. Moore (1942) 4 pertaining to Moore's theory of 
knowledge have been read, and have been of considerable help 
in understanding and evaluating Moore's position. 
Accordingly, Chapter I begins with a : discussion of the 
first half of Moore's "A Defence of Common Sense," in which 
Moore presents a defence of common sense and ordinary lan-
guage, and a criticism of philosophers who have denied the 
truth of ordinary propositions, thereby implying a denial of 
the common sense view of the world. The main problem in this 
chapter is to point out what Moore meant when he asserted 
that philosophers hold views inconsistent with what they know 
to be true, and to show why philosophers would deny this. 
In Chapter II the second half of Moore's "Defence" 1s dis-
cussed, in which Moore's analysis of ordinary propositions 1s 
presented. Moore 1s certain that sense-data are the ultimate 
subjects of propositions referring to the external world, and 
he gives directions for picking out these sense-data. However, 
he is not certain as to how these sense-data are rela ted to 
physical objects. The problem in this chapter is to deter-
mine what Moore means by a sense-datum, and to relate the 
1 . In Contemporary ~British Philosophy, 2nd series, ed. J.H. 
MUtrhead, 193-223. 
2. Reprinted in Philosouhical Studies, 168-196. 
3. Ibid., 220-252. 4. 2nd ed. 1951; ed. Pauls. Sch1lpp. 
v111. 
two sect ions of Moore 1 s "Defence". 
After Moore, Russell's treatment o~ sense-data is taken 
up, particularly Russell's theory of "neutral monism." The 
Problems of Philosoplax, ( 1912), Our Knowledge of the External 
World (1st ed. 1914), the articles "The Relati::~n of Sense-data 
to Physics" (1914) 1 and "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter" 
(1915) 2 , and The Analysis of Mirid (1921) are taken as the 
basis of discussion. Although Russell no longer holds the 
theory of neutral monism~the theory is such a clear and con-
cise construct of th~~ world in terms of sense-data, and has 
had such wide influence, that its inclusion seemed imperative. 
Chapter III, th.:~ref ore, contains an analysis of Russell's 
theory of neutral monism. Beginning with Russell's dualistic 
viel'i in the Problems.~ the transit ion to neutral monism is 
traced in Russell's reconstruction, in terms of sense-data, 
first of the exgernal world, and then of the mind. The prob-
lem in this chapter ts to determine whether such a reconstruc-
tion is warranted forthe reasons Russell gives, and then to 
determine whether Russell provides a consistent and adequate 
theory of matter and mind. 
Although c:msidera.bly influenced by Moore and Russell, 
Broad's treatment of perception was more comprehensive than 
either of the previous theories. In Scientific Thought (1923) . / 
and The Mind and Its Place in Nature (11925}, Broad presents an 
exhaustive analysis of the various problems relating to a 
1. Egprinted in Russell, gysticism and Logic, 145-189. 
2. I b id, 125-144. 
ix. 
theory of sense-dataj; a .g., the genesis and ontological status 
of sense-data, and the relation of sense-data to physical ob-
jects and minds. For this dissertation, however, Broad's anal-
ysis of pe rcept ion in The Mind and Its Place In Na tura is most 
important, and is the basis for the discussion of Broad. 
Accordingly, Chpa ter IV presents Broad 1 s analysis of 
perce ptual situations, and Chapter V contains an analysis of 
the "Theory of Multiple Inherence," the "Multiple Relation 
- . 
Theory of Appearing,"' a nd the "Sensum Theory." The latter 
three theories are all presented by Broad as possible solu-
tions to the problem of discrepant perceptions • . The problem 
in these two chaptera is to determine the adequacy and sig-
nificance of Broad's analysis of perception, and the nature 
and truth of the thrEte theories of perception. 
In the Conclusion, an attempt is made to formulate, on 
the basis of the criticisms in the previous five chapters , a 
postti::m with regard to the sense-datum approach to the prob-
lems of discrepant petrceptions. That is, an attempt is made 
to determine what thct implications of variant and delusive 
perceptions are with re gard to the common sense view of the 
world and ordinary language, and to indicate how such dis-
crepant perceptions can be explained. A view of perception, 
language, and reality is suggested as a conclusion to the 
problems of perception. 
1.. 
CHAPTER I 
MOORE'S DEFENCE OF COMMON SENSE 
1. Introduction. 
One of the criteria by which the status of a philosopher 
is to be judged is the impact of his thought and writings on · 
the contemporary philosophical scene. That G.E. Moore has 
had a profound and lasting impact is beyond dispute. Phrases 
such as "the refutation of Idealism," "the naturalistic fal-
lacy," "a defence of common sense," which either entitled or 
appeared in Moore's writings and now are common coins in the 
exchange of philosophical ideas, testify to Moore's influence. 
Ethical studies were markedly changed by the publication of 
Principia Ethica in 1903. An article appearing the same year, 
"The Refutation of Idealism," 1 although anticipated by Meinong 
and Brentano, proved a main source of the resurgence of Real-
ism in both England a nd the United States. And the articles 
"A Defence of Common Sense" 2 (1925) and "Proof of an External 
World11 3 (1939) not or.1ly aligned Moore's mama with a persistent 
defence of the commor:t sense view of the world, but evan made 
such a position formldable. 
However, it was not Moore's solutions to philosophical 
problems which had tb.e greatest impact on contemporary phi-
1. In Mind, n.s., V. xii, Oct. 1903, 433-53. 
2. In ac;n:temporary British Philosophy, 2nd series, ad. J.H. 
Muirhead, 195-223. 
3. In Proceedings of the British Academy, v. 25, 1939, 273-
300. 
2. 
losophy, but rather his way of doing philosophy. He drew 
attention to the f a ct that in philosophy it is as important 
to analyze statementl:l as it is to analyze experience. That 
is, he showed the importance of language in understanding and 
expressing truths about experience. His analysis of philo-
sophical statements set a standard of clarity and precision. 
From the influence of his writings there developed the lin-
guistic analytic movement which characterizes mo5t of contemp-
orary British philosophy and much of present day American phi-
losophy. 
In this and the next chapter, Moore's analysis of state-
menta expressing common sense propositions about the external 
world will be discusBed. However, it will be Moore's analysis 
of empirical statements into stateme nts which contain the term 
"sense-datum" which will be of primary interest. For it is 
the purpose of this dissertation to determine whether or not 
there a r e such ent it lLes as sense-data. 
At the time Moore began philosophizing, Idealism was at 
its peak in British philosophy. F.H. Bradley (1846-1924}, the 
most famous of the Bl:>itish Idealists, was reputed to be uthe 
g~eatest mind in all England." Therefore, it was no little task 
' 1 
when, in "The Refutation of Idealism," Moore undertook to 
refute Idealism. Aceording to Moore, epistemic Idealism of 
the Berkeleian variety appears tenable only as long as one 
fails to distinguish in sensation the "act" from the 11 object."2 
1. Reprinted in Ptl ilcisoohical Studies, 1-30. 
2 • Op. c 1 t. , 1 7ff. 
If everything one experiences is a content of his conscious-
ness, then it follows that the existence of everything per-
ceived depends upon its being perceived; i.e., its ~ is 
percipi as Berkeley held. But if a distinction can be made 
between the object of sensation and the conscious aspect of 
the sensation, then one could argue that the existence of 
one is not dependent upon the existence of the other. This, 
as is well known, was the position taken by Moore in "The 
Refutation of Idealism". 
But the distinction between the sensation as a conscious 
act, and the object of the sensation leaves one with the 
question as to what the ob,ject is. In the context in which 
the distinction is made, the 11 object 11 does not refer to a 
physical objact but rather to a color. What we are supposed 
to be aware of in a visual sensation (which is the only kind 
Moora discussed) is a particular color. And since this is 
supposed to be an object which can exist independently of 
any sensation, one is led to ask just what kind of an entity 
it is. However, the distinct ion of a separate object in 
sensation, being a sufficient p~:.>blem in 11 The Refutation, 11 
Moore does not go on to answer the latter question. For 
this answer one has to turn to his other articles on per-
ception, particularly his 11 A Defence of Common Sense". 
2. Moore 1 s List of Truisms. 
In his 11 Defence of Common Sense," Moore does two main 
4. 
things. First, he sets forth two different types of state-
ments asserting propositions which he claims to know the 
truth of with certainty. Secondly, he sets forth an analysis 
of the propositions the truth of which he claims to know with 
certainty. However, his conclusions as re gards the analysis 
of the propositions ~re not as certain as his conviction re-
garding the truth of the propositions. Accordingly, he main-
tains that his position differs from most philosophers in 
that most philosophers doubt the truth of the propos it ions 
Moore asserts he knows with certainty, while they claim to 
be able to g ive an analysis of the propositions which is 
certain. 
The statements asserting propositions v-1hose truth Mo')re 
claims to k now with certainty are divided into .two classes. 
The first class ~ssart propositions about the external world 
and Moore's own experiences. The second class consist of all 
those propositions similar to the first class which other 
people know to be true about themselves and their experiences. 
That is, Moore not only knows propositions of the first class 
to be true ( Le., prop ositions which he himself asserts to be 
true), but he also knows with certainty that there is another 
class of propositions corresponding to the first class which 
most other people also know to be true (i.e., propositions 
wh ich they assart to be true about the external world and 
.their experiences). 
The first class of statements consist of two types. The 
first type ass ert propositions about Moore's body, about the 
bodies of other people, about physical objec t s, and about 
spatial and temporal relations. 
Thera exists at present a living human body, which 
is mY body. This body was born at a certain time 
in the past, a nd has existed continuously eve r since 
••• Ever since it was born, it has been either in 
contact with or not far from the surface of the 
earth; and ••• there have also existed many other 
things, having shape and size in three dimensions 
(in the same familiar sense in which it has), from 
which it has been at various distances (in the fam-
iliar sense in which it is now at a distance both 
from that mantel-piece and from that book-case, and 
at a greater d.istance from the book-case than it is 
from the mantel-piece) ••• Among the things which 
have, in t his sense, formed part of its environ-
ment ••• tbere ha ve ••• been lar~e numbers of other 
living human bodies ••• l ~ 
The first type of statements obviously assert propositions 
familiar to most people and the truth of which is generally 
taken for granted. These are the kinds of statements the 
5. 
meaning of which not only permit communication about the f u n-
damental physical categ ories of experience, but which also 
determine the very conce ption of these experiences. That is, 
one learns that the type of statements listed above de note 
common experiences, a nd once the meanin gs of the statements 
are learned, one thinks of experience in terms of these mean-
1ngs. Experience determines the meanings of terms wh ich t he n 
influence the way in wh ich we think a b out expe rience. 
The second type of truisms included in the first class 
1. Moore, "A Defence of Common Sense," in Contemporarz- Brit-
ish Philosophy, 2nd series, ad. J.H. Muirhead, 194. All 
following references to this work will be athreviated 11 CBP".) 
6. 
of stataments consists of propositions raferring to what are 
usually ca.llad "subjactive axpariancas". They are proposi-
tiona \<lhich peopla know about themselvas, rathar than prop-
ositions people ltnow about the external world. 
I am a human being, and I have at diffarant timas 
sinca my body was born, had many diffarant exper-
iancas ••• I have often perceived both my own body 
and other thin gs which formed part of its environ-
mant ••• I hava not only perceived things of t h is 
kind, but have also observed facts about them, 
such as, for instanca, the fact which I am now ob-
serving, that that mantel-piece is at present near-
ar to my body than that book-case; I hava been 
aware of othar facts, which I was not at the time 
observing ••• I have had expectations with regard to 
the future, and many beliefs of other kinds, both · 
true and false; I hava thought of imag inary things, 
and parsons and incidants, in the reality of which 
I did not balieve; I hava had dreams; and I have 
had feelings of many different kinds. And, just 
as my body has been the body of a human being ••• 
who has ••• had many experiencas ••• so, in the case 
of very many of the other human bodies ••• aach has 
baen the body of a different human being, who has 
••• had many different experiinces of each of these 
(and other) different kinds. 
Like the first type of propositions, this type derives its 
meaning from very common experiences. Any language which is 
developed to any degree at all provides for the expression 
of the kinds . ~f experiences Moore denotas in the above pas-
sage. 
Thus the first cla ss of statements is dividad into two 
kinds: tha first type a~erts propositions about ordinary 
physical objects, such as Moora's body, and common spatial 
B;nd temporai ralation::1. Tha se cond type ass'ar·t propositions 
1. CBP, 195. 
7· 
ab~ut common experience such as feelings, beliefs, dreams, 
and so forth. Moore claims to kn ow the truth of these prop-
ositions with certainty. 
The se6ond cla.se~ of statements whose truth Moore also 
knows with certainty, express propositions similar to those 
expressed by the first class, except that they are proposi-
tiona asserted by other people. That is, Moore knows that 
other people know prop ositions about themselves, their ex-
periences, and the external wo r ld corresponding to the first 
class of propositions which Moore claimed to know about him-
self and his experiences. 
In other words ••• each of us (meaning by "ust 11 
very many human beings of the class defined) 
has fre quently known, with regard to himself 
or his body and the time at which he knew it, 
everything which in writing down my list of 
propositions in (1), I was claiming to know 
about ~~elf or ~ body and thl time at which 
I wrote that proposition down. 
Thus Moore is not claiming a ny cggnitive privileges for him-
self, but is asserting that ' most people know with certainty 
what he claims he knows with certainty. 
3. The J ustification of Moore's Claim. 
But now the question must be asked, "vfhat is Moore's 
justification for this claim? 11 What does Moore mean when 
he says "he 'knows 1 1 1'Jith 'bertainty' the 'truth' of such 
propositions?" We shall begin with the first class of prop-
1. CBP, 196. 
8. 
ositions; viz., those propositions Moore knows about himself, 
his experiences, and the external world. 
What Moore meanB, when he says he 11 lmows such prositions 
to be true v-1ith certainty, 11 is that such propositions are not 
partially true, nor that they require translati:m into some 
other set of propositions, namely those referring specifically 
to sansa-data, 1 for their truth to be conclusively known. 2 
Such propositions are wholly true as they stand, understood 
in their" ordinary or popular meaning. 11 3 And having an "or-
dinary and popular meaning11 is essential to Moore's view. 
I have assumed that there is some meaning which 
is the ordinary or popular meaning of such ex-
pressions as "The earth has existed for many 
years past." And this, I am afraid, is an as-
sumption which some philosophers are capable of 
dis puting. They seem to think that the question 
"Do you believe that the earth has existed for 
many years past?" is not a plain question, such 
as should be mat either by a plain uYas" or "No, 11 
or by a plain "I can't make up my mind," but is 
the sort of question which can be properly met by: 
"It all depends on what you mean by 'the earth' 
and 'exists' and 'years': if you mean so and so, 
and so and so, and so and so, than I do; but if 
you mean so and so, and so and so, and so and so 
••• then I don't, or at least I think it is ex-
tremely doubtful." It seems to me that such a 
view is as profoundly mistaken as any view can 
be. Such an .sxpression as "The earth has exist-
ed for many years past" is the vary type of an 
unambiguous expression, the meaning of which we 
all understand.4 
The person who would hesitate to g ive a definite answer 
to the above question would be confusing, according to Moore, 
1. As some phenomenal tats and positivists would require. 
2 • Of • CB:P, 197. 4. CBP, 198. 
3. CBP, 198 {italics mine). 
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the question as to whether we understand the meaning of an 
ordinary proposition, with the entirely different question of 
whether we "know what it means, in the sense of being able to 
give a correct analysis of its meaning." 1 This latter ques-
tion Moore admits is a "profoundly difficult question, and 
one to which ••• no one knows the answer." 2 But, fortunately, 
being unable to g ive a correct analysis of such propositions 
does not involve being unable to understand them. We are all 
in the position, at times, of being able to understand var-
ious things, or being a ble to act in certain ways, without 
being able to analyze what is involved in either situat i on. 
As 1'-ioore correctly points out, "it is obvious that we C!l. nnot 
even raise the question how what we do understand by i t [ an 
expression] is to be analyzed, unless we do understand it."3 
Thus we understand the first class of propositions when we 
know that they are be :lng used in their ordinary sense, with 
the usual intent, and as soon as we know this, we also know, 
with certainty, their truth. 
At this point one might interrupt by saying, 11 Yes, I do 
understand the prJpositions in (1) and I am certainly tempt-
ed to believe that I do know them for certain; but do I 
really know them for certain? Has Moore provided any evidence 
that I do'?" Moore~ s ansv1er is as definite, if unsatisfying, 
as any answer could b.::~. He also asks himself, "Do I really 
know all the pro9ositlons in (1) to be true'? Isn't it pos-
1. CBP, 198. 3. CBP, 199. 
2. Ibid. 
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sibla that I merely believe them? or know them to be highly 
probable?" 1 And answers, 
In answer to this question, I think I have nothing 
better to say than that it seams to me that I do 
know them, with certainty. It is, indeed, obvious 
that, in the case of most of them, I do not know 
them directly: that is to say, I only know them 
because, in the past, I have known to be true 
5the r propositions which were evidence for them. 
If, for instance, I do know that the earth had ex-
isted for many years before I was born, I certainly 
only know thi:s because I have known other things in 
the past which ware evidence for it. And I cer-
tainly do not know exactly what the evidence was. 
Yet all this seems to me to be no good reason for 
doubting that I do know it. We are all, I think, . 
in this strange position that we do know many things, 
\oJith regard to which we know further that we must 
have had evidence f~r them, and yet we do not know 
how we know them,· i.e., we do not know what that 
-- ,, 
evidence was.'-
Thus 1-:Ioore admits that he can give no evidence to ex-
plain why we know ceri:.ain propositions to be true with cer-
tainty, or how we know them to be true; but asserts, merely, 
that we do know them. He says, with regard to the proposi-
tions "two hands exist at this moment," "how a~_ surd it would 
be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, 
and perhaps it was not the case~ You might as well suggest 
that I do not know that I am now standing up and talking--
that perhaps after all I'm not, and it's not quite certain 
that I am. 11 3 
1. CBP, 199. 
2. CBP, 198. 
3. Moore, nProof of an External World," Proc. Brit. Acad., 
XXY, 299-300. 
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4. Are Common Sense Propositions Known . to be true? 
Moore's position, therefore, contradicts th at of other 
philosophers who wo uld assert that we cannot claim to know 
anything unless we ca n explain how we kn~w it, and can con-
clusively demonstrate the evidence on which our knowing is 
based. Such philosophers when asked how they know the ex-
istence of a physical object--say their finger--would reply 
somewhat as follows. 
When I hold my finger in front of my eyes under 
standard conditions (of lighting and vision) and 
with my eyes open, I have a direct or immediate 
experie nce of wha t seems to be a finger. This 
direct sensory experience, plus innumerable others, 
such as wiggling wha t appears to be the finger and 
getting certain wiggly kinaesthetic sensations, 
touching this seeming finger with my other hand 
and getting a bal~nging to me kind of fin ger sen-
sation, turning the finger around and seeing what 
seems to be a finger on all sides, etc., leads 
me to believe that what seems to be finger really 
is a finger. 
Philosophers who would describe their knowledge of their 
finger in this way would admit that after such verifying sans-
ory experiences they would know _with regard to what seems to 
be a finger that it is a finger, or t hat .with regard to~-
pearances that they are finger-like appearances. Yet, in 
spite of this verification, they would deny that one can 
know with certainty that what he seas and feels is a real or 
physical finger, s1nc<3 what is meant by a real or physical 
finger implies an infinite series of verifying expe riences, 
and by definition an infinite series cannot be completed. 
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Or, as Ayer states it, all propositions referring to physical 
objects, rather than to immediate experiences) 
are hypotheses which are c:mtinually subject to 
the test of further experience; and from this it 
would follow not merely that the truth of any such 
prop ositions never was conclusively established but 
that it never coul d be; for however strong the ev-
idence in its favor, there could never be a point 
at whi ch it was im~ossible for further experience 
to g o ,--_against it.J. 
For instance, wha.t I mean by a r eal finger is also that 
if I were to prick it hard e nough it would bleed, that if I 
tore the skin away I would see tendons, muscles, fatty tis-
sue, bones, etc. No doubt if I investigated as thoroughly 
as this I should be strongly convinced that I was looking at 
a r eal finger. And yet, philosophers such as Ayer and Lewis 
2 
would say that although one could be certain that he was 
seeing a r eal finger, he never could be " quite certain" (to 
use a subtle linguistic distinction of Moore's), because the 
object is alaays open to further verification and we ca n nev-
er be "quite certain" that further experience will n ot dis-
confirm what had been previously verified. 
On- this view, then, to know the truth of the assertion 
"this is my finger, 11 I would have to know, and verify, every 
possible assertion that could be made about my fin ger. But 
Moore, as one would e xpect, denies this. If ''~ e understand 
1. Ayer, Language, Truth, an d Logic, 2nd ed., 9-10. Also 
Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, chp. VIII. 
2. This is not to imply that Lewis and Ayer 1 s positi-:m are 
identical, for they are not. But they ag ree in holding that 
propositions expressing empirical fac t s a re not known to be 
true with certainty, a s they a re ordinarily expres s ed. 
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the connotative and denotative meaning of 11 l{now," "this," 
"my," "finger," then it is correct to say, in the situation 
in which the pre sen C €l of one' 8 finger is obvious, 11 this is a 
finger". Correct usage of language does not require that 
the complete connotative meaning of a term be exemplified 
in any one perceptual situation before one can say 11 I know 
such-and-such exists". To require this is to prescribe an 
arbitrary limitati:m to the meaning and use of "know". Al-
though Moore does not ar~ue in this way, I think this is 
what is implied in the following quotation. 
This, after all, you know, really is a finger; 
there is no doubt about it: I know it, and you 
know it. And I think we may safely challenge 
any philosopher to bring forward any argument 
in· favour either of the proposition that we do 
qot know it, or of the proposition that it is 
not true, which does not at some point, rest 
upon some premise which is, beyond comparison, 
less certain than is the proposition which it 
is designed to attack.l 
5. Are Common Sense Propositions True? 
Beside the philo1sophers who would question Moore's 
claim to know common sense propositions to be true with 
certainty, there are philosophers who would appear to ques-
tion the actual truth of such propositions. For instance, 
Materialists and Idealists have asserted such stateme nts 
as "matter is not real," "minds are not real,""space is not 
1. Moore, "Some Judgm€mts of Perception," in Philosophical 
Studies, 228. 
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real, 11 11 t ima is not real," which would seem to imply a dan ial 
of the propositions implied by Moore's lists of truisms. When 
Moore says that 11 his body has existed upon the earth for many 
years," this proposition implies the existence of at least 
two physiaal objects, namely his body a nd the earth. And 
when he says that 11 he is standing a certain di s t ance from 
the book case," and that "he has stood in that · 90sition be-
fore," t his a 3ain implies the reality of space and time, .2£.2.-
vided one uses the terms "physical object," "space," and 
"time" in such a way that to deny that there are such en-
tities is to deny ths kinds tif experiences described. But 
these are the only uses of the terms which have any clear, 
unambiguous meaning, according to Moore. 
Some of the propositions in (1) ••• are proposi-
tions which cannot be true, unless some mater-
ial things have existed and have stood in spa-
tial relati6n to one another: that is to say, 
they are propositions which, in a certain sense 
imply the reality of material things, and the 
reality of Space.I 
Moore then g oes on to g ive examples: . 
E.g. the proposition that my body has existed 
f or · many years past, a nd has, at eyery moment 
during that t i me been either in contact with or 
not far from the earth, is a proposition which 
implies ••• the reality of material t h ings (pro-
vided you use "material thing s" in such a sense 
that to deny the reality of material t h ings im-
plies that no proposition which asserts that 
human bodies have existed, or that the earth 
has existed, ts wholly true) ••• 2 
The point Moore ts making is this, I think. Statements 
1. CBPi 200 . 
2. CBP, 2~~ -202. 
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such as "the chair is in front of t"tle desku imply the reality 
of physical objects and space. By the phrase "imply the re-
ality of, 11 Moore means that the term "physical object" applies 
to such experienced objects as chairs and desks, and that 
"being in front of'' is what we mean by a "spatial relation". 
Thus when one says anything about desks and chairs he is im-
plying that physical objects exist, because the attributes 
of a physical object are the attributes of chairs and desks. 
Whenever one can say 11 this is a chair" one can also say "this 
is a physical object". 
Therefore, when another philosopher says that "matter 
is not real," or "spa ce is not real, 11 he would Seem to be im-
plying that such statements as "the chair is in front of the 
desk" are false, sine<~ this statement as commonly interpret-
ed implies the existence of physical objects and space as 
commonly experienced. But it seems to me that this is not 
altogether true.. Such philosophers would not Eieny the truth 
of such statements as "the desk is in front of the table," 
but they would deny that such statements imply the existence 
of physical objects, §l.Ccording to the usual meaning of"phys-
ical ob.1ect". That is, they would retain the ordinary usage 
of certain terms whil~~ at the same time attributing to the 
terms a different meaning and giving to the objects that 
these terms denote a different interpretation (for example , 
an idealist mi ght say that "a 1 chair' is a 'society of mon <,... ~ ,:: ' 
ads' 11 ). · But Moore ob ,)e cts to this be cause the meanings of 
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terms imply a certain structure of experience, and if one re-
tains the use of common terms while at the same time denying 
to experience its usual structure, then he is asserting that 
experience both does and does not have a certain structure. 
It has the structure we experience it as having, and it has 
the structure asserted by the philosopher. This, as Moore 
will subsequently point out, leads to contradiction. 
Thus far, then, Moore claims with certainty a prior an-
alytic knowledge of the truth of the first class of proposi-
tiona. Other philosophers disagree with Moore in two re-
spects: (1) they either seam to deny by implicatton the 
truth of the propositions he claims to know with certainty; 
or (2), they assert that we cannot know the truth of such 
propositions with certainty. One difference is with regard 
to the truth of the pr opositions themselves, and the other 
is 1<1ith rega rd to the claim to know the truth of such prop-
ositions. A philosopher could hold either of these positions 
independently, although there would be little sense in hold-
ing the first if one denied the second. 
Passing now from the propositions asserted in the first 
class, to those listed in the second, What reasons does Moore 
give for knowing their truth? 
6. Propositi':>ns Other People Know to be True. 
There are two arguments which Moore offer s in support of 
the truth of the second class of propositions. (This class, 
18. 
isted, a nd therefore none can ever ha ve held with regard to 
any such cl ass, tha t no proposition belong ing to it is true." 1 
Stated more explicitly, since propositions of the second class 
state that many of u s huma n beings (defined as having bodies, 
living on the ea rth, having consci c ~ s expe riences, etc.) have 
known with rega rd to their body, a nd their experiences, what 
Moore claims he knows with regard to hisbody and his exper-
iences, a denial of this, according to Moore, places the de-
nier in the peculiar pos i tion of havin g to assert that !@. hu-
man beings (as defined above) do not know that other human 
beings have frequently known with regard to their bodies that 
they exist, walk on the earth, etc. In short, to deny the 
second class of propositions, the denier has to assume knowl-
edge of a kind that ha has been denying. 
When he [the philosopher] says "No huma n bein g 
has ever lmtiwn of the existence of other human 
beings, 11 he i1~ say ing : "There ha ve been many other 
hu man being s be side :..ayself, and none of t hem (in-
clud ing my self) has, 3Ve r known of t h-3 existence of 
It 2 other huma n ba in gs . • 
Now Mo:>re is not as s e r-ting that t h is v1 awi i s so ri d ic-
ulous that other phil t:>sophers could not have held it. On the 
contrary, he is pointlng out that it is a view which philos-
ophers commonly do hold, and the extraordina ry thing is that 
they are not aware of the inconsistency. Thus in denying 
the truth of proposit:L:>ns of the second class, Moore asserts 
that philos ophers have 
1. CBF, 207. 
2. CBP, 205. 
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remember, consisted of those propositions which other people 
claim to know to be true about the external world and their 
experiences, corresponding to the propositions in the first 
class \vhose t r uth Moore claims to l{n ow vJi th certainty.) 
The firs t argument consists in emphatically asserting, 
as he did of the propositions of the first class, that he 
does know that bwe", meaning most people, do know the prop-
ositions he knows. H·9 says "that I do kn01-1 that there is a 
"we," that is to say, that many other human beings, with hu-
man bodies, have l i ved. upon the earth, it seems to me that I 
1 do lm O\-.J for certain. 11 
But he offers an additional argument to support the 
truth-claim of the propositions of the second class :. The sec-
ond class of propositions are of such a nature that i f none 
of them were true, then no human being ever could have exist-
ed. For if it is not true that any human being knew with re-
gard to himself that he has a body, h~s existed upon the earth, 
has had certain kinds of experiences, etc., then it is not 
true tha t there ever has been a human being. For, if none of 
the propositions are true which one asserts with regard to 
his ordinary experiences, then it could not be true that he 
existed--at least in any intelligible sense. 
Thus the peculiar consequence of this argument is that 
if any philosopher denies any of the propositions in the sec-
ond class, he is denying that any "philosopher has ever ex-
1. CBP, 206. 
been holding views inconsistent with propositions 
which they themselves knew to be true; and it was, 
therefore, only to be expected that they should 
sometimes betray their knowledge of such propo-
sitions [as when they asserted that 11~ do not 
know that other people exist"]. The strange 
thing is that philosophers should have been able 
to hold sincerely, as part of their philosophical 
creed, propositions inconsistent with what they 
themselves kn~ to be true; a nd yet, so far as . I 
can make out, t h is has really frequently happen-
ed.l 
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Therefore the difference, MoJre concludes, between his posi-
tion a nd tha t of many other philosophers is not that he be-
lieves anything which they do not believe, but rather that 
he does not hold the inconsistencies which they do. 
7 •. The C ommo10 Sense View of the \v orld. 
This reveals more clearly, I think, the peculiar nature 
of Moore's argument. He began the "Defence" by listing a 
set of truisms wmich he knew for certain. Then he added that 
he knew tha t other people also know about themselves and their 
expe riences the list of t r uisms wh ich he knew, wh ich included 
also knowing certain fa cts about other people. In other 
words, he not ()Dly know s for certain fundamental truisms 
about the world and himself, but he also knows that other 
people know this too, a nd like himself, know it for certain • 
. And the peculiar conS"@1_Uence of t h is view, once a gain, now 
comes to light. Gran t ed the truth of what Moore knows, whick 
includes what most hu man beings know, then no philosopher can 
1. CBP, 205. 
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disagree with Mo ore without necessarily involving himsalf in. 
inconsistencies, providing the sense of the propositions men-
tioned remain)the sam~. This is the decisive point in Moore's 
argument. The philosopher cannot help involving himself in 
inconsistencies because he has to exprass what he thinks in 
language , a nd wha t Moore has tried to show is that ordinary 
common sease assertions about the world, used and understood 
in their usual sense, have a fundamental place in the uni-
verse of discourse. 
That is, Moore's position is that the common use of lang-
uage , the use he has been defending, does not involve one in 
inconsistencies beca use it denotes common experiences. Lang-
uage has a consistent use when expressing ordinary facts 
(otherwise it would cease to be used). But as soon as one 
reinterprets the factB while retaining the ordinary use of 
lan guage, then one finds himself in the k inds of incon sist-
encies pointed out by Moore; i.e., inconsistencies between 
philosophical pro positions and propositions referring to or-
dinary experience. Like any other discipline, if you follow 
the laws pertaining to and regulating intelligent involve-
ment in that discipline, then there i s no difficulty. But 
if you do not, t hen anyth ing can happen. In this case, when 
the rules of standard lin guistic usage and meaning are vio-
lated, the resultant malady is verbal inconsistency or the 
expression of lin guistic nonsense--neuroses in the realm of 
linguistics. Thus \vhen a philosopher says that "no one knows 
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that othar people exi. s t," the misuse of language can be ax-
posed in Moo r e's translation that what ha really is saying 
is that 11 there are many human beings and none of them, in-
cluding himself, know · that thare are. 11 And when a person 
says that "no physical objects exist," the paradoxical na-
ture of the expression is axposed t;y pointing out that this 
in connection with his other beliefs is inconsistent. 
The name that Moore gives to h is position is 11 the Com-
mon Sense Viaw of the World," and what he is maintaining is 
that 11 the Common Sanse View of the Vlorld~' is wholly trua, in 
1 
certain fundamental feabures. And if other philosophers 
deny these fundamental features, then they are raally deny-
ing what they also know, a nd this contradiction is revaalad 
in linguistic inconsistencies. Moora says, 
The features in question (namely, propositions 
of any of tha classes defined in defining (2)) 
are all of th.:Jm features, which have this pec-
uliar property--namely, that if we know that 
they are features ir:i the 11 Common Sense view of 
the \-.Jorld, 11 it follows that thay are true; · since 
to say that ~1 know this, is to say that they 
are true. Avnd many of them also have the fur-
ther peculiar property that, if they are fea -
tures in the Common Sense view of the world ( 
(whether 11 we 11 know this or not), it follows that 
they are true, since to say that there is a 
11 Common 8enseview of the world," is to say that · 
they are true .2 
Unfortunately, t his quotation is not altogether clear. 
What I think Moore's argument comes to is this. Everyone 
would agree, even ph iloso phers, that Moore's two classes 
1. CBP, 207. 
2. CBP, 207 ~ 
of propositi~ns are true in some sense, at least. That is,. 
the common utility of language cannot be completely denied. 
But such philosophers would deny that the structure of ex-
perience, or kinds of objects denoted by common terms cor-
responds to what we ordinarily mean by the terms. That is, 
Idealists do not deny that cha irs and mountains exist, but 
they do deny that chairs and mountains are the kinds of 
things implied by the terms used to denote them. Likewise, 
~~terialists do not deny that people think, feel, remember, 
etc., but they would deny that their experience corresponds 
to the ordinary meaning of ''think," "feel," and "remember". 
But Moore's point is that the only unambiguous and con-
sistent use of terms :such as "chair," "table,'' "feelings," 
"memory," and "know" are the common sense meaning s. Thus 
confusion and even contradiction results from using common 
terms with a different concepti~n of the state of affairs 
denoted by the terms. Tha t is, i t is contradictory to hold 
both that the statement "my moth~r,-in-law is cra bby 11 is 
true, and that the statement "I kn ow other people exist" is 
false. It is contradictory because part of the meaning of 
11 know" involves or implies recognizing the truth of such 
propositions. This, in ordinary lan guage, is what "know" 
means. 
I believe Ivloore defines a "common sense view of the 
world" beeause he wa nts to say tha t the structure and mean-
ing of language reflects the structure and nature of the ob-
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jects of experience. Thus, if one acknowledges a "common 
sense view of the world, 11 namely, the world of ordinary ex-
perience, then he implies that he also knows that ordinary 
propositions denoting common experience and objects must be 
true, since their truth is based on just such data. Moore's 
quotation is ambiguous because we do not have an independent 
knowledge of the world, and also possess a language which 
can eitha r be made to fit this world or not. Rather, our 
understanding of the world is based on our use of language 
(to a g reat extent at least), and the use of lan guage is 
based on experience. Thus Moore defines the common or per-
vasive features of the world in terms of the pro ~ositions 
listed in his first class, but he also s~ys that the recog-
nition of the comm ~n s ansa world also implies the truth of 
ordinary propositions as they are commonly uhdarstood. 
What Moore has attempted to do, tharefore, is delineate 
a common sensa viaw o:' the vlorld in such a way that the truth 
of common, ordinary prop ositions are necessarily or logic-
ally entailed by this view of the world. Or, stated nega-
tively, tha position he is maintaining is that since the re-
lation between ordinary propositions -and the common s ense 
view of the world is so tight, and since the truth of some 
propositions implies t he truth of others, anyone who denies 
the truth of an ordina ry proposition while still granting 
that there i s a common sanae view of the world usually finds 
himself embr6iled in contradictions. 
Thus Moore adds the final criteria in terms of which 
certain propositions can be judged true or false. Earlier 
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we stated that Moore's position is that we understand a prop-
osition ~ if we know that it is being used in its ordinary and 
familiar way, and when we do know this, we not only under-
stand the proposition, but we know its truth for certain. 
But this now must be qualified. We know the truth of the 
proposition in question for certain if we know it expresses 
some feature belonging to the common sense view of t he world. 
That is, we know for certain the truth of propositions if we 
know they denote fundamental features of the common sense 
world. For to say there are such fundamental features is to 
say that propositions of that kind are true. Those who at-
tempt to deny this become involved in inconsistencies. 
8. Summary and Conclusion. 
As one looks back, the argument seems so simple: an af-
firmation that the propositions which nearly everyone would 
admit are true, are true--certainly true; and true as the~ are, 
not requiring translation into more basic propositions refer-
ring to immediate sensory experience. An affirmation that we 
know such propositions to be true in the ordinary sense of 
11 know 11 • An affirmation, finally, that no other knowledge, 
scientific or philosophical, rests on evidence more secure 
than the evidence on which these common pro positions rest. 
For such propositions rest on the fundamental features 
of the world, and their truth is merely dependent upon ex-
perience continuing as it has. 
Phil~sophers have tried to escape this view of t he world 
by reinterpreting certain of its ba sic features. They could 
not coin a whole new language so t hey change the meanin gs of 
certain terms to conform to their theoretical interpretations. 
But in most of their life, the ir beliefs, attitudes, and ac-
tions crowd out their theoretical convictions. They have to 
come back to the world to live and when they do they must 
come to terms with it; that is, they must think and speak the 
lan guage of the world. For all the magnificence of the under-
taking, who but a Whitehead could live in the world of 11 Proc-
ess and Reality?" A few disciples follow behind, write trav-
elogues in the fomm of commentaries, but how many are tempted 
to follow? 
Moore accuses philoso phers of holdin g views inconsistent 
with propositions they know to be true. An example of such 
a philosopher is one who would admit that he was married and 
yet deny that he knew tha~ other people exist; or, one wh o 
would not deny that there was a furnace in the cella r, but 
who would de ny that physica l ob j acts exist unperc a ived; or, 
one who would deny tha t physical objects exist, but not deny 
that he was wearing shoes. 
Of course, the uBual answer is that such a philosopher 
means by 11 shoes, 11 and 11 know, 11 and "physical object" some-
t h ing different. But what is this something else that he 
can mean whi ch, Moore would a sk, does not r es t on pr esupposi-
tions lass certain than the ordinary meanin g? Evan !-ioora is 
a ware that the assertion that philosophers hold views they 
know to be false is too simple an answer. In the "Reply" 
he says, 
Perhao s the ma j ority of philosophe rs who have 
sa id 1':Ma.tter does not exist" have not meant this 
[i.e., have not meant to deny the truth of state-
ments referring to physica l objects]. I don't 
know. Pe rhaps the truth is that mos t haya con-
fused several different meanings with one an-
other, a nd ha ve pa s s ed from asserting it in, one 
sense to asserting it in another, without no-
ticing tha t it wa s different things they were 
asserting.l 
This passage, I think, comas much closer to the truth than 
Moore's earlier assertion that philosophers hold views in-
consistent with wha t they know to be true. 
In conclus ion, then, Moore has asserted that lan guage 
expresses or de notes t he fundame ntal features of experience. 
And since the mea n ing s of terms are so interrelated and i n -
terde pe ndant--the meanings of soma penet r ating the mea nin gs 
of others--one cannot chan ge the mean i ngs of certain terms 
with out i mplying the falsit y of othe r t e rms which he or dinar-
ily holds to be true. Therein lies the inconsis tency. Con-
sistency ma y be a "hobgoblin of little minds," but it ha s 
proved more tha n a mischievous spirit to better minds. And, 
as we shall find in the next chapter, the one ex cursion Moore 
makes beyond the world of common sense leads h im to the vary 
1. Moore's "A Reply to My Critics," in The Philosophy of G.E. 
Moore, ad. ;Taul A. Sch ilpp, 670. 
type of inc~nsistency he notes in others. 
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CHAPTER II 
MOORE'S ANALYSIS OF COJ.vliviON SENSE PROPOSITIONS 
1. Introduction. 
The first part of Moore 1 s "Defence" was characterized 
by a positive, confident assartion of what Moore knew to be 
true for certain. The latter section, in contrast, is admit-
tedly inconclusive. And this sharp divergence between what 
Moore asserts be knows to be true and what he admits he doubts 
is what would be expected in a position defendin g common sense. 
For it is characteristic of the ordinary person t hat he is con-
£ident that he knows many things, without being able to show 
just how he knows this. And it is precisely with regard to 
this latter point that Moore is modest. In this respect he 
believes he differs from many philosophers who are quite du-
bious about wha t they know, while being very confident with 
regard to the analysis or justification of what they know. 1 
Moore's certainty, we have found, extends to the truth 
of such propositions as 11 The earth has existed for many years 
past, 1111 Many human bodies have each lived for many years upon 
it,'' etc.; e. g ., propositions vlhich assert the existence of 
physical objects. But. he is "very sceptical as to what, in 
certain respects, the correct analysis of such propositions 
i u2 s. And he asserts that "the whole question as to the 
1. Cf. Contemnorary British Ph ilosoohy, 2nd series, ed. J.H. 
Mui rhead, 216. (All followin~ references to this work will 
be ab1brevia ted "CBP" • ) _, 
2. CBE, 217. 
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nature of ma terial thi ngs obviously depends upon their [ i.e., 
the proposition's] ana lysis. 111 
2. Sedse-data as the Subjects of Propositions. 
If we know that physica l obj e cts exist--and Moore says 
we do know t h is--we kn ow t h is beca use we perceive such ob-
jects as human hands, pens, paper, etc. But even this knowl-
edge is not basic, acco r ding to Moore. He s ays, 
It seems to me quite evident that my knowledge 
that I am now perceiving a human ha nd is a deduc-
tion from a pair of propositions simpler still--
propositions wh ich I ca n only express in the 
form 11 I am oerceivin~ this" and "This is a hu-
man hand" .2· '"" -- --
Thus if we a re to ana lyze the proposition 11 Ma.ter-ial thing s 
exist," or if we are to tell what the "nature of material 
thing s 11 is, t hen vJe at least must be able to analyze cor-
rectly propositions such as 11 this is a hand," "that is the 
sun," and so forth. And Moore is surprised that philosophers 
who have concerned th emselves with such questions as to 
whether material ob jec t s ex ist, or such profound problems 
as to the na ture of physical objects, have g iven such little 
attention to "wha t pre cisely they suppose themselves to know 
•••• when they lm ow or judge such things as "This is a hand, 11 
"That is the sun," "This is a dog," etc. etc. etc."3 
It is precisely to t h is question, then, that Moore di-
rects his att antion in the l as t portion of his essay. In 
1. CBP, 217. 3. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
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answer to it, he says that only two things seem quite certain 
a b out the analysis of propositions such as "this is a hand". 
The first is that there is always some senBe-datum which is 
the ultimate subj e ct of the propositi on in question, and the 
second is t ha t we a r e never judg ing of the sense-datum itself 
tha t it is a human ha nd. 
Two thin gs only seem to me quite certain about 
the analysis of such propositions [as this is 
a hand] ••• na mely thaAt whenever I know, or judge, 
such a proposition t~ be true, {1) there is al-
ways some sense-datum about which the proposition 
in question is a proposition--some sense-datum 
which is a sub ject (and, in a certain sense, the 
principle or ultimate subject) of t he proposition 
in question, a nd (2) that, nevertheless, what I 
am knowing or judg ing to be true about this sense-
datu~ is not (in general) that it is itself a 
hand, or a dog , or the sun, etc. etc., as the 
case may be.l 
The reason Mo~re believes tha t the s anse-datum ca nnot be 
identified with the r eferent of the proposition (e.g., hand), 
is tha t the meaning of the referent is much greater than is 
exemplified in the form of the sense-datum. 
That wha t I kn ow, with regard to this sense-datum, 
when I know "this is a human ha nd, tt is not that it 
is itself a human ha nd, seems to me certain. because 
I know that my hand has many parts (e. g . its other 
side, and the bones inside it), which are quite cer-
tainly not parts of this sense-datum.2 
3. Directions for Picking Out Sense-data. 
Moore realizes, of course, that there are many philoso-
phers who d oubt that there a re any such entities as sense-
1. CBP, 217. 
2. CBP, 218. 
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data, or sensa. Therefore he g ives a description for "pick-
ing out" sense-data \'lhich he believes should leave no doubt 
as to the existence of the kinds of entities to which he is 
referring. Would that Moore's directions were as final as 
he believed. He says, in one of the most famous passages from 
his writings, 
there is no doubt at all that there are sense-
data, in the sensa in which I am now using that 
term. I am at present seeing a great number of 
them, and feeling others. And, in order to point 
out to the reader what sorts of things I mean by 
sensa-data, I need only ask him to look at his 
own right hand. If he does this he will be a ble 
to pick out something (and, unless he is seeing 
double, only one thing), with regard· to which he 
will sea that it is, at first sight, a natural 
view to take that that thing is identical, not, 
indeed, with his whole ri ght hand, but with that 
part of its surface \vhich he is actually seeing, 
but will also (on a little reflection) be able 
to s ee that it is doubtful whether it can be 
identical with the part of the surface of his 
hand in questi on. Things of the sort (in a car-
tairr respect) of which this thing is, which he 
seas in looking at his hand, and with regard to 
which he can understand how some philosophers 
should have supposed it to be the part of the 
surface of his hand which he is seeing, while 
others have supposed that it can't be, are what 
I mean by 11 sense-data".l 
Sense-data (of the visual type) are thus the kinds of 
things which, wh?n one looks at his hand, he naturally takas 
to be identical ~ 'rJ ith the surface of his hand, but which, 
after a little r eflection, he comes to dou bt can be iden-
tical with the surfa ce of his hand after all. There have 
been many objections to this description of 11 picking out" 
1. CBP, 218. 
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sense-data, however, 1 ? and in his "A Reply to My Critics"-
Moore g ives a clearer account of just what he means by 
sense-data, a.nd how they a re to be 11 p1cked out". 
First of all, he admits in reply to Mr. Bouwsma's crit-
icisms that he did no~ make it clear just how the operation 
of "picking out" sense-data could be perf ormed. From the di-
rections he gives one would suppose tha t when one looks at 
his hand he could 11 pick out" a sense-da.tum in the same way 
that one can pick out his fingers, or knpuckles, or the same 
way one could pick out a piece of transparent paper cut out 
in the shape of his hand and laid on the surface of h is hand, 
from the hand itself. But this woule imply that sense-data 
were kinds of things similar to objects such as flat pieces 
of paper. 
But Moore does not mean this. vfuat he meant to say is 
that whe~ he sees his hand in addition to seeing something 
else he can pick out, or more accurately distinguish, the 
surface of his hand from the background. He says, 
I ought to have made it clear that the operation 
of "picking out , 11 of which I spoke, could only be 
performed if he [the reader] were seeing something 
else besides his right hand ••• It would not be nec-
essary that he sh:>uld see anything el sa except, say, 
a black background, a gainst which he sees his hand. 
This would be enough to enable him to perform the 
operation; bt.1t at least as much as this would be 
necessary.3 
1. For the best cri ttcism see Bouwsma' s "Moore's Theory of 
Sense-Data," in The Philosophy of G.E. Iv!oore , ed. Paul Schilpp. 
2. In The Philosophy of G.E. Moore . (Henceforth, this article 
will be referred to as 11 Re ply 11 .) 
3. " Reply, 11 629. 
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Thus Moore meant by "picking out 11 distin guishing a specified 
obj e ct from some background. But clearly even t his explana-
tion is not en:>ugh. F'or one would still ask wha t one would 
have to know in add it i on to what has been said to distinguish 
the surface of his hand, from the hand itself. For one could 
distinguish the s urfaoe of h i s ha nd which he is seeing from 
othe r objects which he is also seeing with out it occurring 
to him tha t he was seeing a sense-datum--if he were. 
Therefore L"Ioore a dds further directi:ms. Imag ine that 
one places his hand a ga inst a background which e xtends beyond 
the range of vision. Then calling all of wha t ~he person 
se e s his 11 visual field," one can distinguish within his vis-
ual field two objects which he sees; i.e., a hand and the 
background. But, h ow does one further distinguish two sense-
data? 
To do this, I>ioore asserts, one must d ist ingu ish between 
two senses of tha word 11 see"; i.e., the sense of 11 see 11 , as 
when one sees a physical object, and the sens a of "directly 
see", as when :me sees an aft e r-image or a ha llucination. 
The e xamples Mo::>re g ives of the latter sense of 11 see 11 , namely 
11 directly see 11 , are of two types, as when one 11 sees 11 an 
after-image after lo ok in g at a bright object with his eyes 
closed, and as Macbeth is said to have 11 seen" a dagger in 
front of him. 1 Both the after-image and the dagger are "seen",. 
th:>ugh they are not physical objects. 
1. Of. 11 Reply, 11 629. 
34. 
The distinction Moore is makin g is that we should speak 
of 11 directly seeing" c·nt it ies such as 11 after-images, 11 11 hallu-
cinations," and 11 sense-data, 11 and that we should speak of 
"seeing" physical objects. He says, 
there are two different senses in which we all 
commonly use the word 11 see, 11 one in which we use 
it when we talk of seeing an opaque physical ob-
ject, such as our own right hand, and another in 
which we use it when we talk of seeing an after-
image, with closed eyes, and in v~hich Macbeth used 
it when he talked of seeing the object which he 
calls his "vision".l 
How, then, does this distinction apply to our example 
of the visual field or the hand against a background? When 
one sees his hand aga \ nst a background he should, on Moore's 
description, be able t o distin guish within this visual field 
four things; viz., the 9hys ical surface of the hand and the 
background which he is 11 seeing11 , and the two sense-data of 
the hand and of the background which he is 11 direc:tly seeing". 
Strictly s9eaking, however, I think Moore intends in his 
11 Reply 11 that we speak either of a "visual field 11 in which 
physical objects are 11 Seen 11 , or of a "direct visual field" 
2 in wh ich sense-data are 11 directly seen". Moore's descript-
icm of 11 picking out" sense-data in his 11 Defence 11 su ggests 
the discovery of an emp irical entity, but in his "Reply" he 
clearly g ives a stipulative definition of sense-data. 
I have, then, just said that I was assuming that 
whenever a person is seeing his hand as well as 
something else, he must be having a direct vis-
ual field which contains at least two objects. 
1. "Reply, 11 630. 
2. Cf. 11 Reply, 11 ai31. 
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And when I say must, I mean, of course, that it 
is not a mere empirical fact, learnt by observa-
tion, that whenever a person does the one he has 
the other: I mean tha t the propositional function 
"X is see in g a t least two ob j e cts" entails the 
propositional function 11 X has a direct visual field 
which contains at lea st two ob jects 11 or "X is see-
ing directly at least two objects." Onpe can say 
that tt is part of the very meaning of the asser~ 
ti~n that a person is seein g his own right ha nd as 
well as somethin g else tha t he has a direct visual 
field containing at least two obj e cts. This I was 
assumin g , a nd it se ems to me quite evidently true.l 
And Moore immedia tely continues, "But I ought to have expl ain-
ad tha t I was as s umin g it, and tha t when I said tha t the " . 
reader could "pic~ out 11 an ob ject answerin g to tha t lon g de s-
cription I gave, I mea nt that he could pick out such an ob-
ject from amon g the ob j e cts in his direct visual field." 2 
This latter quotation makes it clear tha t the "obj e ct 11 Moore 
is r eferrin g to is oot a physi cal ob j e ct, but a sense - datum. 
When one sees his hand a gainst a backgr ound he can piCk out 
two ob j e cts from his "direct visual fie : d" W!hich he is "di-
r e ctly seein g". These 11 directly seen 11 obj e cts are sense-
da ta. Thus the directions Moore g ives for "picking out" 
sense-data come to t h i.s. When one 11 sees 11 his hand against 
a ba ckground h e will be able to "pick out 11 a sense-datum of 
his ha nd wh ich he is "dire ctly see ing ," and which it will be 
natural to take a s identica l "\Aiith. the surface of the hand he 
"sees," but which, aft e r a little reflection, it will seem 
doubtful can be identi.cal with the surfa ce of his hand after 
1. "Reply," 631. 
~. Ibid. 
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all. This dascripti~n implies that Moore is, at the same 
time, both "seeing" the surface of his hand, and 11 dira ctly 
seeing" a sense-datum of his hand. 
I am now seein g part of the surface of my hand; 
and I do now n~t only feel sura but know, with 
regard to th i s object I am seeing which ~ part 
of the surface of my hand, that it is part of the 
surface of my hand. And also I do ~' at the 
vary same time, feel some doubt as to whether a 
certain · object, which I am directly seeing, is 
identical with the object which I am seeing which 
is part of the surface of my ha nd.l 
One must remember, however, that · the "d ira ctly sean" 
object, i.e., the sense-datum)is enta i led by definition. 
Moore says in a long but most important passage in his "Reply,'' 
that althou gh he was not aware of it at the time, his orig inal 
directions were such that he was trying to show 
not merely hov.1 I preposed to use the term 11 sense-
datum," and tha t there~ sense-data, if the term 
be used in that sensa, but also two quite different 
things as well, viz., ( 1) that the function "X is 
sa .e ing a phystcal objact 11 entails the function 11 X 
is seeing a sansa -datum11 (; "X is seeing soma ob-
ject directl~ " ), or, in other words, that the sensa 
in which we see 11 when we say that we sea a t h ing 
which is a physical object, is such that the see-
ing of a physica l obj e ct necessarily involves the 
sa a ing of a s ense-datum, and also (2) that there 
is soma reas on to think that, even when an opaque 
physical object which we are seein g is not being 
11 sean double 11 by us, no sensa-datum which we are 
seein g is aver identical with any physica l suf-
faca which we are seeing ; or, in other words, 
that though the seeing of a physical object nec-
essarily involves di rectly seeing so ma object, yet 
there are good (but not conclusive) r easons for 
thinking that no physical object and no physical 
surface is ever directly seen, and that therefore 
the seeing of a physical object necessarily in-
1. 11 Reply, 11 636. 
valves the direct s ee ing of an obj e ct whi ch is not 
a physical reality at all. I think I was trying 
(very unsuccessfully) to say something of this 
sort .1 
We a re now in a position to analy ze the propos ition we 
be gan with; viz; 11 I pe r ceive this, a.n d this i s a hand," and 
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three levels must be d istinguished in the analysis. The prop-
ositi::m "I perceive t h i s, and this is a hand" is analy r::'3..ble 
into the proposition 11 I perceive this, a nd this is a pa rt of 
the surfa ce of a hand, 11 which in turn is analyzable into 11 I 
perceive this, an d thi s is a s ense-datum" (which may or may 
not be identical with the surfa ce of the hand). 
pending to the thra e l evels of analysis of the ~ proposi-
tion "I perceive this, and this is a hand, 11 three diffe r ent 
senses of the terms 11 th is" and 11 per·ce i ve" ca n be distin guish-
ed. We ca.n dist i nguish the 11 t h is 11 'in · "this is a hand, 11 from 
the "this" in "this is a pa rt of the s urface of a ha nd, 11 a nd 
that 11 this" from the "th is" in "this is a sense-datum;" and 
we can dist i nguish the sense of "perceiving" in "perceiving 
a hand, 11 from the sense in "perceiving the surface of a hand, 11 
a nd that sense from "perceiving a sense-datum". This is what 
Moore believes to be certain about the analysis of the prop-
osition "I perceive this, and this is a hand." 2 
Thus far, then, we have analyzed Moore 's directions for 
picking out sense-data, and we have also pointed out the 
three levels in the analysis of "this is a hand 11 • But two 
1. 11 Reply , 11 644-645 • 
2. Cf. CB P , 218-219. 
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questions remain: (1) What is involved in the "reflection" 
which leads one to doubt that the ob ject which he 11 diractly 
sees 11 in seeing the surfa ce of his hand, can be identical 
with tha surface of the hand saen? and (2) What is t he re-
lati~n of the "directly seen" object (i.e., the sense-datum) 
to t he surface seen? 
4. Delusive Parce pti~n the Basis of Reflecti on. 
To beg in with the first question, Mo~re does not dis-
cuss this qu esti~n dtrectly in his "Defence, 11 but one can 
easily infer from his writings wha t is involved in this kind 
of reflection. The reflection Moore refers to is the same 
k ind of reflect i on which led to the orig ination of the con-
cept of sense-datum, and involves such data as ballucination)
1 
illusions, and delusive percept i ~n in general. In his "De-
fence," he gives two examples of such data, and in his ar-
ticle "Some Judgments of Percept1on, 11 he g ives another. 
The pr inciple in the example in tbe 11 Dafence 11 is the same. 
Suppose one were lookin g at an object first with the naked 
eye and than throu gh a microscope; or, suppose one were see-
ing an object singly on one occasion, and then seein g the 
same ob j e ct double on another occasion. If the data one saw 
on all four occasions were identical with the surface of the 
object, then i t would be difficult to account for t he dif-
ferences in wha t is seen. How could one sae two surfaces 
of the same surface of one ~·. obj ect, and both be identical with · 
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that surface? Or, if one directly sees with his na ed eye 
and under a microscope the same surface of t he phys ~ cal ob-
ject, how ca n there be such a dif f erence in what one s ees? 
Now I do not wish to imply that either Moore or I believe 
these arguments are conclu s ive, but they do c~nstitute ex-
a mples of the kind of refl e ction which leads one to mak e a 
distincti::m betwe .en wha t he 11 directly sees," and t he sur-
f ace of the physical obj e ct "seen". 
The examples Moore g ives in "Some Judgments of Percept-
ion" is of this kind. Suppose I look at my fin ger at dif-
ferent arms lengths. When I look at my fin ger when it is 
ri ght in front of my nose I see a l a r ge blurred obj e ct, but 
when I see my finger at arms length the object appears more 
distinct but much smallar. Both of these objects differ from 
the one I see when my fin ger is held approximately ten inches 
in front of me. Now I certainly believe (and could verify 
by instruments and oth e r people's perceptions) that the fin-
gar remains the sa me e·ITen thou gh the object which I see in 
the three cases differs. But how can threa different t h in gs 
be identical with one and t he sa me thing? If the seen ob-
jects a re three different sizes, how can they all be identi-
cal with an object which r emains t he same size? Moore argues 
similarly with regard to his percept ion of an inksta nd. He 
says, in reference to the surface of an inksta nd, 
It seems ••• to be a bsolutely impossible that the 
surface seen at a later time sh ould be identical 
with the ob ject pre s ented then, a nd the surface 
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seen at the earlier identical with the object pre-
sented then, for the simple reasons that, whereas 
with regard to the later seen surface I am not pre-
pared to judge that it is in any way perceptibly 
different from that seen earlier, it seems that 
with regard to the later sense-datum I cannot fail 
to judge that it is perceptibly different.l 
And Moore concludes, 
That is the argument, as well as I can pu t it, for 
saying that this presented object, is not identical 
with this part of the surface of this inkstand; and 
that, therefore, whe n I judge "This is part of the 
surface of an inkstand," I am not judging of this 
presented object, which -nevertheless is the ulti-
mate subject of my judgment, that it is part of 
the surface of an inkstand. And this argumant does 
seem to rna to be a very powerful ona.2 
5. The Relation of Sense-data to Physical Surfaces. 
This brings us, then, to our third and last question, 
the relation of sensa-data to physical surfaces. But before 
turning to this que stlJn two related things should be sa id of 
Moore 's discussion so far. First, although the discussion 
has bean exclusively ab out visual sensa-data, Moore holds 
the same theory with regard to other types of sense-data,, and 
offers examples in his "Reply 11 to show this) And secondly, 
it should be clear now that Moore' s definition of sensa-data 
is such that whenever one looks, feels, tastes, touches, 
smells, or in any way perceives, it is logically necessary 
1. "Some Judgments of Pc;rception 11 in Philosophical Studies, 
244. 
2. Ibid. Moore says t ha t this conclusion rests on the as-
sumption that sense-data must have only the qualities they 
appear to have. He then suggests that the conclusion may be 
avoided by holding that sense-data may appaar to, or seem to 
have qualities which they do not have. 
3. Cf. "Reply," 640-645. 
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that he be directly apprehending some sense-datum. 
And now to the third and last question: How, or in what 
way, are sense-data related to physical surfaces? And it is 
with respect to this question that Iv!oore says that "no phi-
1osopher has hitherto suggested an answer which comes any-
where near to being certainly true." 1 
Moore has been careful to define the term "sense-datum" 
"in such a way that it is an open question vJhether the sense-
datum which I now directly see in lookin g at my hand and 
which is a sense-datum of my hand is or is not identical 
'·Jith that part of its surface which I am now actually see-
2 ing." He then discusses what seems to him to be the only 
three alternativetypes of answer possible. 
The first type of answer is the mos t obvious one; i.e., 
that sense-data are identical with the surfaces of physical 
objects . On this view when one sees an object such as his 
h .9. nd he is not only "directly seeing" a sense-da t um of his 
hand, but he is also seeing the surface of his hand in such 
a way tha t the sense-datum is identical with the surface. 
There are two objections to this viaw, the second be-
in g more serious than the first, accord i ng to Moore~ Both 
objections previously have been discussed. The first re s t s 
on the difference between the sense-datum of an object di~ · 
rectly seen by the naked eye, and the sense-datum of an ob-
ject directly seen throu gh a microscope . Since both sense-
1. CBP, 219. 
2. CBP, 218. 
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data hava diffarant qualitias soma of which appear to ba in-
c~mpatible, it is hard to sea how both could ba idantical with 
tha sama surface. This difficulty would be avoidad, howaver, 
on the condition that sensa-data could appear to have qual-
ities they do not have, or could not have qualities they ap-
pear to have. But sinca sense-data are themselves introduc-
have 
ad because physical objects appaar to/qualities thay ara not 
ordinarily baliavad to have, this assumption with regard to 
sensa-data would lead one to talk about an appearance of a 
sense-datum, ad infinitum. 
The other objaction is the one involving double vision. 
\!'fhen seeing double we directly see two sense-data, "each of 
which is of the surface seen, and which cannot ther~fore both 
be identical with it; 9.nd that yet it seems ••• if any sanae-
datum is ever identical with the surface of \-Ihich it is a 
sense-datum, each of these so-called "images" mus t ba so. 111 
Accordingly, Moora concludes by saying 11 it -· l ooks, tharafora, 
as if every sense-datum is, after all, only "raprasentative" 
of the surface, of which it is a sense-datum." 2 
But if sansa-data are only "reprasentative" of tha sur-
faces of physical objects , what ralation have they to thair 
respective surfaces? The second type of answer is based on 
this quast ion. It ass.9rts that whenever we see a physical 
surface we actually are directly seeing a sensa-datum which 
is related to the surface in question, but is not itself a 
1. CBP, 220. 
2. Ibid. 
part of the surface. The only plausible interpretati~n of 
the relation, accordin g to Moore, is one which holds tha t it 
~'-' is an ultimate and unanalyzable relation, which might be ex-
pres sed by say ing that "xRy" means the same as 'y is an ap-
peara nce or manifestation of x." 1 
The ob jection to this view is that it is hard to see 
how we could speak of "seeing" the physical surfa ce, s inca 
"directly seen" sense-data are all we ever encounter. And 
it wo uld be difficult to establish that there was an ulti-
mate and unanalyzable relation of the k ind re qu ired. A" nd 
v 
thirdly, how could we k now anythin g very specific about the 
physical surface if we only know it throu gh the medium of 
a representative? 2 
The third type of answer is the only possible a lterna-
tive, accordin g to Moore, if the first two types are reject-
ed. It is the t ype of answer given by Mill when he said that 
material t hings are "permanent possibilities of sensation 11 • 
What Mill says we know \'l hen we know "this is a hand" is a 
11 whole set of hypothet i cal facts each of wh ich is a fact of 
the form "If these conditi:ms had been fulfilled, I should 
have been perceivin g a sense-datum intrinsica lly rela t ed to 
this s en se-da tum in this aay;," "If these (other) co nd itions 
had been fulfilled, I should ha ve been pe rceiving a sen se -
da tum intrinsically rela ted to this sen se-datum in this 
(other) way," etc. etc." 3 And as with the other types of 
1. DBP ~ 221. 3 • CBP, 222. 
2. Cf. Ibid. 
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view, Mo ore says it i s just possible that it is true, but most 
assu r edly not that it is "certainly, or nearly certainly true ." 
The "very grave objections" he offers to this view are 
threefold. First, he says th9t it seems d oubtful whether the 
hypothetical conditions according to which I know "this is a 
hand," "are not themselves ccmditiDns of the form "If this 
and tha t material thin..g had been in these positions and condi-
tions ••• 111 The second. is that it seems doubtful wheth~r we 
possess a kpowledge of an intrinsic rela tion bet wee n sense-
data of a kind re quired by Mill's theory. And thirdly , if 
Mill's theory v1ere true, "the sense in which a material sur-
face is 11 round" or 11 square, 11 would necessarily be utterly 
different from that in which our sense-data sensibly appear 
to us to be ''round '' or 11 square." 2 
Unfortunately, Moore does not go into ' these viewf in 
greater detail. He is certain that the analysis of such 
s tatements as "this is a hand" finds a sease-da tum as the 
"ultimate" subject. And he is also certain that he "seas" 
h is hand as well as "directly seeingt1 a sense-datum, but when 
he t r ies to analyze the theories accounting for the relation 
between the sense-datum and the hand, he finds each theory 
.. has vary grave objections." 
1. CB P , 222. 
2 . Ibid. 
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6. Summary and Conclusion. 
It was found at t he conclusion of the first chapter 
that Moore was certain of the truth of ordinary propositions. 
In this chapter Moore is again certain of something, but doubt-
ful of much else. He is certain that whenever one judges a 
proposition such as "this is a hand" to be true, there is 
always some sense-datum which the proposition is about: or, 
which is the principle of· ultimate subject of the propositi"Jn. 
And he is also certain that what he knows to be true about 
the sense-datum is that it is not itself a hand. The sense-
datum is not itself a hand, because a hand has more qualities, 
properties, or attributes than a sense-datum has. 
After this initial suggestion as to what a sense-datum 
is, Moore gives directions for "picking out" sense-data. He 
maintains that when one looks at his ha nd he can pick out a 
sense ~datum which he is "directly seeing." And as he later 
said in his "Reply," he meant tha t one can distinguish from 
a broader background the impression or image of his hand from 
the rest of the background, as one can distinguish an object 
in a painting. At first it is natural to identify this im-
pressi"Jn or image of a hand with the surface of the hand. 
But a little "reflection" leads one to doubt that the 1m-
pression can be identieal with the surface of the hand after 
all. Thus the sense-datum is what one directly sees when he 
looks at his hand, and which may not be identical with the 
surfa ce of the hand. This sense-datum is similar to 
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after-images or hallucinatory data. 
Thus Moore provides both a stipulative and ostensive . 
definition of sense-data. He says that "the function 'X is 
seein g a physical obj e ct' entails the function •x- is seeing 
a sense-datum'." And as re gards his directions for picking 
out sense-data, he says : 
I could have said, for instance: "Stare at a lighted 
electric lamp for a little while, and then close 
your eyes: the . after-image which you will then see 
is a specimen of the sort of thing I mean by 'a 
sense-datum' .1 . 
Moore's concluding position is that he is certain that 
there are such th1ngs as sense-data which are the subjects 
at 
of physical object statements, but he is not/all certain of 
the kind of relationship these sense-data have to physical 
objects. He seems strongly inclined to believe that sense-
data are never parts of the surfaces of physical objects, 
which would im ply that physical objects as s uch are never 
directly observed. And yet, since he knows the truth of 
ordinary physical object statements with certainty, it seems 
as if he ou ght also to know how sense-data are rela ted to 
physical surfa ces. 
This last statement, I believe, expresses the para-
doxical natur.3 of Moore 1 s position with respect to both sec-
tions of the 11 Defence 11 • In the first section he claimed to 
know with certainty the truth of common propJsitions refer-
1. 11 Raply, 11 644 . 
ring to physical objacts, as thasa propositions a re ordinarily 
undarstood. He was ce rtain about this. ..... In tha last pa~rt of 
his 11 Dafance" he is also certain that such common propositions 
as "this is a hand" ara about some san sa-datum ( L-9., "thara 
is alway s soma sensa-datum a b out which tha propositi~n in 
qu es tion is a proposition") . Now the quastion arisas , How 
can Moore be cartain both that a proposition such as "this is 
a hand" is true, understood in its "ordinary and popular 
meaning" , and tha t the proposition is about a sense-datum? In. 
the first part 'Jf his "Defence" he said ha k naw the truth of 
such common· propositions when understood in their ordinary 
meaning. But is the ordinary maaning of "this is a hand 11 that 
a sensa-datum is 11 the principle or ultimate subject" of the 
proposition? or that the proposition is "about" a sense-datum? 
In other words, if Moora is certain that the analysis of com-
mon proposit i ons referring to physical objects reveals an 
unnoticed but ultimate subj e ct which in turn ch~n ges the re~­
erence of the proposition (i.e., to a sense-dat um instead of 
a physical object), is he still justifiad in say in g that he 
knows such propositions to be true with certainty understood 
in t heir popular or ordinary sense? 
It would seem to me that tha latter sec t ion of the 11 IDe-
fence" completely contradicts the earlier section. In the 
earlier section Moore wa s quite explicit in saying that ha 
knew tha truth of ordina ry propositions with certainty. And 
an assantial part of his thasis was that the meaning and 
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reference of the ordinary proposition is the usual one. This 
was so true that a. "common sense view of the world" implied 
the truth of these propositions. He criticized other philos-
ophers for retaining the ordinary use of propositions while 
changing their meaning or the nature of their referent. But 
now he has done both of these things. Certainly the common 
sense view of the world does not imply the existence of sense-
data. 
One does not ordinarily mean by "this is a. hand, 11 that 
the "this" denotes a sense-datum. The "this," denotes a 
hand; a. recognized hand. And Moore's distinction between 
11 see 11 and "directly see" does not help his case either. Cer-
tainly the usage of ordinary English does not sanction a 
distinction between "see 11 and "directly sea" in reference to 
designating the existence of perceived physical objects. If 
Moore bases his defence on the ordinary meaning of proposi-
tions, he cannot also say that the statement "this is a hand" 
entails 11 directly seeing11 a sense-datum. He says "one can 
say that it is part of the very meaning of the assertion that 
a person is seeing his own right hand as wall as something 
else that he has a direct visual field containing at least 
two objects [viz., two sense-data]. "1 But this is not part 
of the ordinary meaning of "this is a. hand". On "the ordi-
nary and popular meanin g" of "this is a hand," the 11 this" is 
understood to 4enote a physical hand, whether one sees all 
1. "Reply," 3· (Previously quoted on page 35.) 
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of the hand or not. 
It is interesting that Moore criticizes other philoso-
phers who said that we do not know physical object proposi-
tions for certain until we reduce them to basic propositions, 
or propositions referring to sense-data. Moore argues that 
physical objact propositions do not denote physical objects 
as such, because all of the characteristics of the .object 
(inside, underside, etc.) are not revealed in a single per-
ceptual situation. But this is the very reason why philoso-
phers such as Ayer and Lewis would not say that physical ob-
ject statements are known to be true with certainty; viz., 
because such propositions imply an innumerable number of 
characteristics which are never verified in a single per-
ceptual situation. Moore wants to hold both that ordinary 
propositions understood in their usual sense are known to be 
true with certainty, and that such propositions do not refer 
to ordinal~ physical objects, but refer to sense-data which 
may not even be actual parts of the surface of physical ob-
jects. I..J:oore' s "Defence 11 was supposed to show that other 
philosophers contradicted themselves; but I do not see how 
a view could be more contradictory than this. 
Gardiner Murphy and Paul Markenke in their articles on 
Moore are also struck by this inconsistency. Murphy says, 
Moore seems to hold quite definitely that it is 
possible to "know for certain" that such a state-
ment as "this is my hand" is true v1i thout knowing 
the analysis of the proposition to which it re-
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fars ••• Yet when ha does analyze 11 this is my h~t nd 11 
ha says tha t ha is quite certain that it has f or 
a subject 11 and in a certain s ensa its principle 
or ultimate s1.1b je ct 11 a s ense datum, and his ques.;,. 
tion about the analysis of the proposition is 
stated as if it ware a qu sstion about what I am 
knowing to be true about this sense datum when-
~ I k now tha t "this is my hand 11 ••• I find this 
difficult to a ccept or reconcile with what want 
before. So far as I can see the proposition 
Moore kn ew an d could verify did not have a sense 
datum for its principal and ultimata subject at 
all .l 
And Mu rphy adds the obvious conclusion that 11 if we had to be 
knowing what only a corre ct epistemolog ical analysis, not 
yet satisfactorily performed , would disclose when we know 
that 11 this is a hand," there would thus be cons iderable 
ground for scepticism about common sense knowledge after all. 112 
And Marhenka also says, 
If MJore is correct in holdin g that we k now that 
there are physical objects, we can obviously know 
this only because wa see them. But I would have 
no evidence for the existence of a physical ob-
ject of a certain sort which is stron g enou gh to 
support the claim tha t I know that, e.~., this is 
a thumb, unless the sense-datum I 11 see' is identical 
with a part of the surface of this thumb . If the 
sensa-datum were merely representative of this 
thumb, I would not know that this is a thumb, 
though t h is be lief might than be true with some 
degree of probability, as some philosophers have 
held. Hence in knowing that this is a thumb, I 
likewise k now that this sense-datum is a spatial 
~:>art of this thumb , for the Dnly evidence I have 
for the "balif~ 11 that this is a thumb is that I 
see a spatial part of this object. I should there-
fore re gard the identity of sense-datum a nd phys-
ical surface as an immedia te conseque nce of I\~oore ' s 
view th3t -v;a :!fnDw propositions such as "This is a 
thumb" . · 
1. Mu rphy, 11 Moore 1 s 1Defence of Common Sense '", in The Phi-
los ophy of G.E. Mo ore, ed. P . Schilpp, 315-316. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Marhanke, "Moore 's Analysis of Sanse-Percepti:m", op. cit., 
278. 
It is clear that b oth Murphy and ~~rhanke stress the 
first pa rt of :Moore's "Defence" at t he expense of the l a tter 
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part. They say, in eff ect, we d'J know, as Moore says we do, 
the truth of such propositi:::ms as "this is a ha nd" with cer-
t a inty, a nd thus Mo)re 's analy s is of such propositions, which 
he also claimed is certain, is n 'Jt true. But it is just a s 
clea r that this is not the only a lterna tive. Phil'Jsophers 
such as Lewis and Ayer would accept the certainty of the an-
alysis (up to a point), and deny Moore's claim to know the 
truth of such proposit i ons with certainty. If one only i n-
directly apprehends an object, and therefore has indirect 
knowledge of it, one doe s not ordinarily cla im to know prop-
os iti on s ab out it with certainty. One is certain only of 
wha.t he directly apprehends. Thus kn Ol-v l edge of the ex is-
tence 'Jf mountains on the other side of the moon is only 
\Jl! probable, whereas kno~edge of the directly seen su rfa ce of 
the moon is considered relatively certain. Therefore, i f we 
only know physica l objects indirectly, as Moore suggests, he 
could not claim, on the basis of common sesse, to know prop-
ositions about them with certainty. Common linguistic usage 
W'Juld not support his claim. 
The point is tha t Moore cannot have it both ways. He 
cannot maintain that propositions referring to physical ob-
jects are true understood in their 'Jrdina ry meanin g , and also 
analyze these propositions in such a way that they do not de-
nota ordinary physica l objects, but denote s ensa-data. And : he 
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was not just referring to the connotative meaning of the prop-
osition when he said he knew them to be true for certain, be-
cause he said these propositions ware implied by a common 
sense view of the world. However, the existence of sense-
data is not implied by the common sense view of the world. 
Thus Moore's claim to k now with certainty the truth of 
propositions such as "this is a hand" should be dependent 
upon knowing whether what one "directly sees" is his hand 
or not. Furthermore, if Moore does claim to know the truth 
of such propositions with certainty, while also claiming cer-
tainty with regard to the analysis of the propositions, 
which changes in some sense the meaning and reference of the 
propositions, then the metaphysicians whom Moore claimed to 
refute, can also maintain the truth of propositions such as 
"this is a table, 11 while g iving an analysis of the natura 
of the table which is quite different from our common sense 
belief. Thus Moore iB caught in the very trap which he set 
for others. 
The next a nd last point I want to discuss in Moore's 
"Defence" is his dire ctions for "picking out" sense-da ta. He 
has said of sense-data that they are the "ultimate subjects" 
of basic propositions such as "this is a hand," that they are 
what we always apprehend in any sensory experience, that they 
are the k inds of things of which after-images are specimens, 
that they a re directly seen in the way in which illusory and 
hallucinatory da ta a re seen, tha t they are necessarily di-
rectly se en whenever a physi£al object is seen, a nd that 
there are g ood but not c Jnclusive reasons for thin k in g that 
they are at least in some ca ses not identical with physical 
surfaces, and thus not themselves physical. After all this, 
one would expect that the exi s tence in some sense of sense-
data was definitely established. And yet, I cannot bring 
myself to t he conviction that I really know that a sense-
datum exists--in the way, for example, , that I know I exist, 
or the way I know that this paper exists. 
I can identify a physical object, say a chair,and I can 
/'-
cause myself to see a n after-image by direc t ly look ing at 
v 
a bright light and immedia tely closin g my eyes. I know what 
it is to have a mental- ima ce of somethin g , but I do not really 
know what it is to ba seein g a sense- datum. ltlhan I look at 
my hand I do know that I am seein g my hand (because I under-
stand the meaning of the terms), but I cannot say that I can 
"pick out 11 a sense-datum ~Jhich I am "directly seeing". I 
can distinguish whB.t I see, namely my hand , from a background, 
but I cannot distin gu i sh a sense-datum fr~· .n the actual sur-
f a ce of my hand. The only thing I can 11 pick out 11 is the 
hand itself. And reflecting about delusive percepts while 
helpful to soma extent, yet is not convincin g either. There 
is a difference betwe en seeing my hand and seeing a mirror-
ima ge or hallucinatiJn which cannot be resolved by reducing 
see ing my hand to directly se e in g a sense-datum. 
Perhaps I am certain that what I see is a hand because 
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I also feel certain kinaesthetic sensat ions at the place 
whe re my band is. But whether this is true or not, "seeing 
my hand," implies whatever evidence is necessary or involved 
in convincin g me that what I sea is a hand. This is what 
the phrase denotes. If Mo.ora is going to defend common 
sense lan gua ge, then he mu s t admit that when I sea my hand, 
11 seeing my hand'\ is true, ' whether I am only se e in g the sur-
face, or even a part Df it. "Seeing my hand," does not 
imply "seeing all my hand at once;'' it mar2ly implies "see-
ing something which I can identify as my hand." There is no 
reason for supposing tha t because I do not sac all of my 
hand at once that I a m seeing something alJse which may not 
even be a physical obj e ct. 
The point is, MoDre talks as if one cou J.d "pick out" 
sense-data as one can pick out numbers in a bingo game. But 
obviously he means some thing different by "pick ing out" {and 
hare again his position is inconsistent with the first part 
of his "Defence") sanse-d3. ta, since one cannot just pick out 
sense-data as one can pick out a square piece of cardboard 
or a piece of chocolate . If the problem were as simple as 
all this one would no more doubt that there are sense-data 
than one doubts that there are pieces of cardboard or pieces 
of chocolate. 
I think th~ difficulty is that Moore has really failed to 
give "sense - -datum" a denotative meaning because it has none. 
When Moore says that one is always apprehendin g sense-da ta 
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he has obliterated any criteria in terms of which sense-
data can be distin guished. One··· cannot even conceive of an 
experience wh ich will e ither c onfirm or disconfirm the ex-
istence of sense-data. And Moore admits this himself in a 
reference to Bouwsma 's art icle. In connection with his 
criticism of Moore's directi~ns for picking out sense-data, 
B ouwsma had said , 11 once the doubt [as to whether we a re per-
ceiving a physical surface or a sense-datum] has arisen, 
there is nothing to do but to go on duubting. Scratching , 
smelling , looking more closely, do not give raliaf. 111 And 
' Moora)reply is extremely interesting: 
he [Bouwsma] points out that doubt as to whether 
a certain surface was cart of the surface of a 
glove or or a hand, could be sat at rest by such 
means as getting a nearer view of it, feeling it, 
etc., etc. whereas~ aoubt could not be set at 
rest by any such means. This is, of course, per-
fectly true: my doubt is a philosophical doubt, 
and , like other philosophical doubts, certainly 
cannot be set at rest by any empirical observa-
tions .2 
This is rather a startling and frank admission; i.e., that 
phi losophical doubts cannot be settled by any empirical ob-
servations. How, then, are they to be settled? Moore con-
tlnues, 
But ~rr. Bouwsrna goes on to say something \·Jhi ch 
seems to me to be utterly untjust if iable: he says 
that my doubt differs from the other one in that 
it cannot be resolved: that there is Q.Q. way of 
settling the question whether the directly seen 
1. B~uwsma, 11 Moore's Theory of Sense-Data," in The Philos-
oph~ of G.E. Moore, ed. Paul Schilpp, 207. 
2. Reply 11 , 637. 
object which I have picked out is or is not iden-
tical with that part of the surface of my hand 
which l am sa a ing.l . 
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Moore, on the other hand, thinks such doubts can be resolved: 
!, of course, do not know how this particular phi1-
osophic question is to be settled, just as I do not 
know, in the case of many other philosophic ques-
tions, how they can be settled. But that ways of 
settling this and other philo~ophical questions 
\-Jill not soma day be discovered, I certainly do 
not know; and Mr. Bouwsma certainly does not know 
it either. Thera is certainly something else to 
do besides goin g on doubting; and that is to g o on 
thinkin g about it.2 
So Moore admits that his doubt cannot be settled by 
any empirical observation . . To settle the doubt we must go 
on thinkin g about it. But in what way can further thinkin g 
settle this doubt? It is significant that experience (i.e., 
emp irical data such as illusions, dreams, hallucinations) 
g iv$ r ise to the problem of the distinction between two 
senses of ••see ,u and yet a the cry of sense-da ta prop osad with 
the intent, in some sen s e I should think, to take into ac-
count these empirical facts, is not itself empirical, or 
can be either verified or disconfirmed. This, I submit, is 
a very paradoxical situation and is, I think, at the basis of 
so much of the critic :. s1n and c::mfusion with regard to the 
whole problem of sensa-data. 
This difficulty ca n be pointed out in a further way. 
Moore 's description in the 11 Defence 11 for " p ickin g out" sense-
data and the relevance of the "reflection" comes to this. ir[hen 
1. 11 Reply, 11 637-638. 
2. Ibid., 638. (This argument seems to i ncorporate the fal-
lacy argumentum ad i,rJ:norantiam. 
·I 
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one s -8es his hand it 1.s natural for him to believa that the 
Jbject which he is diractly sae ing (which laavas open the 
question of wh~t it is he is really seeing) is a part of the 
I'.. surfa~ce of his hand, but which, after a littla reflection, 
appears doubtful can be ide ntical with the surfa ce of his 
hand aftar all. It is because of t h is "reflection" that :ma 
is lad to doubt, and then almost con ~lude, that tha objact 
he is saeing is not a physical surfaca but a sanse-datum. 
One can point out the significance and peculiarity of 
the role of this reflaction by showing its function in an-
other situation. Suppose one knew that a friend of his ware 
away from the city a.nd yet thought that ha saw him pass by 
on tha othe r side of tha street. As he saw the person on 
the other side of the streat it was natural, on tha basis of 
wha t ha saw, for him to baliave th~t that person was his 
friand, but refla " t ing (in this case remembarin g that he 
had just receivad ·" a teleg ram from his friand say'fung he would 
be away another we ak) caused him to doubt, and then concluda, 
that what ha saw could not be idantical with his friend after 
all. And if ha went ovar to tha other parson he could con-
firm whethar it was his friend or not. In othar words , there 
was a way in which the reflaction leading to the d oubt could 
ba sattlad. His judg·nant v1as with ragard to tha idantity of 
two objects, which could ba datarminad by furthar obsarvation. 
In a similar mannar, one could datermine whathar what ona saw 
was a mirror-image or a real physical objact. But whan ona 
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introducas a third objact, ne ither physical nor typically il-
lusory (i.e., not a mtrror-ima.ga, nor a hallucination, etc.) 
than the paradoxes amarga. It would be as if the parson who 
first thou ght he saw his friend, and later found he was sea-
• in g a stranger, concluded that because he was seein g a par-
son who was not his friend, but whom he did not recognize 
as a str~ngar, he must have bean seeing something which was 
neither his friend nor a stranger. But thi s indeterminate-
,_ ness could only be attributed to the valid tty of his judg-
ment, not to the object he was see ing (or, the indeterminate-
ness could be attributed to his identification of the object 
he was saa ing, but not to the natura of the object itself). 
Moore , not knowing in soma cases whether what he is see-
in g really is a physical object or not, seams to con clude 
that he must be seeing something which is neither sim ply a 
physical object, QQ£ j ust an illusion of soma sort. But 
just as one would have difficulty identifyin g a person which 
was neither the parson's friend nor a stranger which resem-
bled the friend, so Moore has difficulty 11 pointing out 11 an 
object which is neith ~ r a physical ob ject nor a standard il-
lusory object. Thus there is nothing for Moore to do but to 
g o on thinking about it . 
And there is still another way in which the paradoxical 
natura of Moore 's def inition of sense-data can be pointed out. 
Whenavar we think we are perceiving a physical object we al-
ways are perceiving something . In casas of veridical par-
59. 
caption we verify that the object we sa w actually was the 
physical object we thought it was. In cases of illusion or 
hallucination we find that what we saw either was not a phys-
ical object, or was a distorted appearance of one. By intr~­
ducing the terms 11 diract visual fi eld" and "objects directly 
seen," .. 1oore g ive ~ a name to a person's perceptual state 
when he believes he is perceiving a physical object but does 
not know, on the basis of what he first seas, whether the 
object actually is a physicaL:>bject or not. "Direct visual 
field" including "objects dir&ct ly seen" defines what a per-
son sees when he thinks he sees a physical object when the 
possibility exists of his being mistaken; Le., of his see-
in g an illusion or having a hallucinati:>n. Thus the percept-
ual situation called the 11 di rect visual field" which contains 
"objects directly seen 11 is intermedia te between the percept-
ual situation in wh ich" one verifies that he is seeing a phy s-
leal object, and one in which it can be shown by verifica tion 
tha t one is seeing an - i llusion or having an hallucinati~n. 
The 11 direct visual f i c:,ld, 11 then, is defin ed st ipula t ively in 
such a way as to leava open the question, or l eave for fur-
ther verification, the questi::m whether the "obj e cts di-
rectly sean 11 included in the 11 direct vi sual field 11 actually 
are physica l obj ects or not . 1 Thus the terms "direct visual 
1. This is often called a state of perceptual certainty since 
it refers to wha t is immediately sean prior to verifica tion. 
That one is seeing something ~ certain, evan though be may 
find that what he saw was not the kind of thing he took it to 
be. 
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field" and "objects d:l.rectly seen" have an epistemic use: 
the latter term t; ives a name to the objects one sees before 
verification takes place. Once one verifies that he is 
either see ing a physical objact or having an illusory ex-
perience of some kind, then the epistemic utility of the 
terms is lost; for the conventionally defined, and ephem-
eral "directly seen objects/' one substitutes or refers to 
the raal physical object or real illusory data. That is, 
further verification determines whether the "directly seen 
object" is a physical object, or an illusory object of some 
kind. 
But we found that this is not the case in Moore's view. 
He treats the stipulatively defined "direct visual field," 
and the "objects directly seen 11 as if the former were the 
actual perceptual situation, and the objects included in it 
(i.e.,~ the 11 directly seen objects") the most real objects. 
That is, he transfers "direct visual field 11 and "objects di-
rectly seen" from an epistemic idiom to an ontolog ical idiom.1 
He gives the name 11 sense-data 11 to the 11 objects directly seen" 
which implies that they mediate our perception of physical 
objects. Once in this frame of mind, and thinking that sense-
data are peculiar kinds of things similar to after-images 
and hallucinations, he is then led to ask how they ~ be 
identical with the surfaces of physical objects. (And in-
deed it is an interestin g question how someth ing non-physical 
1. This latter term was introduced to me by Professor Lazer-
owitz. 
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could be identical with something physical). But this pr~b-
/:' lem ~nly arises b e ca~use Moore gives ontolog ical status (i.e., 
conceives of it as a particular existent) to something which 
merely has, or only sh~uld have, epistemic utility. Instead 
of treating the "directly seen objects" as hypothetical epis -
temic objects whicb are then either classified as physical 
or hallucinatory as a result of further verificati~n, he 
treats them as the actual objects and thus wonders how they 
can be related to physical ~bjects. 
We see that Moore's procedure is apt to lead to a multi-
plication of the entities in the universe •. Instead of there 
being physical objects and illusory or hallucinatory data, 
we also have sense- data which are su pposed to be what we 
dire ctly see when we normally think· wa are see ing physical 
objects (even when this can be verified). Other philosophers 
r following the lead of Moore ha ve spoken of sense-data as 
v 
indubitable objects from which our knowledge of physical 
objects is inferred, or even more radically, that physical 
objects are 11 constructs" 1 or "log ical constructs" 2 from 
sense-data . 
In Moore we find that the discovery of sense-data lies 
in attributing to hypothetical objects having epistemic util-
ity an ontological status having cognitive certainty. Mo~.ra 
defined a situation which would take into account what one 
was seeing on any occasion prior to verification. In one 
1. Bertrand Russell. 
2. A.J •. Ayer in Langua~, Truth, and Logic. 
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sense this situation is uncertain in 
classification (e.g., as physical or 
that its ontolog ical 
illusory) rec{ures vert-
/1 
fyin g ; in anoth.er sense it is indubitable in that it identi-
fies epistemolog ically whatever one is seein g prior to any 
verificat i on. Moore ha s identified the objective constituent 
of a kind of artificial state of mind in which one notices 
tha t he is perceiving something wh ich he recognizes as a 
physica l object of some sort, but wh ich he is aware is in-
sufficient evidence for concluding tha t the reco3nized ob-
ject actually is the object it is taken to be (most of the 
time we just go our merry way without goin g through the pro-
cess of verification u~til we are shocked by some unexpected 
illusion). The surprising thing is that it i s a consequence 
of Moore's analysis tha t even on further verification (which 
;!'. 
would normally be accepted a vs C'Jn clus ive) v1e nev e r can be 
quite certain whether what we a re seeing is a representa-
tive--a uniquely disguised re~resentative--of the object be-
lieved to be seen, or the object itself. But why, one is 
led to ask, if this were true in all cases, . vJould we ever 
have been led to think we were seeing the physi cal obj e ct 
directly at all? 
The followin g pas sage previously quoted brings out this 
difficulty explicitly: 
I am now seeing part of the surface of my hand; 
and I do now not only feel sure but know, with re-
gard to this object I am se e ing which ~ part of 
the surface of my hand, tha t it is part of the 
surface of my hand. And also I do now, at the 
very same time, feel some doubt as to whether a 
certain object, which I am directly seeing, is 
identical with the object which I am seeing which 
is part of the surface of my hand.l 
How, one may ask, is it possible for one to get into the state 
of mind such that when he sees a physical object he not only 
knows that the object he sees ~ part of the surface of the 
physical obj e ct, but also doubts tha t what he is seeing (in 
a direct and non-inferential sense) ~ be identical with the 
physical object, or itself a physical object? As an initial 
psychological state this is of course conceivable and quite 
possible. But the amazing thing is that Moore ends his an-
alysis vJith the same conflict ing ·convicti::ms, as the quotati::m 
above indicates. After all the discussion,: criticism, and 
reply, ·rvroore can only conclude that he may be "both feelin g 
sure of arii doubtin g the very s a me proposition at the same 
time. 112 
Thus the conclusion of this discussion of Moore 's theory 
of s ense-data is twofold. First, an analys1s of the two 
sections of Moore 's "Defence" reveals a fu ndamental c::mflict 
between what Moore asserts he knovm to be true with certainty 
about common sense propos itions, and wha t he also claims he 
knows to be true about the subje cts of such propos iti ons. If 
physical object statements have as their subject a sense-
datum which there are good reasons for believing is not iden-
tical with the physical ob j ect itself, then it hardly seems 
1. "Reply," 636. 
2 . "Reply," 636. 
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possible that one w~uld know the truth of such propositions 
v-Jith certs.inty underst~od in their ordinary meaning. For 
example, if the propositi 'Jnl "this table is heavy" has for 
its subject a sense-datum, wh ich one would not commonly re-
gard as being hea vy, then there does seem to be some questi~n 
as to the truth of the proposition .. 9,.s it is ordinarily under-
stood. 
Secondly, we have concluded that Mo~re has n'Jt provided 
either a connotative or denotative definition of sense-data 
such tha t one could varify that there actually a re such en-
titles. The closest Moore comes to providing an ostensive 
definiti'Jn of a sense-datum is his statement that "the aft.sr-
ima~e wh ich you will ••• see [after staring at a lighted elec-
tric lamp for a little while] is a specimen of the sort of 
thin g I mean by 'a sense-datum'." Unfortunately, however, 
whereas \ve know what the 11 specimen 11 is like, \ve do not know 
what the "sense-datum" is like. Phrases like 11 thin gs of the 
sort (in a certain respect) of vJh ich t h is thin g is," 11 a 
spec iman of the sort o.f t h ing I mean, 11 are shr~uded in am-
bigu ity and mystery, whereas they are the very phrases 
which should characterize and define sense-data. 
CHAPT~R III_ 
RUSSELL 1 S THEORY OF NEUTRAL IviO~>J ISM 
1. Introduction. 
Associated with the name of G.E. Moore as one of the 
outstanding philosophers of Cambridge in recent years is 
that of Bertrand Russell. Althou gh Russell's own special 
interests and abilities led him to develop a philosophy 
quite different from Moore's, yet their influence on each 
other was pronounced. In his autobiographical notes Russell 
says that his emerg~n ce from a Hegelain period was quicken-
ed by the inf luence of Moore. 1 Moore led the rebellion and 
Russell followed with a sense of emancipatiJn. Rejectiog 
Bradley's view that everythin g common sense belives in is 
appearance, lVJ:oore and Russell reverted to the opposite ex-
tre me . 11 \.tHth a sense of escaping from prison," Russell 
says, 11 we allowed ourselves to think that grass is green, 
that the sun and stars would exist if no one was aware of 
t hem , and a lso that there is a pluralistic timeless world 
of Platonic ideas ." 2 
This na'ively realistic attitude (as regards perception 
of physical objec t s) adopted, in reaction, by Moore and 
Russell was apparently shortlived. Although Moore called 
1. Cf. 11 1'-ly 1\.fen tal Deve l :>pment, 11 in The Philosophy of Ber-
trand Russell, ed. Paul Schilpp, 12. 
2. Ibid. 
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his philosophy 11 A Defence of Common Sense, 11 he left na'ive 
realism behind in entertaining a theory of sense-data. And 
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Russell was even m~re way\vard in h is loyalty to common sense. 
Or at least 11 common sen se" meant someth ing different for Rus-
sell fro m what it did f.nr Mo:>re. Russell v1as much more in-
fluenced by the developmsnt of the physical sciences than 
was Moore. For Rus sell it was :;,nly "common sense" to accept 
the truths of physics over the speculati~ns of philosophy 
and the prejudices a nd inconsistencies of ordinary beliefs. 
\vith r egard to the rela tive truth-value of physics and phil-
osophica l systems he says: 
Philosophers may say: What justificati on have you 
for accepting the truth of physics. I reply: Mere-
ly a common-sense basis. If you ask any one who is 
neither a philosopher nor a physicist, he will say 
that physics has a much better chance of being true 
than has t he system of this or that philosopher. To 
set up a philosophy a gainst physics is rash; phi-
losophers who have done so have always ended in dis-
aster.l 
And with regard to com~on sense beliefs: 
Most of our common sense beliefs must be right 
from a practical point of view, or else science 
could never get started; but some turn out wrong. 
Science dimini s hes their number; in this sense it 
corrects common sense in spite of sta: rting from 
it. The procedure is exactly like that of cor-
recting testimony by other testimony, where it is 
assumed throu ghout tha t testimony is usually 
trustworthy .2 
Thus Russell accepts common sense beliefs in general as 
a neces sary foundation on which the structure of science is 
1 · Op • cit • , 700 • 
2. Ibid. 
built. Scientific vie~s, namely those advanced by physics, 
a re to be ac ce pted as true and provide part of the data on 
which philosophical speculati~n is based. In the final trans-
ition, however, it is the philosophical view which is g iven 
preeminence. 11 We need not listen to physics outside physics, 
and it is for the philosopher rather than the physicist to 
ascertain just what physics asserts." 1 Common sense as the 
foun dation, science correctin g and enlarg ing common sense 
beliefs, and philosophy emendating and synthesizing scien-
tific truths is the structure of knowleds e su ggested by Rus-
sell. 
On this structure have been built several different 
philosophical positi~ns. But there is not so great a trans-
ition or d~vergence in Russell's views as one would suspect 
from the cries of inconstancy among his critics. In all of 
Russell's 11 stages 11 he holds a view of sense-data, and it is 
primarily as regards his interpretation of the nature of 
mind and matter that the divergence occurs. Our discussion 
will bear mainly on Russell's theory of neutral monism, the 
theDry develope d in Russell's Our Kn owledge of the External~ 
(1914, 2nd ed. 1926), The Analysis of Mind (1921), and in 
the essays 11 The Ultimate Constituents of ~.1Ja.t ter11 (1915) and 
"The Relati::m of Sense-data to Physics" (1914): raprinted in 
Mysticism and Log ic. Although Russell no longe r holds the 
view of neutral monism, t his theory was so influential among 
1. Op. cit., 701. 
sensa-data theorists tha t it warrants soma treatm~nt in a ny 
discussion of the theory ~f sense-data • . Before turnin g to 
the theory of neutral monism itself, ho•Jevar, it will be 
helpful to trace the orig ins of Russell's theory of sensa-
data in The Problems of Philosoohy (1912). · 
2. The Sense-data Theory in the Problems. 
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Russell be g ins the Problems in a Cartasian mood of scep-
ticism. uis there any knowledge in the world," he asks, 
"which is so cartain that no reasonable man could doubt it? 111 
At first this question appears unduly incradulous--ona has 
knowledg e of h i mself, of other people, and of many material 
obj e cts around him. But is this k n owledge really so certain 
tha t no reasonable man could doubt it? 
Let us taka Jur commonest knowledge--our knowledg e of 
physica l ob jects. Before me I see a desk and a chair which 
sit directly in front of a window. It is a clear December 
morning and the s un streams throu gh the windovJ and curtains 
fallin g brightly on the desk and chair. The curtains are of 
a transpar.ent matar·ial dyad a light g rean. There is a grad-
ual transition in the oolor of the curtains from the darker 
graen of the part further away from tha 1 i ght to the almost 
white shade of tha curtains in tho se places rtJhare the light 
shines t hrou gh. On the saat of tha chair t he re is r a flectad 
1. Russell, Problams of Philosophy, 7. (Hareafter, this 
vi ork shall be ab brav i a ted "POP 11 ). 
the shadow of the round su pports formin g the back of the 
chair so that the seat is divided at even intervals by black 
lines. The smooth surface of the deek reflects the white 
glare of the sun makin g a path across the center. This is 
the way the curtains, desk, <J, nd chair look now, but this is 
not the way they looked last night under · a rtificial light-
ing, nor is it the way they will appear later in the after-
noon. I can, in f a ct, chan ge the appearance of the objects 
I described merely by cha,nging my position in relati~n to 
tham. 
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How certain, then~ is my knowledge of the objec t s be-
fore me? Can I attribute to them a definite color and shape? 
What am I to take as the standard--the colors of the objects 
as they appear in the l:l r i ght sun, or under the incandescent 
rays of the bulb? The shade of the curtains appear to vary 
with the de grees of illumination and yet they appear the same 
color under a uniform light. Is the seat of the chair really 
traversed by black lines? Is the desk re~lly white where 
'-"' 
the light falls, or is it really brown .as it appears on the 
surface beyond the light? 
Even the size and shape of the object appear ·-· to vary 
with the different positions from which it is se en . A ruler 
appears smaller from a distance and much larger under a 
magnifying glass. 
The exactness of the tactual senses a nd the discrimina-
tion of sounds and pitches is even more variable. The tac-
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tua l discrim i nation of distance va ries with the area of the 
skin that i s bein g stimulatad. A cavity in a tooth which is 
barely visible appears cavernous to the investigative toogue. 
To different people the same sound will often appear loud 
and soft, shrill or pleasant. 
And the scientis t s g ive us even mo re rea son to doubt tha t 
our common knowledge of the obj e cts around us i s cert~in. We 
believe that material :>bjects exist as we perceive them: : that 
the qualities we a ttribute to them e. re inherent in t ~J em . But 
the physiologist tell s us that the qualities things appea r to 
a ve de pend up:>n the san se organ of the organ ism ax peria n c ing 
them. Things appea r colored to man beca u se he possesses cones 
a s a part of his optical apparatus. To animals that do not 
p os sess cones a s a par t of t heir o ptical organ an obje ct . 
does not appear colored. Binocula r vision is im possible in 
the 1o·t1 ar vartibra tes such as fish, whose ayes cannot be si-
multaneously directed to the same object . A dog ca n hear a 
ran ge of pitch inaudible to the human ear, and so forth. The 
researches ")f the phys:Lolog ist lead ~. us to doubt, therefore, 
that our k nowledge of physical obje cts with re gard to tha ir 
po s s ession of secondary qualities is as certain as we usually 
taka it to be. 
And the physicist, in turn, calls into qua st1on our com-
mon know ledge of the primary quali t ia s of th i ogs. Things ap-
pear to be solid, appear to have a definite shape, and to be 
made up of matter. According to the physicist, however, thing s 
consist of microcosms c>f atomic un i verses with rela tively 
large spaces between the swirling charged particles, and 
possess an indefinite boundary because of the changing posi-
tion of the electrons in the outer orbits. In place of solid 
chunky objects we have a model of spaces filled with tiny 
nuclei and particles flying about in dizzy patte r ns. 
Accordingly, all of these reflections lead us to doubt 
that our common knowledge of things is certain. Without be-
ing sheerly a rbitrary, which color of the desk ca n we select 
as the r eal one: the whitish color of the reflected morning 
sun, the light brown appearance of the afternoon, or the deep 
brown of the evening? It appears that the color is not some-
thing inherent in the table independently of any conditions, 
but someth ing depending upon the desk, the spectator, and the 
way the light falls on the table. The physiologist adds to 
this conclusion the claim that without certain sensory or-
gans no colors would be perceived at all. And the physicist 
tells us tha t physica l objects do not even have the primary 
qualities which we believe them to have. 
It seems, therefore, that our common knowledge of things 
is not as certain with regard to either seconda ry or primary 
qualities as we would ordinarily believe. But if our usual 
perceptual knowledge of things which is usually taken to be 
true is not true, t hen is there anything about our knowledge 
of things which is? To this question Russell gives the fa-
milia r answer. Even though we cannot be certain that the 
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properties or qualities of material objects a re inherently in 
t hem, yet we ca n be certa in tha t they present a certain ap-
pearan ce to us. That is, the desk may not be brown or white 
in it s elf, but the fact tha t it appea rs those colors to ma 
a t a pa rticula r time is in dubitable. It may even ba that I 
am dream in g or ha vin g an hallucinati~n in which ca se I wo uld 
not b e perceivin g physical obj e cts in the usual s ense at all. 
But tha f a ct tha t I would ba hav ing an experience of a par-
ticu~ar k ind would be undeniable. Thus the f a ct tha t I ha ve 
experiences of a ce rtain k ind is i ndubitable, even thou gh 
the interpratati :m (either immedia t 3ly or reflective ly) I 
place on the se experiences may be quite erroneous. 
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The discrepancy b·9tween our common knowled ge of the phys-
ical ob ject a nd wha t e p istemic a nd scientific analys is of per-
ce ption revea l s is t herefore qu ite apparent. We believe the 
object to be a definite color and shape indepandently of any 
perc .i;:lient. This be li.sf is common evan t hou gh the colors a nd 
shape s of t hings vary as they d o fr'Jm different points of vievr 
<:J.nd fro m one parson to anothe r . When it is pointed out, how-
~var, that thin gs a r e 1ot al 1 ~ys (at lea st) as they appea r to 
be , one than makes a disti ~ct ion between the t hin g it self, 
a nd its appea r ance. I t t hen seems that our kn owledge of the 
ap pea r an ca is indub i tabla, wheraas our kn ov.Jledge of the t hing 
is problematic. Wa know how t h ings ap pear to us, even if we 
do not kn ow tha t t h in gs a r e like in themselve s. 
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From t h is point of vi aw, our k oowladga ~f tha thin g ba-
c~me s un ce rta in vJh ila tha appaaranca is kn own with certainty. 
S ince the relative chan ge in cognitive certainty batween tha 
thi .1 g and its appearance su ggasts a revision in tarminology, 
as well as outlook, the name sense-data is g iven to wha t is 
immadiataly prese nted or e xpe rienced in sansati~n. Our kn owl-
adg e of the thin g ~f c~mm on s e nsa i s problematica l wh ile our 
axpar i ance of s ens a - data is indu b itable. And to preserve 
tha indapendanca of what we axperi en ce from our experiencin g 
of it, a distin cti~n is made betwaan tha a cts of sensat ion 
a nd the sensa-data t hemse lves. Russell says (as l'-1: o:>ra d id), 
Let us g ive t he nama of "sensa-data" to the t h in g s 
that are immadia taly kn~wn in s a nsati Jn: su ch t h in g s 
as colors, s ~und s, smalls, hardnesses, rou ghnes ses, 
and so on. We shall g ive the name "sen sation" to 
the experience of ba ing immediately a wara of these 
t h in gs ••• It is plain tha t if we a re to Kn 0\·1 any t h in3 
about the tabla, it must be by me a ns ~f the sen sa -
data--brown colour, ob lon g shape, smoothness, etc. 
--wh ich we associata with the table; but for tha 
reasons wh ich hava be a n g ivan, wa cannot say that 
tha table ~ tha sensa-data, or evan tha t the sense-
data are dirac ly preparties of t h e t able.l 
Accepting s a nsa - da t a as tha grounds of our kn owledge of 
ma t erial t hings, the qu astiJn remain s as to what we k now of 
materia l t hings. Or as Russell say s: "Granted that we are 
cartain of our own s ensa - data, have we a ny reason for regard-
in g t hem as s igns of t he ex ist ence of s~methin g elsa, wh ich 
wa ca n call the physical obj a ct? 112 In ~th ar words, when we 
have enumerated all th<~ sense-da ta which ':>na would re gard 
1. POP, 12. 
2 . POP, 20. 
as appea r ances of the table is there anything l e ft over--
someth in g whi ch is not a sense-datum but a physical object 
of s ome kind. There are many reasons wh ich lead u s to be-
l ieve that t here is such an object. For example, when a 
thing is transferred from one person to anoth e r one does not 
transfer his sense-data, yet something is tran sferred. Sim -
ilarly, when two people look a t the some obj e ct their sense-
data are not the same since t hey see the t hin from their 
own p oint of view , yet they can identify what they see as a 
"' common object. A lso, the object two people see seems inde-
__.. 
pendent of them in t h e sense that if one lea ves t h e room the 
obj ect remains unchan 3 ad for t he other. One might say that 
they a r e not seeing the same obj e ct at all, but both can de-
scribe what they see i n minute agreement , and can work on or 
handle the same obj e ct~ 
The cessation of the existence of sense-data, therefore, 
does not seem to i nvolve the cessation of the thin g . 
What ca n be bought and sold a nd pushed ab out and 
have a cloth l a i d on it, and so on, cannot be a 
mere collection of sense-data. If the cboth com-
plet e ly hides t h e table, we shall derive no sense-
data from the table, and therefore, if the table 
we r e merely sense-data , it would cease to exi s t, 
and the cloth wou ld be suspended in empty air, 
resting , b y a miracle, in t he pl a ce where the 
table formerly was .l 
Most of the world is unperceived a nd yet we be li eve tha t it 
continues to exist. Continuity of effects or results often 
re quires our postulating the continued act ion of things even 
1. POP, 20. 
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though unperceived. A housewife puts her clothes in a wash-
in g machine and expects them to exist and to be washed evan 
thou gh she d~es not guarantee their existence by watching 
them. 
These and similar reasons lead one to conclude tha t the 
common sensa belief in an independent thin g is not wholly 
arbitrary or unfounded. And in The Problems of P~ilosophy 
Rus s ell himself accepts t h is conclusion, mainly because of 
the simplicity it affords in our account of experience. There 
is no log ical impossibility in balLsvin g that the \oJOrld con-
sists entirely of sense - da ta, or evan that all of our axper-
lance is a dream. But such a hypothesis does not seam to 
be warranted by the facts. It is, as Russell says, 
not b y argument that we orig inally come by our 
belief in an independent external world. We find 
this belief ready in ourselves as soon as we be-
g in to reflect: it is wha t may be called an in-
stinctive balief ••• Since t h is belief does not lead 
to any difficulties, but ~n the contra ry tends to 
simplify and systematize our account of our exper-
iences, t here seams no g ood re ~son for rejecting 
it. We may th.srefore admit--t h ough with a slight 
doubt derived f rom dreams--that the external world 
does really exist, and is not wholly dependent for 
its existence u p on our continuin ~ to perceive it.l 
When it comas to g iving an account ~f just what the na-
ture of t h is external irJ orld is, Russell i s rather vague. He 
says tha t "we may assume that there is a phy sica l space in 
which physica l objects have spatial relat ions corresponding 
to those whi ch the corresponding sense-data have in our pri-
vate spaces." 2 That i B, t he order of sensory events being 
1. POP, 24. 
2. POP, 31. 
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independant of us, it must , as Kant also arguad, dapend up:m 
and _rapresent tha ordar of tha indapandant physical w ~rld. 
Also, if two objacts appa~r tha same color wa may assume that 
tha phys ica l objects rasambla aach othar to some extant, just 
as thay must differ if thay appaar differant. But wa can 
never know what tha physical object is in itself. We know 
it throu gh its relati~ns with otha r obj ects which ara repro-
duced or raprasantad in tha ralations of sensa-data themselves. 
Thus we find that, although the relations of phys-
ical objects have all sorts of knowable propertias, 
darivad from their correspondence with the rala-
tions of sansa-data, the physical objects them-
selves remain unknown in thair intrinsic natura, 
so far at least as can be discovared by means of 
tha sensas .l 
The view that Russell offers in tha Problems , accordingly, 
is dualistic as ra gards mind and matter. Ha baliavas in an in-
dapendant physical world as the cause of tha sensory world of 
our axperiance. And he saams to hold a generative thaory as 
to tha orig in of sense-data. Sense-data seem to ba dependent 
both upo~ tha external world (i.a., causes from tha .external 
world) and tha natura of the percipient, without which they 
could not exist. But at tha sama time thay cannot ba iden-
tifiad with either; i.e., thay are not parts of the surfacas 
or inharant qualities in t h ings, nor are they parts of, or 
inharent in, tha act of sensation. Thay origina te whe n an 
external physical cause acts on a percipient organism. 
1. POP, . 34. 
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3· Elimination of the Physical Object. 
The transiti:m from the dualistic position as rega rds 
mind and matter· developed in the Problems to the position of 
11 neutral mon ism11 invol Yes two stages •1 The first stage oc-
curs in Our Knowledge t)f the External Vl orld in which Rus sell 
dispenses with tha independent physical object as defined 
in the Problems. The rejecti~n of the distinction between 
sensation and sensory obJect because it i mplies the exist-
ence of consciJusnass as a distinct antity constitutes the 
second stage, and occurs in The Analysis of Mind. Both stages 
are naces sary in the adoption of a fullfledged 11 neutral mon-
ism," since a neutral mon ist is one who balieves that there 
is only one 11 stuff 11 constituting the material of the universe. 
This stuff, depending upon how it is related, forms a series 
of either physical or mental events. The view was orig inated 
2 by \villiam James , and adopted by Russell. It is easy to 
see, however, how this view developed naturally out of the 
position Russell held in the Problems. 
In this section, the first stage in the transition to 
neutral monism w il1, be d <1scussed . There is one passage in 
the Problems which anticipates the theory developed by Rus-
sell in Our Knowled~e of the External World. In the Problems 
Russell says that whan we look at a coin wa distinguish be-
1. Cf. Stace, "Russell's Neutral Monism," in Tha Philosophy 
of Bertrand Russell, ad. Paul Schilpp, 351-384. (I am in-
debted to this article for much of my interpretation of 
Russell's neutral monism.) 
2. Cf. Essays in Radical Empiricism. 
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twaan tha apparant shapa and tha raal shape. Ha then goes on 
to say that 
this r ea l shape, which is what concerns scienca, 
must ba in a r aal spaca, not tha same as anybody's 
apparent space, The r aa l spaca is public, the ap-
parent spaca is private to the perc~pient. In dif-
farant paopla'a private spaces the s c(.me objact 
saems to hava diffarent shapes; thus the raal space, 
in which it haa real shape, must be diffarent from 
the private spaces.l 
In the viaw devalopad in Our Knowledga of the External 
World, Russell no lon ger beliavas in a "raal" public space 
or a 11 real 11 shape. Or rathe r, the ralative reality of the 
public and priva te spaces a nd the real and apparent shapes 
of an ~bject is reve rs ed. In the l a ter wor~ the priva te space 
of the percipient as w.::, ll as the apparent shape of tha object 
bacoma tha "real" space a nd shapa. The "public space " and 
"raal s hape'1 raferred to in tha Problams bacomes a "construct-
ad spaca'1 a nd a 11 tl on st ructed thing " in Our Kn owladga of the 
Extarnal World. Lat us sea why and how t his revision of a 
thing came about. 
Earlier we pointad out tha t the appearance of a thing 
varies indapandantly according t o tha conditions under wh ich 
it is saen . This led to a distinction betwe en the appearance 
called a sense-datum, a nd the thing lyin g behind the appear-
ance, on the g rounds that two different appearances could 
not occupy tha same physical spa ce. In tha Problems Russell 
r a tainad the rea lity of tha thin g , beliavin g that it provided 
1 • POP, 29-30 . 
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the simplest h~pothasis. But he admittad that we could know 
not h ing about . tha intrinsic nature of t h in gs, knowing only of 
the ir relations to aach othar t h rou gh the ralations of sanse-
da ta. 
In the External World, however, Russell tak es another 
tack in tha belief that it is more empir i cal. He wishes to 
elimina ta the unknown thin g and construct a theory in terms 
of verifiablas only. Thus the problam bacomes how to con-
s truct a viaw of tha extarnal world in tarms of sensa-data 
wh ich a ra priva ta to aach individual. This nece ssitates 
abandoning dualism and the ganera tive theo ry of sense- data . 
The sense-da ta a re t hemselves the "stuff" out of which mind 
a nd mattar a re to ba con st ructed. 
Let us turn, than, to Russell's viaw of nautral monism. 
Whan ona elimina tes the material obj e ct on the g rounds that 
a ll we e ver perceive a re its appearances and these appear-
a nces cannot occupy the s ame space, one is left with a plur-
ality of pr iva te appearances, all existing in a priva te space. 
In the External World Russell calls these priva te appearances 
of the world 11 perspectives. 11 A pe r spe ctive of the world is 
a particular view of the world. In the neighborhood theater 
each spectator observas tha scraan from his own point of view, 
and in the theater of the world, each person obse r ves certain 
data from his own p oint of viaw, or his parspactive. However , 
thara is a parspactiva a nd therefore sensory data at every 
place in tha universe where there could be a percipient, even 
v 
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if in fact there is n~ne. A perspective which is observed 
(i.e., one at which thare is a sentient organism of some kind) 
is called a "private world" in distinction fr')m unperceived 
perspectives. The totality of perceived and unperceived per-
spectives Russell ca lls the "system of perspe ctives". 
The system consistin g of all the views of the uni-
verse, perceivad and unperceived, I shall call the 
system of "perspe ctives"· I shall confine the ex-
pre ssion "private worlds'' to such viaws of the uni-
verse as are ac tually perceived. Thus a "private 
wo rld11 is a perceived "perspective 11 but there may 
be any number of unperceived perspectives.l 
On th~s view the universe consists of a ~ystem of per-
calved and unperceived perspectives , each of which is a par-
ticular view of the world. The data perceived in B perspec-
tive as well as the spa ce of a perspective are private to 
that perspective . The common reference and social interde-
pendability of so much of our experience, as wall as the de-
notati')nal significance of langua ge indica te, however, that 
perspe ctives ca nnot be entirely dissimilar. Any diff erence 
at all prevents perspectivas from exhibitin g the s ame data, 
a nd yet f or most purposes the similarity in what one perceives 
is so g reat tha t the difference in perspectives may be i g nored. 
Most of us act as if we we re perceiving identically the same 
objects and our lan gua ge is based on t h is as s umption. 
Different perspectives contain aspects of similar ob-
jects, for example, trees, do gs, buildin g s, stars, and so 
forth. However , the aspect s of objects exhibited in a pe r-
l. Russell, Our Knowl ed.:<:e of the External Vforld, 95 . ( Hence-
forth t h is work will be a b b revia ted as OKE~ .) 
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spactiva are not the rem8ta physica l object, but the physical 
obj e ct ~aly as it ca n be k nown; i.e., the perceived object. 
Different aspects of the object appear in different parspac-
tives. To use the over-worked but familiar exg,mpla, a penny 
ap pears round from one point of view, elliptical from another 
point of view, and thin a nd flat from still another point of 
view. This is expressed by say ing that different aspects of 
the penny occur in different perspectivas. 
Thera is, h owever, no penny apart from these different 
aspects. The series of aspects of the penny in all possible 
perspectivas constitute the penny. There is no mysterious 
penny lurkin g behind the veil of appearances. The peany is 
the sum total of its appea rances in all the vari'Jus perspac-
tives. For a batly, the diffe r ent aspects of a thing may ap-
pear fleetin g and unconnected, but in the cou rse of ex perience 
the different aspects of an obj e ct are correlated by means of 
their similarity and continuity. Later they can be correla,ed 
by the lavJ s of perspec t ive and 'Jf reflection and diffraction 
1 
of light. At any one time, only one aspect of the obj e ct is 
perceived fr~m one perspective. But 'Jn the basis of exper-
lance, this aspe ct is identified with simibar aspects, and 
distinguished from other aspects identified as other objects . 
As I look about my room I perceive a series of parspactives 
containin g a similar number of objects . I see the asp e cts 
of a chair, a desk, a fireplace, a couch, and so forth. As 
1. Cf. Russell, The Analysis of Mind , 99 . 
I m~ve around the perspectives chan ge and the aspects of the 
objects cha n ge, but thare is a similarity and continuity in 
the observed aspec t s. The aspect of the chair does not all 
~f a sudden become connected with the aspect of the fire-
place, and the aspect of the book marge into the aspect of 
the desk . The objects pre s ent a c~ntinuous series of similar 
aspects . It is bec~usa of this continuity nd similarity of 
aspects within different perspectivas that ~ objects can be 
identified. The thin g s of common sensa are constructs from 
these aspects. 
By the similar1.ty of neighborin g perspectives, many 
objects in t h e one can be correlated with objects in 
the other, namely with the similar objedts. Givan 
the object in one perspective, form the system of 
all the objec t s correla ted with it in all the per-
spectives; that system m~y be identified with the 
momentarr. common-sense 11 th ing11 • Thus an aspect of 
a "thin~' is a member of the system of aspects which 
is the' thing 11 at that momant ••• Al l the aspects of 
a thin g are real, wher?as the thin g is a merely log -
ical construction.l 
Accordingly, from different perspectives common obj3cts 
ca n be constructed. The object is the series of similar a nd 
continuous aspects in al l these perspec t ivas. But along with 
the qualitative similarity and continuity of aspects appear-
in g in different perspectives, there is also the problem of 
spatial contin~ ity. Objec t s are belie ved to oocupy def in ite 
places in objective space. But t he space of each parsp~c-
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tive is priva te to the perspective. How, then, are the spaces 
of diffe r ent perspec t ivas correlated? 
1. OKEV.J" , 96. 
The problem of constructing a common obj e ctive space is 
basically similar to that of constructin g a common obj e ct. 
Common objects can be constructed because of the similarity 
and continuity of the presented aspects . Similarly, a com-
mon space can be constructed because of the similarity and 
continuity of the priva te spaces of perspectives . The data 
of each perspective are a rran ged in a three-dimensional space. 
Neighboring perspectivas preaeat a similarity and continuity 
of these spa ttial relations. Therefore, one can say that 
the space of one perspective appears perceptually continuou s 
with, or adj a cent to, the space of another perspective . How-
ever, since t he space of different perspectivas always is 
private to t h ose perspectives , the space in which different 
perspectives a re correlated is a different kind of space . It 
is, in fa ct , a constructed or inferred space . Like the com-
mon s e nse thin g , the obj e ctive spa ce of common sense is never 
directly experienced, on t hi s view. \'ihat is experienced are 
private spaces which are arranged in an all inclusive per-
spective-space . The perspe ctive-space is inf e rred or con-
structed from these priva te spa ces . 
It will be observed that, while each perspective 
contains its own spa ce, there is ooly one space 
in wh ich the persp·2Ct ives themselves are the el-
ements. Thera are as many priva ta spaces as the re 
are perspectives; the re are therefore at least as 
many as there a re perc¢ipiants, and there may be 
any number of others which ha ve a merely material 
existence an d a re no t sea n by any one. But there 
is onl y one perspective-space, wh ose elements are 
sin g le perspe c t i vas, each with its own privata spaca . 1 
1 • OKE'tl , 97 . 
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This pe rs pe ctiva- s pa ca is six-dimensi~nal since it con-
tains tha threa-dimansional space of parspactivas, and is lt-
s a lf a threa-dimansional arran ~amant of thase perspectivas. 
"The world wh ich wa hava s~ far constructed is a wor ld of six 
diman s ions , s ince it is a thre e-d imens i~nal sarles of pe r spec-
tives , each of ~-~h ich i s i tsa lf t hra e -dime n s i ')nal. ul Tha spe.ce 
of touch a nd hsarin g etc ., wh ich for conveni e nce ha s t ean ne -
g lected, can be correla t ed with t h a space of sigh t i n the p r i-
vate spaca of one perspective. Actua lly, perspact ive- space 
is eight dimensio na l since ob jactiva time, on th is v iaw , would 
be a const ruct a nd would also have to b e included in ~c ompl e ta 
definition of a parspectiva. But time too may b e omitted fo r 
raas~ns of c ~nvenience. 
A thin g , on t h is t heory, is see n to occupy more than one 
place. It occupies a p l a ce in private spa ce wh a r e ve r a n as-
pact of it a ppaa r s , or wheraver the t ~ ing is s aid to ha ve a n 
effect, a nd a t the same tima it occupies a placa in parspec-
tiva-s paca wh ich is a lo g ica l construct from all the aspe cts 
of t h e t hing appaa r i n g in d iffe rent parspectives . For in-
stanca , if one draws a lin e throu~h the d ifferan t series of 
as pacts of t he thin g , these lines will converge at a p oint, 
a nd this p oint in pers pective-space is th e place of the 
th i n g , just as the t hin g is a construct ~ut of a ll the va r-
ious aspects. The aspa c t s a~d the privQte spaces are the 
only thin g s tha t a re ever experianced, a nd thus they are what 
1. " Sanse -Da ta and Physics" in My st icism a. nd Log ic, 1 62. 
is r aal. Tha thi ng of c~mrn on sensa doa s n~t exist , b ut is a 
log ical con s truct presumably adopted for coovaniance. 
It wil l be ~b servad that t wo placas in perspec-
tive space are a ss ~ciatad with ever-y aspe ct of 
a thin g : namely, the space where tha thin g is, 
and tha place which is t he parspactiva of which 
the a s pect in questi~n forms a pa~rt ••• Tha two 
places ass~cia ted with a sin gle aspe ct corres- . 
pond : to the two ways of classify ing it. We may 
dist inguish t ta t wo pl aces as tha t at which, a nd 
that from whieh , t he aspect appears . The 11 place 
at which11 is the place of the thing to vJhich the 
a spe ct bel')n g s; the "place f rom vJhich 11 is t he 
place of the perspective to which the aspe ct 
belongs.l 
These t wo "places" of an aspe ct account for the duality in 
our pe rcaption of an Jbjact. Tha object always appaa rs at a 
cartain p l a ce or d ist a nce from us, a nd yat our awarenass of 
it is whara wa a re. Tha appearance seems to live a double 
1 ife. 
To conclude t his section, then, we shall amphasiza that 
in dany in g a real inde pe ndent spaca and a real physi ca l ob-
j a ct occu pying a definite r egi')n of space, Russall paved the 
way f')r rej ect in g the view that since differant perce pti')ns 
of an object are qualitatively incompati~l e some must be 
cla ss ifie d as illusory or less real than others (an ellipti-
cal appearance of a pe n ~y is c:msiderad l ass raal than tha 
standard circular appea rance). Every a s pact or appearance of 
an object is a s rea l a s a ny other; in f a ct, such aspe cts or -
cupying a privata spa ca in perspectivas a ra the r eal thin g s 
in tha uh·.ivarsa. Tha objact or thin g of common sensa is 
1. OKEW, 100. (This will be discus s ad more ful ly in the naxt 
saction.) 
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merely a lo g ica l c~nstruction from the correlated s e ries of 
a s pect s whi ch is the rea l obj e ct. 
One of the obvious merits of this view--a nd one which 
was a central motiva tin g factor behind Russell's development 
of this position--is tha t it a ttempts to g iva an a ccount of 
1 phys ica l ob j ec t s in te rms of verif i ab l es only. Tha obj ects 
of phy sics wh ich are methodolog ica lly correlated with s ensa-
data are also to be ontolog i cally reduced to sensa-data. The 
unknown t~in g-in-it salf wh ich haunted philosop by fr'.) m Locke 
to Kant is thus elimina ted , as wall as the inferred entities 
of scie nce (e. g ., a t'.)ms, molecules, e l ectrons , etc.). Whara-
ever possible, reference to sensa-da ta or to log ica l con -
structs is to be substituted for inferred entities . 
However , there ara t wo kinds of inferre d e ntities wh ich 
Russell finds it ne ce ssa ry t'.) admit i nt o his theory. One 
kind is the sense-data of perspe ctiv~ s of other pe opl e , and 
the other is the sense - data or 11 sen s ible s , 11 as Rus sell cal l s 
2 them, of unperceived pers pe ctivas. Both of these i nferred 
entities are ne ces sary if Rus sell is to escape solipsism . 
The inferred en ti t i e s wh ich I shall allow myse l f 
are of t wo k inds: (a) the s ensa-data of other 
pe ople, in favour of wh ich there i s the ev i den ce 
of testimony , restin g ultimately upon the analog -
ical ar~ument i n f a vour of minds oth er than my 
'.)wn ; (b) th e 11 sansibilia11 1-Jhi ch wou l d appear f r:::>m 
p l a ces whe re there hap pens to be no minds , an d 
which I s uppose to be rea l a lthou gh they are no 
one's data.3 
1. OKE1 , 88 - 89, a nd My st icism a nd Lo~ ic, 145-46 . 
2. Cf. Mysticism a nd Lo p: ic, 148 . 
3. " Se nse-data and Physics" in Mysticism a nd Lo a: ic, 157-158. 
It would g ive me the grea test satisfaction to be 
able to dispen s e with it [i.e., the inferred en-
tity], a nd thu s establish physics up on a solip-
sistic basis; but those--and I fear they are the 
ma jority--in v1hom the human aff;§ctions are str'Jn -
er t han the desire for log ical economy, will, no 
doubt, not share my desire to render solipsism 
scientifically satisfa ctory.l 
Thus is concluded the fi rs t stage in Russell 1 s transi-
tion to "neutral monism". The stuff of the physica l universe 
consi s ts of perceived and unperceived sasse-data, whi ch when 
rel ~t ed by continuity a nd similarity form the t hings of com-
mon s e nsa. In t he next s e ction we shall turn to the second 
stage in Russell's tra nsition to neutral monism. 
4. Russell's Ellmina tion of Consciousness. 
Ever sin ce Jamas' assay "Does 'consciousnes s ' axist ? 112 , 
the concept of consciousne ss as a distinct kind of entity has 
been on the wane. PhiloBophers such as Moore wh o distin uish-
ad in sensation the different obj e ct s from the common element 
of consciousness 1-Jare hard put to define t he conscious ale-
me n t. Ivioora u sad such descriptive te rms as 11 ill us iva, '1 a nd 
11 d i a pha n ou s. '' Ru ssell, origina lly following Ivioora' s lead, 
l a t er had to admit tha t no such sepa rate entity of conscious-
ness was discernible. He says, "my own belief ••• is that James 
is ri ht in rej e cting coDsciousnass as an entity. 11 3 The grounds 
for Rus sell's conclu sions are : 
1. 11 Sanse-data a nd Phy s ics" in Mysticism a nd Lo p; ic, 157-158. 
2. James, Essays in Radica l Emp iricism, 1-38 . 
3. -Russall, The Analys i s of I'!!ind, 25. (All furthe r references 
to t h is work will be roh- revia ted 11 AO:H"'!) '.1 
The first criticism I have tJ make is tha t the 
a ct seams unnecessary a nd fictitious . The Jccur-
rence of the content of a thou ght constitutes the 
occurrence of the th~u ght. Emp irically, I canno t 
discover anythin g corresponding to the suppo sed 
act ; and theore tica lly I cannot see tha t it is in-
dispensable. via say : "1. think so-and-s ~," and 
this word "I" su ggests that thi nking is the act 
of a pars on . Me in ~n g 1 s 11 ac t tt is the ghost of the 
subj e ct, or wha t once was the full-blooded Boul. 
It is supposed tha t thou ghts cannot just c ome and 
g o , but need a pe rs on to th~nk tham ••• But I think 
the pers on is not an ing r a dient ln the single 
thou ght : he i s rather con st ituted by rela ti?ns of 
the thou ghts to ea ch bth=r and to the body . ± 
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Thus Russel l takes tha se cJ nd step in his transit ion to 
"neut ral monism," the elimination of consciousness as a sap -
ara te entity . Consci ou sness , as the " thin g " of common sense 
b efore it , is to be r educed to ce r t ain r e l ations of percepts , 
part iculars , or sensatiJns . 
To describe the way in wh i ch this is acc omplished we 
must refer to the two ways of c l a ssifyin g aspects ment ion e d 
earlier. One may collec t the differen t asp e cts of an obj e ct 
in different pers pe ct:Lves , or one may concentra te on the var-
ious aspects of different objects in one pers pective . The 
former method is the way of physi cs, the latter is the way 
of psychology . The physicist is cJncerned with the d ifferent 
appearances of an object , wh ile the psycho l o 1st is concerned 
with the occurrences of part icu l ars a t a p la ce where there is 
a brain and ne r vous system . 
We s p oka ••• of two ways of class ifyin g pa rticula rs• 
1. AOivi , 17-18. (In his phr=t s e " ghost of a su b ject", Russel l 
sea ms to antic ipa t e Ry l e 1 s " ghost in the machine ".) 
One vJay c :)lle cts together the appa a ran cas commonly 
regarded as a g iven obj e ct from diffe r ent pla cas; 
this is, broadly speaking , the way of physics , lead-
in g to the cons truction of physica l objects as e ats 
'Jf such appea rances. The other way collacts t3r;ath-
ar the appear&nces of different objects from 3 g ivan 
place, tha re s ult being wha t we ca ll a perspactiva. 
In the particula r case whera the pla ca concerned is 
a human brain, the perspactive belonging to the 
place consists of all the parcaptions of a certain 
mao at a ~ ivan tima . Thus classification by per-
spect i.ves is r e levant to psychology , and is essen-
tial ~ in defining wha t we mean by one mind.l 
And jus t a s the history of an object consis ts of the 
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series of correlat e d a sp e cts at successive intervals of tima, 
so the history of a pa rson consists of the series of perspec-
tivas at t h e time s whe n the parson is s a id to be conscious. 
Such a history constitutas what Russell calls a "biog raphy ," 
in contra st to a t h ing . The thin g of common sensa consists 
of all the corralated aspacts which are commonly regarded 
a s its effects or app<:!arances in different pla ces. A "biog -
raphy, 11 on the othe r ha nd, consists of a ll the appearB.ncas of 
different objects from one oo int of view or c l ace at succes-
sive times. 2 Thus t he same data constitute either aspe cts 
in t he syst e m formin g the thin g, or tha particula rs contained 
in tam9orally succe s sive parsp.~· c t ivas formin g one biog raphy. 
Phy s ics is con cerned with the totality of as p ects fo r ming 
one thin g ; psychology is concerned with tha aspects -:>f dif-
ferent thing s contained in one persp a ctiva.3 
So far, than, in pl B. ce of consci ousness Russel l has 
substituted a perceived perspective , and in place of a par-
1. AOM, 105. 
2. Cf. AOM , 127. 
~. Cf . Mystic ism and Lop; ic, 143-144. 
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s~n he has substituted a bi~graphy which consists ~f a t amp-
oral se r i es of perspectiv es . But t here i s m~re t ~ pe rsona l 
e xper i en ce than a succa s s iJn of presanted data ; i~ e ., there 
is a l so pers~nal identity . Locke buried this ida nt ity i n a 
soul sub s tanca, Huma tried to locata it in tha laws of associ-
at ion, and Ka nt pr~jectad it into tha transcendental a g o. 
For Russell mem ory "tra nsforms" successive percepts into ax-
periencas c ~n stitutin v a pars on or mind. 
It is not only by time-re l a ti::>ns that tha parts 
of ona bio3r~ phy a r a c ~llacted togathar in tha 
casa of livi ng b a in g s. In this case thera a ra 
the mnamic phen omena wh ich constitute tha unity 
of one 11 expar:Lence," a nd transform mara occur-
rences into 11 e xpari an cas 11 ••• they are [ the mnemic 
phenomena] \vha t transform a biogra phy (in our 
technica l sensa) int~ a life. It is they tha t 
g ive tha c~nt i nuity of a "pars on" or a 11 mind 11 • 1 
We a r e n ~w in a p~s it i J n to see how the 11 stuff" of the 
universe (i. e ., a spects, sense-data , particu l a rs, s a ns ibles, 
etc.) can form b :>th physical a nd menta l a v ents , a c c ::> rd .ing to 
Rus sell. Part i culars, vJ a ha ve found, may be members of t wo 
g roups: (l) the syst em of aspe cts wh i ch constitute t he w ~rld 
of objects inva stiga t ad by phys icists, and ( 2 ) the as act s of 
d iff a ren t objects in one b io g r aphy , invest i ga ted by psy ch ol-
og ists. If one i s concerned with an aspect in rela t ion to 
similar aspe cts as f ormin g one obj e ct, t he n he i s in the 
physical rea l m. If, however , he is concerned with the ap-
peara nces of diff s ren t ob jects at a pl a ce where the re also 
i s a brain a nd a narv ous systam than he i s i n the mental 
1. AOM, 129 . ( How does one a ccoun t for mamory in terms of 
sense-data?) 
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realm. When one se a s a star, the aspe c t of the star he se a s 
is both a member of t h e gr~up of particul a rs which is his par-
spactiva, a nd a member of the system of different as pedts 
which is the star. The same aspect is thus associated with 
t wo pl a ces: (1) the pla ce where the star is, and (2) the p lace 
whara he is. 1 Percepti::m it self is "the appearance of an ob-
ject from a p l ace where there is a brain (or, in lower ani-
mals , some suitable nervous structure), with sensa-organs 
and nerve s formin g part of the intervenin g med ium." 2 Such 
appaa r a n cas of objects a re d ist in g u is had from other appear-
ances in tha t they g ive rise to, and a re aff e cted by mnemic 
phenomena. 
Wh a t is neutral ln the perce ption of a parson is the 
bare particular or 11 se nsat i on, 11 ( as Russell calls it in- The 
Analysis of Mind). The sensation or particula r is wha t is 
left after a ll mneillic phenomena a re abstracted from it; ile., 
11 the sensation is a t heoretica l core in the actua l e xpe r-
iance.113 These sensa tions or particula rs a.re the 11 stuff 11 
of t h e unive rse which form e ither mental or physical events 
depend ing u p on whether they a re taken as be lon ~ ing to the 
s y stem of as pe cts of one t h ing , or the series of a s pe cts of 
different t hing s in one perspective . 
1. Cf . A0 >1 , 131. 
2. AOM, 131. (The difficu l ties in thi s view will be p ointed 
out l a ter .) 
3 . AOM, 132 . (This raises t he qu e st i on as to whether Rus s e ll 
hol ds a sel e ctive or generat ive thao~J of sen s e-data a s a part 
of his neutral monism . s If the mnemic phenomena a re a dded to 
~~ ...... 
the sense-da ta it vJould "that a purely se l ective theory is not 
h e l d by Rus sell. This '\>Jill b e discus s ed l a t e r .) 
Sensations a re wha t i s comm on to the me ntal and 
phys ica l wor ld s ; they may be defin e d as the i nte r-
s e ction of mind a nd ma tter ••• Tha e ss e nce of s an sa-
ti J n, a c co r ding to the view I am a dvoc a tin g , is its 
indapan d en ce of past expe r i e nce . It is a cora in 
our a ctua l exper i e nce , never ex i s tin g i n isola t i on 
exc ept possibly in young infants.l 
Sen sa-data, than1 ca ll ed particula rs or sensations, f :n·m 
the neutra l stuff of the universe. Vario u sly r e lated , they 
are a i thar phy s lea l or me ntal events. The ref ora, as Ru s-
s e ll says, they are common to b oth the mental a nd phys ica l 
world . But be s ide thes ·e common el ements, t hera a l s ::> are 
entit ies pe culia r to each of the mental a nd physica l realms . 
'
1Sensib les 11 v~ ere def ined in t he l as t section as t h ose "ob-
j act s wh ich hav e the s ~me me t aphys ica l a nd physica l sta tus 
as a e nsa -da ta, with:>ut nece ssarily ba in g data to any mind . " 
Thu s ''sensi blas" a re tnha b ita nts only of the . hysical rea lm 
s ince by definition they do not occur in a perspective a t a 
place whe r e the r e is a b rain a nd nervous system . They com-
prise a ll the data in all the un perceive d pe rs pe ctivas. As 
s uch, they a re k nown ~nly by i nfe re nce, but postula t ed by 
Russell to p r ? sarva t h e continuity of the physical world. 
We have not t he mea ns of a scertaining how thin g s 
appear from place s n'Jt su rrounded by brain an d 
nerves a nd sense-organs, becau se we ca nnot l ea ve 
the body ; but continuity makes it not unreasonable 
to suppose t hELt they p re sen t some appea rance at 
such places. If--oar imoossible--thare ware a 
complete h uma n b ody with no mind inside it ~ all 
those sensib ilia would exist, in rela tion to that 
body, which would be sense-data if t he re wa r e a 
mind in the body . ~~at the mind a dds to sansi-
1. AOl'-1 , 144. 
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billa, in fact, i s merely awareness: everything 
elsa is physical or physiolog ical.l 
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.And just as the physical realm has it s peculiar inhab-
itant, so does the mental realm. Like the "sensibilia'' 1.-vh ich 
are inhab itants of the physical r sa lm a nd d~ not intersect 
with the mental realm, imag es are inhabitants ~f the men tal 
r ea lm which do not int e r se ct with the physical realm~ That 
is ', the re are no perca ivad 11 sens ib 11 ia," and t he re. are no un-
experienced ima s es. Ima ges resemble sensations, but they 
differ fr:>m sansati :ms, according to Russell, in havin g dif-
farant cause a nd effect ralat i~ns. Thus, 
the practica lly e ~fa ctive distinction between sen-
sations and ima ga s is tha t in the causa tion ~f sen-
sati~ns, but not of images, the stimu lation of 
nerves carryin g an effect into the br.:=t in, usually 
from the surfa ce of the body, plays an essential 
part. And this accounts for the f a ct t hat imag es 
and sensations cannot always be distinguished by 
their intrinsic nature.2 
The primary d i stinction, therefore, between sen sat ions and 
i mages is with ~e gard t~ t heir causatiJn. Sensations are 
c a used by stimulati:m external to the body, whereas irr:aE: ~ s 
ara n~t. But sensations and ima3e s also differ with r ega rd 
to t he ir effects, thou h in a lesser de g ree. 
Images also di.ffar from sensa tions as re gards 
their effects. Sensations, as a rule, ha ve ~~th 
physical and mental effects • .As you watch the 
1. "fy st ic ism a nd Log ic, 150. (It is curl ous hov1 t he mind, 
as a r e l a tion of sense-data, co uld add "awareness" to sensi-
bilia. Aware n e ss should be the appearance in a perspective 
of sense-data where the re is a brain and nervous system.) 
2 • .A OM, 151 
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train y ou meant to catch lea vin g tha stati~n, 
thara ara both tha s uccassiva positions of tha 
train (physical eff a cts) and tha success ive wav es 
of fury and disappointment (me ntal affects) •. Images , 
~n tha contrary, thou gh they may produce bodily 
movaments, do so according to mnemic laws, not 
a cc~rding to tha laws of physics. All their ef-
fects, of wha teve r natura, fol l ow mne mic laws.l 
It is claar, now, that Russell's position ~nly can ba 
cla ss ified as a modified neutral monism. Ha believes that 
the '' st uff 11 out of whi ch wa ara to reconstruct our e x perience 
of tha external worl d in accordance with both physics a nd 
psych ~logy is . naither mental nor physical, but neutra l. Per-
capts, particula rs, s ensations, se nsa-data are terms desig nat-
in g tha neutral stuff con st ituting the material of the world. 
Sen sa - data rela ted a ccording to t he laws of physics constitut e 
the physica l world. Sen sa -data rela t ed by t he laws of psy-
chology constitute the me ntal world. 11 Sensibilia 11 and "im-
a ges " r e semble the 11 neutral s tuff," but ara not themselves 
neutral since they belon g exclusively to the physi ca l and 
menta l world respe c t ively. Thus Russel l is a monis t with ra-
gard t o the "stuff 11 of common experience of the exte rnal 
world, but he remains a du a list with re gard t~ the causal 
laws of physics a nd psychology, and vJi th re ga rd to the dif-
ferenca be tween ''sensibilia" and "images". He malc.as t h is 
cl ear himself. 
My own b e lief ••• is that James is ri ght in r e ject-
ing con sciousness as an entity, a nd that the Amer-
1. AOM , 151. (Unfortunately, Russell does n ot further clarify 
the view that i mages produce b odily movements a ccord i n to 
mnemic laws.) 
lean realists are partly ri ght, not wholly , i n con-
sidering tha t both mind a nd matter are composed of 
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a neutral-stuff which, in isolation, is neither men-
tal nor material . I should admit t his vie vJ a.s re-
ga rds sensations: what is heard or seen belon gs 
equally to psychology and to physics. But I s h ould 
say that images belon g only to the mental world, 
while those occurrences (if any ) which do not form 
part of any "experience" belong only to the phys-
ical world . There are , it seams to me , prima fac~, 
different kinds of ca usal laws, one belong in g to 
physic s , and the other to psychology . The l aw of 
gravitation, for example , is a physical law, while 
the l aw of a s ~ ociation is a psycholog ica l l aw. 
Sensations ara subj e ct to both kinds of laws , a nd 
are the ref ora truly "neutral" ••• But en tit i a s s ub -
ject only to physical l~ws, or only to psycholog-
ical lavJ s, a re n 'Jt neutral, and may be called re-
s pe ctively purely materia l [i.e. , physical] , and 
purely rnantal.l 
This view also i m:)lias an abandonin g of the generative 
t he ory of parc a~)t ion wb ich Rus.sall held in t l1a Probl ems . 
Sensa-data now have an independent existence and a re select-
ad out of the whole sy s tem of sensa -data by t he organism do-
ing the perceiving . At leaa~ t h is would seam to be the view 
most (onsistent with Russall 1 s theory. But, curiously enou gh, 
Russell a lso holds that sensations are the 11 t heorat 'l. cal core" 
in actual experiences , and never exist in 11 isolation except 
p ossibly i n y :>ung infants'1 • How, on Russell 1 s view, does 
pa st experience add to perception? Do the aspects of the 
brain and nervous system add chara cte r istics to sensations, 
which must be "abstra ctad 11 to a rrive at the sensation? This, 
however , cannot quite be the case, since it is memory whi ch 
adds to the sens~tions . But what is memory, and to what ex-
1. A Oivl , 25-26 . 
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tent does it add to the s e nsat ion? I s the addition 3 enerat-
ed by mem ory , or is it selacted? At this point it i s n ot clear 
just \.;hat theory Rus s ell does hold. Bu t s ince he d::>e s not 
discuss this point himself, one can only infer what his posi-
t i on really is. At any rate, however, there d oes seem to be 
a difficulty here . 
This, then) concludes the exposi tion of Rus s ell's neu-
tral monism. He does not s a y that this is the ::>nly view con-
sistent with t h e f a cts of psychology, physics, and perception , 
but mg.kes the more modest claim that this is "one pos s ible -
explanation of the f a cts". 
5. Cr itical Ana l ys is and Evalua tion. 
l~ oore entitled his phi losophy 11 a defence of common sense ." 
By this he affirmed that know led~e of the fundamental features 
of rea lity as expressed in ordinary propositi::>ns as commonly 
understood a re kn own to b e true with certainty. That is, or-
dinary know ledge based on common experiences as usually ex-
pressed r es t on less dubious foundati::>ns than an y other k ind 
of kn owled _e. Attempts to revise the common interpretation 
and expression of the pervasive features of experience lead 
to inconsistencies beca use of the interpenetration of the 
meanin g s of terms, a nd the r e fere nce of these meanin g s to 
ordinary expe rien ces. On e can attempt to think differe ntly 
about ex perience , but experience remains the s ame. 
In his 11 Re ply to Critic isms, 11 Russell said that 1 t was 
only 11 common san sa" to accept the truth of physics . Common 
sense k nowledge must be true to some extent , or even science 
would ha ve no f~undati~n, but it also harbors i gnorance, 
myths, g,nd inc:msistencies. "Science diminishes t heir num-
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ber ; in t h is sense it corrects common sense in s~ite of start-
ing from it." 1 And although Russell accepts the "truth of 
phy s ics," ye t he cle, imB 11 it is for the philosopher rather 
than the phys i cis t to a scertain just what physics asserts." 2 
Althou gh thes e statements \'Jere made after Russell had 
aband~ned his the~ry of neutral monism, yet they are not only 
consistent with, but expre ssive of his e~rlier attitude as to 
the general relationsh i p between common s ense, science, and 
philosophy . The diff arence, perhaps, was tha t in the earlier 
period he was much more under the influence of a log ical ap-
proach to problems then he was when he vJrote the ''Reply". 
But it is certain, at l east, that Russell wou ld disa-
gree with Moore tha t common sense is the most secure and the 
most reliable kind of k nowledge . This is clearly reflected 
in h is approach to the prob lem of sense-data. 
According to Rus sell, there are two k inds of evidence 
wh ich lead him to construct a philosophical the~ry of the ex-
tarnal world quite different from either the common sense 
view or the scientific view. The first k ind of evidence is 
the familiar evidence of delusive perceptions. 'ihile the 
1. " Rep ly to Criticisms," in The Philosophy of Bertrand Rus-
sell, ad. Paul Schilpp, 704 . 
2 • Ibid. , 701. 
common sense noti~n of perception seems adequate as regards 
normal perceptions, it is inconsistent when extended to de-
lusive perceptions. That is, the common sense view is that 
the mere percepti~n of an object is evidence for its exist-
ence. But in the case of hallucinations, mirror-images, 
dreams, etc. tbis is not tbe case. 
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The second kind of evidence is based on the physicist's 
description of the physical world or object, a nd the physiol-
ogist's description of perception. On both of these accounts, 
the common sense view that physical objects exist as we per-
ceive them is false. It is implied that a distinct~on must 
be made between things as we perceive them and things as they 
exist in rerum natura. 
Russell neither defers to science nor to common sense. 
Instead, he reconstructs the world in terms of the so-called 
indubitable data of perception; i.e., sensations or sense-
data. In our analysis we shall attempt three things: (1) 
determine whether Russell's reconstruction of the external 
world leaves fewer problems than the scientific-common-sense 
view; (2) determine whether Russell's theory fulfilled the 
theoretical requirements Russell set for himself; and (3) 
deter~ine whether the evidence of delusive perceptions and 
the scientific description of perception requires ~ rejection 
of common sense. 
To begin with Russell's theoretical reconstruction of 
the world, there are two main aspects of this reconstruction 
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t::> ba discussed: Russell's viaw of physicg,l obje cts and spa ce, 
and Rus sall 1 s account of perca ~ tion with spe cific referanca 
t') tha function of mind a nd mamory. 
According to Ru s sall , physical ob jects ara naithar mi-
c ros copic at::>mic entit i as , n or t hi ngs as usually percaived . 
Instaad , t hay a r a dafined as a series of aspacts , aach as-
.,. 
pact occuring at a pl a ca whe ra tha ob j act has an effect. Tha 
J\ 
object , meani ng the tota lity of aspects , i s navar axpe r i-
anc ad as such, but only the individua l aspe ct s e x i sting in 
each perspec tive. The objact , a s ordinarily conceived , is 
a "log ica l construct" from these aspect s. 
Al th::>u gh t h i s view d ::>as t aka into a ccount tha va riab il-
ity of perca _ tions, it seams to do so a t c::>nsidera ble sa c ri-
fica in int ellig ibility. Neither the comm on n')r the scian-
tific properties of otjacts are re t a ine d ::> n t h is view. An 
object ex i sts b ')th a t t he place whara the pe rc eive~ is , a nd 
1v hara i t appaa r·s t') be. It is spr·aad out in spa:ce a t avery 
p ::>int where t ha obje ct cou l d ba saan. No two people eve r see 
the same obje ct, s ince the same object is ma ra l y a log ical 
c ')n st r uct ion . 
If t h is viaw wars t he true ona , it is hard to understand 
how anyo na aver could hava arrived at the common notion of an 
object. An object seams t::> ha ve a discrete locat ion in space ,. 
and a unity whi ch i s inta gral t::> it . It s eams to be public 
a nd rr jb i la as a unit. It has phys ical propert i es s uch as 
density, mass , ma gne tic or e l ec t r ica l charges . H::>w d oas ::>na 
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c:Jnceive of thase chara cte r i s tics and proparties on Russell's 
view ? Supp ose one p l a ces a screen between h i mself a nd the 
:Jbject. Wh e n the screen is re moved there is an aspect of the 
object a t t he pl ~ce where the obse rver is. When the screen 
is repla ced t he aspe ct of a n ob j e ct is re placed by a n .aspect 
of tha s creen . But how can both aspects of t he obj e ct be a t 
exactly the same p l ace (i.e., t h e place where the :Jbserver 
is)? Does the as pect of the :Jbj e ct cease to e x ist whe n the 
screen is p l ace4 before it, an d than come into existence 
a ga in when the sc r e en is r e moved (remember, an as pe ct ex ists 
wherever the perce pti:Jn occurs, a s well a s where the objact 
ap pea rs t o be)? If so, is it s ex i s t ence dependent u p on our 
percaivin g · l t? Although the serie s of as pects of an obj ect 
a re b rok en up by the screen, t h ey return whe n the screen is 
remove d . Does the ob ~e ct include the interrupted aspe cts or 
n 'Jt? 
If the scraen is mere ly a ser i e s of a spe cts how can one 
move it, and interpose it between othe r a s pe cts? ~~at is 
m:Jv ement on t h is view? vlh.a t does Russell mean by ~me th i ng 
ef f a c t in g a n other? How a r e complex b,i i :Jl og i ca l organ i za -
tions and processes (such as reproduction) to be ex pl a ined 
in te rms of aspects alone? .And how is the objec·t constructed? 
Do sen sa tions psycholog ica lly related log i cally cons t ruct an 
obj e ct? If so , h 'Jw is t hi s done? Do series of aspe cts pro-
vide an int e llig ible concept of phy sical unity? 
Ru s s ell talks about a n "intervening medium , 11 and sense 
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organs, the nervous system, a nd the brain media ting percep-
ti ~n . But since the se are aspe c t s, how do they mediate per-
c ept i ~n? Wha t is air on t h is view, since it is never per-
ceived? 
Similar questiJns can be raised rega rding s pa ce. If 
every perspective is p rivate, how can spac~ appear to be so 
public , continuous, and objective? Once asain, what is con-
struct ~d space? How is it constructed? 
vlhen one turns to Rus sell's view of parsonal ex perience, 
at leas t as many problems arise. How does the brain and 
nervous system sel e ct percepts? How does the mind, whi ch 
is only a se r ies of sense-data psycholog ically (or mne mical-
ly) r e l a ted .·. a dd a ware ne ss to perception? Vlhat is memory 
a nd how does it transform percepts into personal experience? 
Wh a t is i ma g ining , conceiving , and feelin g ? Are conce pts 
and mean ings attach_ted to sense-data, or themselves s e nse-
data? What is evaluat in g and reasoning on th i s view? 
To be sure , awarena ss, conceiving , ramamberi n g a re 
mysteries on any view . But at leas t on the scientific-com-
m~n-sense view such activities have ac quired a f a irly in-
tellig ible frame of reference, and can be correla ted with 
neurolog ical p r ocesses. On Russell's view they merely seem 
to b e a ttachme nts to his theory as an after-thought. 
The point I wish to make is that thou gh Russell' s theory 
is an interes tin g theoretical interpreta ti on of experience, . 
there se ems to be little justification for ac cepting it as 
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a true account of the world. It does not have the common 
intelligibility of our ordinary experiences, nor does it have 
the practical consequences of a scientific theory. It is a 
different way of thinking about the world based on different 
assumptions as to what is given in our experience, but it 
raises more problems than it solves. 
As a matter of fact, the theory does not even satisfy 
the theoretical objectives which Russell set for himself. 
There were two such objectives; (1) the elimination of as 
many unverifiables from his theory as possible, and (2} the 
elimination of the traditional dualism between the physical 
and the mental order. 
Has Russell, first of all, constructed a theory in terms 
of verifiables only? Tha answer is, No~ In order to escape 
solipsism and an incomplete world Russell had to introduce 
11 sens1bles" into his theory. By definition "sensibles" are 
not perceived but are supposed to resemble · ordinary sense-
d~ta. Sensibles are the kinds of things which could be per-
ceived by any percipient, human or animal, at places where 
no percipient now exists. In other words, a person on the 
other side of the moon would presumably see as sense-data 
what are now sensibles. But a sensible by definition is 
never experienced. They fill in or fill out the unexperi-
enced world. 
I should like to ask whether there is any greater evi-
dence for these sensibles than there is for inferred sci-
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entific objects? I suppose t here is in the sense that sensi-
bles a r e supposed to resemble sense-data whereas scientific 
objects are n ~t expected to. This advantage seems to me to 
be miti ated , however, by the f a ct that scientific objects 
have such predictiv·e a nd explanatJry va lue. An atom , a virus, 
a chem ica l bond can be represented mathematica lly in a way 
prec l uded of perceptual data. Referring to the qual ities 
a lone ca nn ot explain why and in 'vvha t quantities hydr~ chl oric 
acid and sodium hydrox ide combine to f~rm salt and water . 
I 
l Such quest ion s have req~red the k in d of analysis and sym-
bolic r epresen t at i on achie ved in chemica l analysis. I do not 
think , therefore , thatthe advantages i n logical simpli city 
offered by Russell 1 s theory (s upp osing it could be vJo rked 
out con s i stently) are suff icient to lead us to accept it 
as a truer account of reality than the ordinary scientific -
common-sense view. 
Secondl y , has Russell ' s the ory elimi nated the tradi-
ti onal gulf between mind and matter? I d o not believe tha t 
it has . Russe ll is still left with a psycho-physical dual-
ism between the sensibles and the ir physical rela tions, a nd 
image s and their menta l causes. In pla ce of the traditional 
dualism Russell has s ubstituted a tripa rtite division of 
the anti ties of the worl d into sen s ibles 'tlh ich are wholly 
physical, i ma 5es which a r e wh olly mental, and sensati~ns or 
parti cu l a rs which are suppo sed t o be neutral as between the 
phys :ical or t he me ntal 1'1/ orld, but are themselves ree. lly 
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psycho-physical (since only sensations ara entirely neutral). 
I cannot see that Rus sell 1 s theory has helped to elimina te 
traditional dualism . Aware ness and the orig in of mnemic phe-
nomena a re more of a mystery on Russell ' s vievJ then they are 
ordinarily. 
And finally, Russell avowed to establish his theory on 
the indubitable foundation of sense experience. But even here 
he failed. The sensation\ which are ul timately neutral as be-
tween the physical a nd psychological world are the "theoret-
ical core 11 in experience. That is , sensations themselves are 
never experi-enced but a re arrived at thr-:>u gh a process of 
abstracti:m, a nd there are phil osophers who w::>u l d disa gree 
as to vJhether this 11 theoreticB.l core 11 can be a rrived at or 
not. 
Consequently , Russell ' s theory rests on presuppositions, 
t-:> use Moore 1 s phrase, at le.ast as questionable a s the sci-
entific or comm on sense view . One could certainly argue that 
the belief in a sensation which is an abstracti::>n fr om ex-
perience rests on less secure evidence than the belief that 
there exists before me a 9iece of paper which is not just a 
series of asp e cts s pread;, out in a lDnstructed space, but is 
a three-dimensional solid object, publically observable , and 
having an internal structure. 
This, t hen, leads us to the third quest ion: 11 Do delu s i va 
perce ptions and the scientific distincti-:>n between primary 
(or unperceived) properties of objects and secondary (or per-
calved) qualities lead to a rejection of the common sensa 
view ( as amended by science) of the world?" 
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In this chapter I shall not discuss delusive perceptions 
since the philosophical interpretation of such da ta will be 
carefully analyzed in the following two chapters in reference 
to Broad 's theory of parcepti~n . Suffice it to say, for the 
present, tbat the ordinary physiolog ical or optical axplana-
ti'Jns of illusions, hallucinati'Jns, mirages, etc. provide 
an explanation of delusive perceptions c'Jnsistant with , but 
more precise than, the ordinary common sense view of parcep-
tion :. That is, I shall try to show in the followin g tv1o chap-
tars t hat the occurrence of delusive perceptions does not ra-
quire a philosophical reconstruction of experience incorpor-
ating "sense-dat~'as the fundamental buildin g ~l~cks for the 
rae on struct ion. 
Let us turn, then~ to the last questi'Jn in this chapter: 
Does the physicist ' s concept of physical objects and the phys-
iolog ist's explanati'Jn of perception imply that the common 
sense view of the world is incorrect? Or, does it merely 
mean that the comillon sense view is too simple as it stands, 
or even insufficient as it stands, but that once amended by 
science, it serves as t he truest account of experience and 
reality? 
f Accordin g t'J the physiolog ists account of per~?p t ion, 
color vision depends upon the cones, and black and wh ite vis-
ion upon the rods. Of course, much more is necessary for nor-
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mal parcapti::m of objects; e.g., a normal aye, optic narva, 
an d visual araa of the corte:x. .Acc:>rding t o the physiolo-
g i st's v iew, certain kinds of ''undulations" or "corpuscles'' 
when ref l ected from objects strike the retina of the eyes, 
sanding a cha r ge :>f nervous anergy along the optic nerve to 
the visua l area of the cortex. Vision occurs when the cortex 
is thus stimulated. A similar account would b e given of audi-
tory, olfactory, and tactual sensations. The significance 
of these theor ies for our discussion is that they imply a 
distinction between the experienced world and an unperceived 
physica l world. We experience a world rich in sensations 
whereas the wo rld itself is said to be devoid of such sensory 
qualities. This conclusion seems almost certain when one can 
cause the experience of certain sensations by directly stim-
ulatin g areas of ths brain independently of the stimulation 
of the external receptors . It v1ould seem , then , that the 
brain is somehow the repository of the sensory qua l ities v-1h ich 
we mistakenly attribute to independent material objects . 
And the physicist ' s interpretat ion of physical objects 
tends to reenforce this conclusion . On his view physical ob-
jects do not have definite boundarie s or surfaces, clOd are 
not colored or solid. They are made up of moving particl es, 
or perhaps are not made of particles at a l l , but are quanta 
of energy or fields of activity. I do not pretend to know 
what the latest physical theories are, but they certainl y 
suggest a physical world quite different from the one we 
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usually experience. 
Thus the physiologist's a nd physicist's account of the 
physica+ world and of per·cepti'Jn is qu ite different from the 
c~mmo n sense view. And as long a s one stays within the c~m­
m~n sense frame of reference or the scientific frama of ref-
erence no JUzzl es occur. But as soon as the l a nguage or 
points of view are mi xed , then we get all kinds of curious 
quastio ns . People ask where in the brain is the perce pt. 
They ask how colors can be cau sed by nervous energy. They 
ask how colored objects can appear to be outside of us when 
they actually are in our brain or mind. They ask how phys-
ical objects can appaar to be colored when they ara not col-
orad. They ask how the indefinite boundarias of atoms can 
appear as smooth physical surfaces to the san ses, at c. at c. 
It is my con tent i Jn that B.ll such quas t ions ara psaudo 
quastions . Tha t is, that they are not quas tions of f a ct, such 
as could ba g iven a definite or probable answar . They ara not 
questi"Jns such as , 11 Hm.J many chairs are in the room? 11 11 Is the 
book blue or green? 11 11 How many electrons does a hydrogen atom 
have in the outer orbit? 1111 '1tlhat is the weight of a hydro gen 
proton?" etc . Instead they are quasti"Jns like "Is the a tom 
red or graen? 11 uHov~ can a physical obj 3ct fit into your brain?7 
11 If the chair is in my bra=.in how can I sit on it? 11 That is, 
pseudo questions are qu e stions whi ch cannot be answered be-
cause they depend upon conflicting interpretations or frames 
of reference for their maaning . They resemble such ques t ions 
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as , 11 Is blue heavy? 11 11 Is sugar happy1" "How many is g ood? 11 
etc . They are what have been .called 11 category mistakes" be-
cause of the peculiarity of the idiom in which they are 
phrased . Such quest ions have no ansv~er, so they are pseudo 
questions: i.e., they re s emble ordinary questions , but are 
not ansvJerable. 
Pseudo questions are raised about perce 9ti::>ns because 
people mix the la n ~-2ua -:se of physics or physiology •~11th com-
m'Jn l anguage , a nd vies versa . V-ihen one asks 11 \..Jhere in t he 
cortex is the perce pt?" he comb ines the physioloe; ica l a ccount 
of percepti'Jn with the common sense view . Suppose, for ex-
ample, that I now see a chair . The phys iologist expla-ins 
- ...__ 
this process of seeing in terms of retina , optic ne r ve , cor-
tax, etc . He concludes that what one sees depends upon all 
these processes and wou l d ~ot occur without them. This seems 
to imply that what one sees is not wha t or where he seas it , 
but is somehov.J in his bra in , the last place in the physiol')g-
ical tra in of processes . But t he n one is left vl ith the alarm-
ins conclusion tha t the chair is in his brain. "But how could 
a chair :fit into my brain? " There i s someth i ng queer ab::>ut 
the process of rea soning l eading to such a quest ion. 
The cha ir that I see is not in my bra in . It ts v.1ha t a nd 
where I see it. The sc1entist 1 s interpretation d oe s n ot 
cha nge tha t . What science offers is an expl anation of the 
process of seeing . The common sensa vi ew of s eein g , on the 
other hand , is not an exol anation of the process of seeing , 
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but a dascript ion af \l/h 9. t is seen . Ordinary lan guage sarva s 
t::> danate a nd dascribe ordinary ax par i ancas with ::>ut, h owaver , 
axpl a in in g hovJ thaE·a axpariances occur. Tha tarminology of 
the sciancas, on t ha other ha nd, is not adaquata to danota 
or dascriba ordina ry exparience, but do es provide an explan-
at i::>n of t he occurrence of such experiences. 
It saams, therefore , that tha symbolism · adaquata to da s-
i 3na ta a nd dascriba ordina ry exparienca doas not it sa lf pro-
vide an ada qua ta mada of explanation . To axplain san sory pro-
cassas , one is lad bayond comm on s a nsa to a physiolo~ ical 
tha or·y of perce ption; but this theory, in turn, d 'Jas not pro -
vida a desc r iption of wha t we saa. 
This way of looking at tha point of viaw a nd l a n 0 ua ga of 
comm on sensa , a nd the theore tical frama of referance and sym-
b olism of scienca ana bla s ona to saa why neither point of viaw 
conflicts with the othar. One is an axplanation of a certain 
stata of affairs, wharaas tha othar is a description of it. 
Thu s science be g ins a nd ends with obsarvation, yet its ex-
planations or t ha ories are not descriptive accounts. The 
basic notion, than, is t hat an explanation i s not a dascrip-
t ion, and a dascript ion does n 'Jt s e rve as an explana t i on1 for 
tha m'Jst part. Rafa rences t'J light waves , abso rbtion and re -
flaction of light, nervous stimuli, occipital ~~citati::>n are 
not descriptive of "'hat is sa en, but serve as explanati'Jns of 
tha visua l p r'Jcess. On tha oth e r hand, descripti'Jns of what 
one sees, a baautiful sunsat, for exampla, does not explain 
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the se ~ in g process. 
Thus paradoxes ar ise from confusing the scientific ex-
planation of the process of Seeing with a description of wha t 
is sean. If one trias to dascriba what he seas in physiolog-
ical terms, it wil l appear as if the object he sees does not 
have the qualities it appea rs to have, or is not where he 
seas it. But clea rly the object one seas does have the qual-
ities it appears to have a nd is wh e re he sees i.t--this state-
ment is practically tautolog ical. 
Similarly, when a physicist explains what a physical ob-
ject i s , he does not describe the perceived physica l object 
(i. e ., pen, tree, paper, etc. as seen). If one confuses the 
physicist's explanation of what a physical object is with the 
perceived physical ob ject, then it will seem as if the object 
one perceives do e s not ha ve the qualities or properties which 
it is perceived to have. But again this is not the case. 
I have been trying to argue, therefore, that scientific 
explanations do not prove that the percactual world is not 
as we perce ive it to be. A physiolog ist (or mora likely a 
philos opher arguing from physiolog i cal data) often concludes 
his J_Jh ysi:>log ical descripti')n of perception with the re mark, 
11 The re, y ':>U sea, the world as you axperien ce it is really in 
y our brain or in y0ur mind." · This, however , is misleading 
be causa the world I experience is not in my bra in or in my 
mind, but is where it is seen to be. Only confusion ca n re-
sult from considerin g it ~tharwisa. It makes no sense to 
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say 11 tha building is in my mind ," a nd the raas ~n it makes no 
sensa i s beca use I do n~t ax parianca the building as baing in 
my mind, a nd the mea ning s of t he ta rms 9.re basad on ordinary 
experi ence . I t maka s no sensa in tha s a me way tha t it mak as 
no sensa to say 11 tima is \~a t 11 • 
Similarly, one ofte n hears tha rama.rk , 11 Tha papar is a ot 
r eally wh ita, 11 The ob ja ct is not really s olid, but it is j u st 
tha t y ou axpa r i a nce it a s bain g solid, 1111 T t1o fira is not really 
hot ," ate . But t he poin t is t hat the object whi ch is supp osed 
not to be solid, ~ t he solid objec t I experi ence . Another ob -
ject , t he phys icist's ob je ct, may n~t be solid , b ut it is not 
the expe rienced s9lid obje ct. And the langua ~e in t e r ms of 
. - ~ 
which we talk a bout ch a irs, trees, st on es , ate. a nd their 
qualities is the l a ng ua ge of common se nse. It is mea nin gfu l 
t-:> say , and ca n be ve r if led, "The chair is hea vy, 11 "The tre e 
is g reen ," "The stone is s olid ," and s o fort h . It d ~e s not 
make s e nse to say 11 The cha ir has no weight , 11 "The tree i s not 
colored , 11 11 The s tone is not solid." These l at ter statements 
do not make se n s e be cause a different meaning is baing fo r ced 
on the words alth ou ~h t hey ara a rran ged in the usua l syntac-
tica l way . One is confused a s to why the statements sound 
puzzlin g beca use they appear simila r to ordina ry s t a teme n t s 
su ch as 11 The g rass i s One understands t he mean i ng of 
" g rass ," and " g re en " and understands the meanin g asserted 
when t he t arms are ra l a tad in the usual synt a ctica l way a s 
in the sentance "The g ra s s is g raen 11 • '· han one s ay s "The 
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g rass is not really green," this statement appears as intel-
ligib l e as the f~rmer f~r t he reasons g iven, but as a state-
ment its significance depends upon reinterpreting the meaning 
of " green " and 11 grass 11 • This l at ter statement is only intel-
lig ible if ~ne keeps in mind t his linguistic revisi~n. But 
once t h is lin guistic ravisi~n is s een, it "ls evident tha t the 
statement 11 The grass is not really green,'' does not imply, as 
it appears , that the grass that we ordinarily experience and 
call g reen is not gree n. It asserts, perhaps, that the mole -
cules in terms of vJh ich the phys icist interprets the grass 
are not green, and this is undoubtedly true. But this does 
not mea n , as it is often taken to mea n, that the grass as the 
garde!lJa r experiences it is not green. The physicist refers 
osten s ively to the sa.me object, but the frame of referen ce is 
diffe r ent. 'tlhat can be sa id in one frame of reference or in 
one type of symbollsm cannot be said in another. Saying the 
paper is not wh ite is like sayi ng an atom is round or square, 
or t hat a nervous st imulat i~n is blue or red. The concepts 
r'.)und and square and blue and red do n'.)t ap ply to t 'o in g s such 
as electrons, atoms, or nervous energy. But they d'.) apply to 
the common objects of expe r ience. 
To pe sure, the distinction I have made betwe e n ex-
planatory scientific theories, and a descriptive common Biilrnse 
view is over-simplified. Explanations occur at the level of 
common sensa, as when one 11 explains" the cracking of a dish 
when it is heated or cooled too rapidly as due to too rapid 
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expansion or contracti~n; or, when one explains a broken win-
dow as resulting from a th r own ball. But a mor~ adequate ex-
planation requires an excursion into molecular structure _and 
move ment, and force, etc. which are not primarily descrip-
tive terms. Likewise, even scientific theorias are descrip-
tive in the sense that the concepts employed are often anal-
ogou s to a perceived situation (e. g ., 11force'' connotes physical 
effort, and atomic structure is modeled after the perceived 
universe), or when the theory is an expression of more care-
ful, or microscopic or telescopic observati~n. 
The question is often asked, which account is the truer 
one: the scientific explanation of phenomena, or t h e comm on 
sense de s cription. I do not know how such a ~uestion can be 
answered. 11 True" and 11 false 11 as applied to propositi~ns are 
p olar terms, the ap plication of one excludin g the application 
of the other. Thus two different scientific explanations of 
an event can be verified as either true or false. Likewise, 
two different descriptions of the same event imply that one 
is false. But since an explanation and a description of an 
even t each have a definite function, the truth of one does 
not seem to imply the falsity of the other. Just as the 
same object can be both heavy and colored, because these 
charact~ristics do n ot conflict, s o it may be the case that 
the common sense description 'Jf ·_ an object as solid, colored, 
square, etc., a nd the scientific explanation of the structure 
of an object as molecular also does not conflict. I do not 
know that they do not$ But a scientist, at least, does n ot 
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seem to find t ha t they do. 
Here aga in this soluti~n is perhaps too simple. If the 
common sense object is squa re and solid, and the scientific 
~b ject is molecular in structure having indef i nite boundaries 
and consisting mostly of e mpty space, there · appears to be a 
conflict between the t wo accoun t s. But the re may be no con-
flict i f one remembers that the t wo accounts are rela tive to 
diffe r ent f rames of refe re nce. Is there a conflict in a drop 
of blood looking red a nd congealed to the naked aye, and show-
ing r e d and wh ite corpuscles in a clear liquid under the mic-
roscope? Which is m~st real? Clearly it is the same drop of 
blood sean under different conditions and neithe r conditi~n is 
mora r eal than the other. The difference g atwaen the comm on 
sense parca pti~n of a physi ca l object and the physicist's 
account may be of a similar na tura. 
I fail to sea how a scientific theory , however fruitful, 
could prove that the chair I sea in front of me is not color-
ad, solid, a nd does n ot ha ve a permanent and independent ex-
i s tence in soma s ensa , as t hes e terms are ordinarily u nder-
stood. On t h e other ha nd, to assart that the common sense 
way of experiencing t h in g s is the only true account seams to 
me to overlook the tremendous advance s in understanding and 
control of t he external worl d afforded by science . Science 
be g ins from the point of view of common sensa, and its final 
verifica tion de pends u p on ordinary experience. But inbetwean, 
the theoretical frame 1'1 0rl{ may be quite different from the com-
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mon sense way of looking at things . 
To return to Russell, then , it seems to me t hat neither 
the physiolog i s t' s tha~ry of percapti~ n nor t he physicist ' s 
conception of a phys i cal object require a complete rejection 
of the common sense view. Russe l l offers a philosophical re-
constructi~n of the world which l acks the intell i gibility of 
the common sensa way of looking at t h in g s , and at the same 
time minimizes science by r e jecting its inferred entities . 
It seems to me that ordinary lan guage provides a medium for 
describing ordinary experience which when inadequate i s amend-
ed by science . Science offers an explanation of experi e nce 
by referr in g to unexperienced inferred entities . Prac t ically, 
science and common s e nsa do not seem to collide , but rather 
one seems to be an extension of the other. I f one asks which 
is t he truest account of reality , I do aot know how the ques-
tion c a n be answered. The evidential basis for common sense 
is ordinary experience ; the e v idential basis of science is 
percept ion plus its pragmatic utility in understanding and 
facilitating control of ordinary experience. Ne ither view 
necessa rily implies a denial of the other . 
Russell's philosophical theory , however, rejects the in-
fer r ed entities of sci.ence, and conceives of ordina ry experi-
ence in a way which tends to make this expe rience more of a 
problem than it ordinarily is. So I would reject Russell ' s 
attempted ph iloso phical reconstruction of the world . It 
seems to me t hat thi s a ttempt to sin gle out sensa tions or 
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or sansa-data as tha ultimata constituents of the world, and 
reconstruct the wo r ld in tarms of thasa alone , although an 
interesting and ambitious undertakin g , is n~t justified aithar 
pragmatically or thaoret ically . 
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CHAPTER IV 
BROAD'S ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION 
1. Introduction. 
In this chapter we turn to the third, and last member 
of the philosophia triumvirate which ruled Cambridge in the 
first quarter of the twentieth century, and who, more than 
any others, have helped mold the character of contemporary 
British philosophy. There are some who are not so pleased 
with this character, describing it perhaps as a wordy quib-
ble over linguistics with a morbid fixation on philosophi-
cal puzzles, and who would welcome a return to the grand, 
if destructive, speculation of F. H. Bradley. But this 
stress on linguistic analysis has at least had the positive 
effect of emphasizing the importance of language as the in-
dispensable medium for understanding, communicating, and 
facilitating the verification of meanings about experience 
and the external world. No longer can one rest content 
with the assumption that one can freely speculate with 
language, ignoring its common meaning and function. Lan-
guage is a tool which when used appropriately enables one 
to accomplish certain tasks, but it is a tool adapted to 
certain functions and with an appropriate structure and 
use, and therefore cannot be used indiscriminately. The 
flexibility and richness of language should not lead one 
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to conclude that its significance is maintained independ-
ently of its use. Moore, Russell, and Broad have done 
much to obviate thi~ conclusion. 
In this chapter we turn to an examination of Broad's 
theory of sense-data which comes as a natural climax to 
the other theories that have been discussed. In the two 
works which will be considered here, Scientific Thought, 
and The Mind and Its Place in Nature, Broad haa analyzed 
perception and the problems leading to a rejection of the 
common sense view of the external world and the adoption 
of the sensa theory more carefully and more fully than 
anyone previous. In our analysis of Moore and Russell we 
have carried on what would be called in military terms "a 
probing action" -- a tactic of fe .eling out the strength of 
the enemy -- in this case the strength of the sensa theo-
ry. So far we have not attempted to do battle with the 
sensa theory on a complete front -- taking into account 
all the arguments -- but this will be our aim in this 
chapter. Fortunately, this aim is facilitated by there-
1 
cent (1953) publication of a book which submits Broad's 
analysis of perception to an exhaustive criticism. 
Since there will be less need of exposition in this 
section because the "facts" on which the sensa theory is 
based should be quite familiar through the discussion in 
1. Martin Lean, Sense-Perception and Matter. (All follow-
ing references to this work will be abbreviated "SPM •1~ 
the previous chapters more time will be spent on analysis 
and criticism. This requires a different methodological 
approach than was the case in the previous chapters. 
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There we presented a systematic account of tm philosopher's 
views first and turned to the criticism later. However, 
this method although adequate for exposition is not wholly 
satisfactory as regards criticism since it does not allow 
discussion of problems as they arise. If both the expo-
sition and the criticism have been brought off satisfac-
torily, often one is left with a positive feeling with 
regard to both, and some doubt as to which is the more 
adequate (especially if the criticism has been adverse). 
But a criticism continuous with the exposition should 
leave no doubt as to the validity of the conclusion since 
it exposes and confronts problems as they occur. 
2. Perceptual Situations. 
The . influence of Moore and Russell on Broad will be 
apparent throughout the discussion. But, as one would ex-
pect, this influence manifests itself through Broad in a 
new way. Like Moore, Broad begins his analysis of percep-
tion by referring to common sentences which he says no 
one would doubt actually indicate certain kinds of expe-
riences. Dispute begins only when one starts to analyze 
such experiences to determine whether they are such as to 
make the phrases denoting them true in the usual sense. 
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Moore, we will remember, said that he knew certain common 
sense propositions to be true for certain even though he 
was not certain as to what would constitute a correct ana-
lysis of them, or even though he did not know how he knew 
them to be true for certain. Broad says that undoubtedly 
such statements as "I see a bell," "I feel a bell," "I 
hear a bell" denote actual states of affairs, but there 
is some doubt as to what must be meant by "I", "bell," 
"seeing," "feeling," and "hearing" if the above are true. 
That is, philosophers differ as to what the analysis of 
mental and physical phenomena are, even though they under-
stand the meaning of such statements as "I hear a bell," 
"I see a tree," etc. 
Some people would raise doubts about the ex-
istence of physical objects, such as chairs, 
tables, bells, etc. Some people would raise 
doubts about the existence of selves or minds 
which perceive such objects. But no one doubts 
that sueh phrases as "I see a bell," "I hear 
a bell~' indicate states of affairs which ac-
tually exist from time to time. People do 
not begin to quarrel till they try to analyze 
such situations, and to ask what must be meant 
by "I", by the "bell", and by "hearing", if it 
is to be true that "I hear a bell". 
There is something strange, it occurs to me, in philo-
sophers raising doubts about the existence of physical ob-
jects and minds, and yet having no doubt that such state-
menta as "I hear a bell," "I see a bell," indicate actual 
1. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, 140. (Hence-
forth reference to this work will be abbreviated "MPN".) 
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states of affairs. How, one might ask, could the state-
ment "I hear a bell" denote an actual state of affairs if 
there were no I's or bells? Broad's way of answering this 
question is to say that although statements such as "I 
hear a bell" and "I see a chair" "stand for real states 
of affairs which differ in certain specific ways from each 
other," yet "these states of affairs may be extremely 
different in their structure and their components from 
what the form of words used to indicate them would natur-
ally suggest to us. "l 
Hence Broad is in effect saying that the meaning and 
structural relationship of the terms in such sentences as 
"I hear a bell" . and nr see a chair" may not actually 
correspond with the states of' affairs which they denote, 
even though they superficially designate them correctly. 
Although terms such as "I," "bell," "chair," "hear," 
"see" have acquired their meanings from certain kinds of 
experiences, yet a more careful analysis of' the experi-
ences may indicate that "the only senses of' "I;' "bell," 
and "hear," which wil l make the statement {!I hear a 
bell~ true are very different from those which we are 
2 
wont to attach to those words." This, as we shall find, 
is a very significant statement. Broad seems to be saying 
1. MPN, 140-141. 
2. Ibid., 140. 
r' 
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that statements do designate certain state of affairs, but 
the structure and components of the state of affairs is 
not what is implied by the common meaning of the terms. 
Broad then goes on to designate such "statements as 
are naturally indicated by phrases like 'I am seeing a 
chair' or 'I am hearing a bell' by the name of 'Percep-
tual Situations'. 111 He says that everyone will agree 
that there are such occurrences as perceptual situations. 
Perceptual situations differ from other experiential sit-
uations such as those designated by the statements "I 
feel cross," or "I feel fine" in that they refer to some-
thing. That is, when we say "I feel cross," and "I hear 
a bell," we are asserting by both statements that we i'eel 
somehow, but only in the latter statement is it also 
asserted that we are experiencing something. "The im-
portant point about the perceptual situation is that we 
claim to be in cognitive contact with something other than 
2 
ourselves and our states." This claim also applies to 
perceptual situations which ordinarily would not be called 
veridical; i.e., hallucinatory, illusory, or dream experi-
ences. When one says he is "seeing pink rats" or "seeing 
an oasis" he is claiming to be in cognitive contact with 
a real physical object even though ai'ter subsequent veri-
1. MPN, 141. 
2. Ibid. 
fication a physical object may not be found to exist. 
Therefore, all perceptual situations, whether veridical 
or delusive involve the "claim to be in cognitive contact 
with something other than ourselves and our states." 
The thing indicated in the perceptual situation Broad 
calls an "epistemological object." "The bell-situation 
and the pink-rat-situation both have epistemological ob-
jects; the situation indicated by 'I feel cross' has no 
epistemological object."1 The recognition of "epistemo-
logical objects" will prove significant because such re-
cognition tends to imply that the delusive situation and 
the veridical situation contain a common object. Perhaps 
a less misleading classification might be one in which 
the situations indicated by "I feel cross" and "I see a 
pink rat" were similarly distinguished from the situation 
indicated by "I see a tree" on the grounds that the form-
er contain as elements only "ourselves and our states" 
while the latter contains as an element (when not a 
mirror-image or an hallucination) a real object. 2 We 
shall find throughout this analysis that original distinc-
tions and classifications tend to pre-determine the re-
sultant theories. 
But we are getting ahead of our story. Broad of 
1. MPN, 141 
2. By a real object here I ·only mean such things as trees 
and chairs which are distinguished from hallucinatory data, 
and are not usually considered mental states. 
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course realizes that there is a distinction between veri-
dical and delusive experiences even though both claim 
cognitive contact with a thing. His adjectival classi~i­
cation of the object as "epistemological" initially ac-
counts for this difference. He says, 
My motive in adding the quali~ying word "epis-
temological" is that otherwise some bright 
spirit will at once complain that the pink-
rat situation has no object. What he really 
means is of course that there is no ontolo-
gical object, corresponding to the epistem-
ological object which the situation certain-
ly as; i.e., that the situation involves 
a certain claim rhich the physical world 
refuses to meet. 
Unfortunately, there is no transitive verb which disting-
uishes between veridical and delusive perceptions. 
Moore coined the term "directly see" to apply to imme-
diate apprehension of a non-physical object, such as an 
after-image or hallucination, and used the term "see" 
to apply to the usual perception of physical objects. 
The more common way of expressing a delusive experience 
in which a physical object is not really present is to 
say: "You are not really seeing so and so; you only seem 
to be seeing it." But Broad objects to this way of 
speaking because it implies that you are not seeing any-
thing in a delusive perception. He says, 
1. MPN, 141-142. 
words like "seeing" and "hearing" are hopeless 
for our present purpose if they are to be in-
terpreted in this way. I therefore wish it to 
be clearly understood that I shall depart so 
far from common usage as to say that a man 
sees a pink rat, provided he is subject of a 
perceptual situation which has a pink rat as an 
epistemological object and is of the visual 
kind, regardless of whether there is a physi-
cal pink rat colresponding to this epistemo-
logical object. 
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The difficulty to which Broad refers stems from the 
ambiguity of the words "see" and 'lthing". When one sees a 
pink rat he obviously is seeing something, or he would 
not identify what he sees. But also he is not seeing a 
real rat which is colored pink, so he is not seeing a 
thing if one means by "thing" a real physical object. 
In saying that he will so far depart from common usage as 
to speak of "seeing a pink rat," Broad paves the way for 
making an existent entity out of what is seen in the pink-
rat-situation. That is, the assertion nr am seeing pink 
rats" implies "I am seeing something" (in the descriptive 
sense of "thing"). And since this pink-rat-something is 
a particular, Broad later asserts that it is a thing in 
the sense of "thingtt attributing actual existence.2 
So far the distinctions indicated have been based pri~ · 
marily on the meanings of terms. To know the epistemolo-
gical object of a perceptual situation one only has to 
1. MPN, 142. 
2. Cf. MPN, 186. 
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understand the meaning of the object of the transitive 
verb of the phrase designating the perceptual situation 
(e.g., "I see a cow"). To determine whether there is also 
an ontological object, viz., a real cow, as well as an 
epistemological object, one has to consider more than the 
meanings of terms. 
In order to know what is the epistemological 
object of any situation it is only necessary 
to know the meaning of this substantive-word in 
the phrase which expresses the situation. In 
order to know whether the situation has an 
ontological as well as an epistemological ob-
ject it is plainly not enough to consider the 
meanings of words; the question can be set-
tled only, if at all, by a careful enquirf 
into the nature and connection of things. 
The perceptual situation containing an epistemologi-
cal object has definite characteristics: (1) the epistemo-
logical object contained in it is an object of "the physi-
cal kind," rather than a subjective feeling; (2) the per-
ceptual situation in which the epistemological object 
occurs is intuitive as opposed to a thought-situation 
which has as its object a discursive content; (3) the per-
ceptual situation claims to reveal an object as it is at 
the time of the perception, rather than as it was as in a 
memory situation; {4) and finally, the epistemological 
object of the perceptual situation has a sensory content. 
Everyone, Broad believes, should agree to this characteri-
zation of a perceptual situation. 
1. MPN, 143. 
' ! 
127. 
We may now sum up the points on which every 
one is really agreed, however much they may 
differ in their language, as follows: There 
certainly are perceptual situations; they are 
intuitive and sensuous and they have epistem~ 
ological objects of the physical kind, which 
are given as simultaneous with the situation 
itself. This is of course neither a defini-
tion of the perceptual situation nor an analy-
sis of it; it is simply a set of propositions 
which are admittedly all true of perceptual 1 
situations and not all true of anything else. 
We can be agreed that there are the kinds of percep-
tual situations indicated by Broad having epistemological 
objects with the characteristics he describes. One of 
these characteristics is that the epistemological object 
is of "the physical kind". This means, as was previously' 
defined, that in the perceptual situation a claim is made 
that one is in cognitive contact with a physical object. 
This raises the question as to what one means by a 
"physical object". There are five characteristics which 
. 2 
are ordinarily attributed to physical objects: (1) they 
endure for some length of time; (2) they are believed to be 
literally extended, to have a definite size and shape, an 
inside as well as an outside, and to stand in spatial re-
lations to other objects; (3) they exist independently of 
perception; (4) they are publically observable; and (5) 
they have a number of characteristics in addition to spa-
tial one's (e.g., color, temperature, hardness, and so on}. 
1. 1V1PN, 146. 
2. Cf. MPN, 146-147. 
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Since the experience of certain qualities seems to depend 
upon certain sense organs, physical objects may have qua-
lities never revealed to humans. But if there are physi-
cal objects they must at least have most of these quali-
ties, since these are the qualities ordinarily attributed 
to physical objects such as mountains and cars. Broad says 
that if there are "no things which have all these charac-
teristics ••• lfhe~ all perceptual situations are delu-
sive" ••• or "there might still be things which literally 
possessed some of these characteristics and to which the 
rest could be ascribed in various more or less Pickwick-
1 ian senses." Here Broad has reference to the common 
scientific notion that physical objects are not literally 
colored or hard, and to the Berkeleyian view that percep-
tual "situations are delu~ive in every respect except in 
their claim to reveal something independent of and common 
to percipienta; 112 viz., the volitions of God. 
I cannot help but feel that there is something peculiar 
in Broad's statement of the problem. Since the meaning s of 
such terms as "endure;• "extended," "size, 11 "shape,'' 11 in-
-
dependent existence," 11 publically observable," acquire 
.. 
their meanings in reference to commonly perceived objects 
such as doors, stoves, tables; etc., what does it mean to 
1. MPN, 147. 
2. MPN, 147-148. 
129. 
inquire whether there are such objects having these charac-
teristics? Are there no stoves, stables, and chairs? Does 
Broad mean that such objects have characteristics other 
than, or different from those they appear to have? If so, 
what meaning shall we then give to "endure," "extended," 
~~~ ~ ~ 
v "sixe," "slope," "independent existence," 11 publically ob-
. . 
servable," etc.? Perhaps there is no difficulty in 
Broad's query. But it seems odd that people should ask 
whether objects which are observed to have particular 
qualities, actually have these qualities. Is a door ex-
tended, colored, independent, and publically observable? 
If it is not these things, then what is it? But this is-
sue will be taken up later and these remarks and by way 
of preliminary suggestion. 
3. Analysis of Perceptual Situations. 
So far Broad has said that such statements as "I see 
a chair," and "I heal" a bell" designate perceptual situa-
tions. And this mode of expression, he says, suggests a 
certain kind of analysis. It suggests that the situation 
consists of me, the physical object whose na~e appears in 
the sentence, and the two of us related directly by a non-
symmetrical two-term relation which is indicated by the 
verb. Now if there never were any delusive experiences 
'(" 
rv then the mere oceu:r;_ence o.f this situation would be taken as 
a guarantee o.f the existence of both constituents. Every 
phrase such as "I see a chair" seems to carry a warranty 
of such existents. But because there are dreams, halluc!-
nations, and mirror-images the mere occurrence of the per-
ceptual situation is no guarantee of the existence of the 
physical object. Thus Broad is led to inquire to what ex-
tent the sentences mentioned serve as an adequate analysis 
of the perceptual situation. In his characteristically 
terse manner, he says: 
In philosophy it is equally silly to be a 
slave to common speech or to neglect it. When we 
remember that it represents the analyses made 
unconsciously for practical ends by our prehis-
toric ancestors we shall not be inclined to 
treat it as an oracle. When we remember that 
they were probably no greater fools than we 
are, we shall recognize that it is likely to 
accord at any rate with the more obvious facts, 
and that it will be wise to take it as our 
starting-point and to work from it. It is 
plausible to suppose that the perceptual situa-
tion which lan§uage describes by the phrase 
"I see a chair does contain two outstanding 
constituents related by an asymmetrical two-
term relation. But it is quite another ques-
tion whether these two constituents can pos-
sibly be what is commonly understood by "me" 
and by "chair." .1 . 
The question under consideration, then, "is whether the 
'objective constituent' of the perceptual situation desig-
nated by the phrase 'I see a chair', is what one ordinarily 
understands by •chair'." Acc(!)rding to Broad, this is not 
the case. There are three respects in which the objective 
constituent (the seen chair, the heard bell, the felt cloth, 
etc.) falls short of fulfilling the meaning of the substan- · 
tive terms (''chair," "bell," "cloth,") denoting the objec-
1. MPN, 148. 
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tive constituent. (The "objective constituent" is what is 
actually presented in the perceptual situation on the basis 
or which the claim to be in cognitive contact with some-
thing is maae.) The rirst respect in which the objective 
constituent does not rulrill the meaning of the term "bell" 
is as regards physical completeness. That is, "in any one 
perceptual situatiom I am never aware or the whole of the 
surrace of a physical object, in the sense in which I do 
seem to be aware of a part or it. n1 Whenever I see a phy-
sical object I do not, in other words, usually see the rar 
side of it, the inside, or the bottom side. The term 
"bell" designates the complete physical object, but this 
is never seen in toto in any one visual experience. The 
most one can say is that he sees a part of the surface of 
the bell. 
The second respect in which the objective constituent 
does not fulfill the meaning of the.· term "bell" is as re-
gards duration. By a "bell" we mean something which has 
existed for quite some time. No persons's perception of 
the bell consumes an amount of time equal to the history 
of the bell. That is, the history of the bell prior to 
and after anyone's perception of. it is not given in the 
sense in which the history of the bell which coincides 
with the perception of it is given. Thus Broad concludes, 
1. MPN, 149. 
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we have no right to say that the situation, des-
cribed by the phrase "I am seeing the bell" con-
tains the bell as a constituent; at most we can 
say that i~ntains as a constituent a short 
event which is in fact a slice of a longer 
strand of history, and this lo~ger strand is 
the history of a certain bell. 
And thirdly, the bell has more qualities than is ever 
revealed in any one perceptual situation. ~~en I hear the 
bell, I may not be seeing it or feeling it. vVhan I sea it 
I may not be hearing it or touching it. And in most cases 
at least I am certainly not tasting it. Thus Broad again 
concludes that the objeetive constituent of a perceptual 
situation does not satisfy the meaning of the term denot-
ing it since the term connotes more qualities than are ever 
given in one perceptual situation. The conclusion of this 
analysis is especially significant to Broad, so I shall 
quote it in full. 
.... 
Thus we are forced to modify the first naive 
analysis of "I see a bell" at least in the 
following respects: We cannot hold that this . 
situation literally contains the bell itself 
as a constituent. The most we can say is 
that the situation contains me and something 
related by an asymmetrical two-term relation; 
that this s orne thing is in fact a part of a 
larger surface, and is also a short slice of 
a longer strand of history; that it has in · 
fact other qualities beside those which are 
sensuously revealed to me in this situation; 
and that this spatially larger and temporal-
ly longer whole, with the qualities which 
are not revealed sensuously in this situation, 
is a certain bell. This whole is the epis-
temological object of the situation expressed 
by the phrase "I am seeing the bell". And, 
even if it be granted that there is an onto-
logical object which corresponds accurately 
to the epistemological object, we cannot 
admit that it is bodily a constituent of the 
situation. ~e most that we can grant is 
1. MPN, 149. 
that a small spatio-temporal fragment of the 
ontological object is literally a constituent 
of the situation, and that a small selection 
of the qualities of this fragment is sensuously 
revealed in the situation. 
What Broad means then is this. There is no doubt that 
there are perce ptual situations as designated by state-
ments such as 11 I see a bell." Such situations contain a 
claim to be in cognitive contact with an "epistemological 
object" having all the characteristics connotated by the term 
"bell"; i.e., that a bell is literally contained or given in 
the situation. But on closer analysis one finds that not 
all the characteristics or properties of the physical object 
are g iven in any one perceptual situation. In Broad's terms, 
the "objective constituent" of the perceptual situation does 
not coincide with the 11 epistemological object 11 : "the s 1 tua t ion 
does not and could not contain as a constituent anything that 
2 
could properly be denoted by the word "bell". The conclus-
ion, then, is that "the existence of the situation denoted by 
the phrase 'I see a bell' does not suffice to guarantee the 
existence of s. certain t h ing denoted by the phrase 'the bell' ."3 
That is, one may only be seeing a mirror-image or having an 
hallucination. 
Broad's analysis 1s certainly a very clear one. And 
1 • I-1PN, 150 • 
2. Ibid., 151. 
3 • I b id • , 151 • 
134 . 
in so f'ar as it points out that a bell is not "literally" 
contained (i.e., not all of its characteristics are revealed) 
in a single perceptual situation, and thus that one cannot 
be sure on the basis of' a single perception that he is see-
ing a real bell, Broad's analysis is also revealing. How-
ever, I think Broad's analysis is misleading if' it is taken 
to mean that one never sees a real bell, or that what he 
sees cannot ever be properly denoted by the word "bell." 
The word "bell" names such objects as bells. Origi-
nally, its meaning was determined by the characteristics of 
the objects named. However, once the term acquires a def'i-
ni te meaning (.conmta ti ve meaning), and once one learns the 
meaning, then the connotative meaning determines the denota-
tive significance of' the term; i.e., the application of' the 
term to particular objects. Now, the connotative meaning 
of' the term must have been acquired through successive ex-
periences of a bell: seeing it from one side and then anoth-
er, f-eeling the top of it and the inside, etc. This is 
true because one cannot experience all of' the bell simul-
taneously. But this does not mean that after one has learned 
the meaning o:f the term one cannot "properlyn apply it to a 
bell if' he is only seeing it, or if he is seeing and touch-
ing it, but not hearing it, or if' he is hearing it but not 
seeing it or touching it. Objects are "properly" named in 
exactly these kinds of' situations. If one had to be experi-
encing all of' the characteristics of' an object before he 
I I 
could "properly" name the object, then no object could ever 
.be named, as Broad has so clearly pointed out. But also 
such a restriction, if originally enforced, would have pre-
vented objects from being named, and names from acquiring 
meanings. 
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Also, I think it is misleading to say that since we do 
not experience all ·of the object at the same time "we can-
not admit that it is bodily a constituent of the situation • 
• • Lbu!T that a small spatia-temporal fragment of the 
ontological object is literally a constituent of the 
situation." In one sense the statement is true and in anoth-
er it is not, and the ambiguity results, I think, from 
fluctuating between thinking of the object as being physi-
cally or "bodily" contained in the situation and being 
"literally" contained in the situation. Broad has shovm 
that not all of the characteristics of an object are per-
ceived at once, and thus that not all of the object is per-
ceived at once, but does this mean that the object is not 
being perceived? If one is not seeing all of .the object 
at once, does this mean that he is only seeing a part of 
the object, or that only a part -of the object is "bodily a 
constituent of the situation?" Again, there is a sense in 
which this is true and a sense in which it is not true. 
By "a part of" one can mean what he is attending to which 
is related to a larger whole, such as a thread in a coat, 
or the painted flower on a dish. By "a part of" one can 
also mean a piece of, or extraction from, as when one 
breaks the dish and holds a piece of it, or pulls out the 
thread. This fragment no longer fits into the whole. 
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Now, the part of the object one sees is not a piece of 
the object, but a part of the larger whole, of which it can 
be singled out by attention, but not dismemembered except 
by destroying the unity of the object. Thus in one sense 
one can speak of only seeing a part of the object, or that 
only a part of the object is presented to him. But this 
is not to be taken to mean that only a fragment of the ob-
ject is seen, or only a piece of it is presented to .tne 
person. Perception does not occur by piecing together 
1 
glimpses of the object. 
Broad's way of analyzing the perceptual situation sug-
gests that one is never aware of bells, tables, trees, or 
at best, that he is only aware of a part (meaning a frag-
ment) of such objects. But if this is the case, then one 
is left with the question as to what is the basis for the 
"claim" that one is aware of a complete object. And at 
this point, I think, the weakness of Broad's analysis is 
exposed, because he cannot justify the claim. 
Thus to return to Broad's analysis of the perceptual 
1. As seems to be the case in theories of perception which 
analyzes the object into a series or family of sense-data. 
But it seems to me that this kind of analysis does not do justice either to the Gestalt quality of experience, or to 
the unity of the object. 
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situation, we found that he had concluded that the objective 
constituent did not exhibit all the qualities connoted by 
the word "bell." And yet, the perception does carry with 
it the claim of cognitive contact with a whole bell. This 
conviction that the objective constituent is not just a 
partial manifestation but a real object Broad calls "the 
external reference of the situation." 
This is the conviction that this particular 
ithe objective constituent7 is not isolated 
and self-subsistent, and rs not completely re-
vealed in all its qualities; but that it is 
spatio-temporally a part of a larger whole of a 
certain characteristic kind, viz., a certain 
physical object, and that this whole has other 
qualities beside those which are sensuo~sly 
manifested in the perceptual situation. 
And now we come to the significance of the analysis 
given above. When Broad analyzes the logical grounds of 
the nexternal reference" he has little success. The pro-
blem for Broad is trying to determine how one can infer 
from a part to a whole, when the whole is never given. He 
says, "I can see no way of validly inferring from the mere 
presence of an objective constituent, which sensuously 
manifests such and such qualities, that this constituent 
is part of a larger spatio-temporal whole which is not a 
2 
constituent of the situation and has other qualities." 
This, I think, reveals the peculiarity of Broad's analysis. 
1. MPN, 151. 
2. Ibid., 151-152. 
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He began by saying that every perceptual situation 
carries with it the claim to be in cognitive contact with 
a physical object. However, he analyzed the perceptual 
situation in such a way tha t he cannot justify the claim. 
He can describe the claim, viz., that one believes on the 
basis of perceptions that he is aware of a whole object, 
even though he does not experience all of the object, and 
yet this cannot be justified on the basis of Broad's ana-
lysis. He admits it is a fact, but denies that he can ac-
count for the fact. So instead of questioning his analy-
sis, he denies the validity of the claim and concludes 
that not only is one never aware of a whole physical ob-
ject, but that the persistent existence of physical ob-
jects is itself not a fact, but a hypothesis. 
Strictly speaking, the most that could be 
directly inferred from a study of perceptual 
situations and their mutual relations is 
that probably such and such a perceptual 
situation will be accompanied by such and 
such others, belonging to different ob-
servers; or that it will probably be suc-
ceeded by such and such other perceptual 
situations, provided I make such and such 
movements. The notion of persistent physi-
cal objects is logically merely a hypothe-
sis to explain such correlations between 
perceptual situations; and the common-
sense belief that the objective constituents 
of perceptual situations are literally 
spatio-temporal parts of persistent physi-
cal objects is logically one veri special 
special form of this hypothesis. 
1. MPN, , 152 
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But it seems to me that this conclusion merely fol-
lows from Broad's way of analyzing the perceptual situa-
tion. He maintained that since not all of the character-
istics of the physical object are manifested in single per-
ceptual situations, one cannot admit that the object is 
bodily a constituent of the situation, or that substantive 
terms denote whole objects. This leaves Broad with a 
"spatio-temporal fragment of the object." However, since 
successive perceptual situations only reveal different 
"spatio- ·temporal fragments," how does one justify the be-
lief that there are, and that one sees, persistent, com-
plete, physical objects? But Broad cannot answer this. 
In other words, his analysis cannot account for the common 
notion and belief in physical objects. And if his analysis 
of perception were the correct one, I do not see how the 
common notion and belief in a physical object could have 
arisen. The notion of a persistent physical object is not 
just an intellectual conviction -- an hypothesis -- but 
a fact encountered in experience. 
Even though all of the characteristics of an object 
are not presented in a single perceptual situation, this 
does not mean that a real physical object (not just a 
"spatio-temporal fragm~nt") is not present. It may not be, 
as in the case of mirror-images and hallucinations, but if 
in subsequent verification one finds the characteristics of 
the object verified, then one is justified in claiming that 
139. 
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he is aware of a real physical object, and that such an ob-
ject is "bodily" presented in his perceptual situation. It 
seems to me that this is an empirical fact which cannot 
be denied by analysis. One can only clarify our understand-
ing of the fact. Broad's analysis, however, leads him to 
deny the fact. 
That is, the tendency to accept something as a sign 
of something else, or the predisposition to identify some-
thing on the basis of a partial clue is so characteristic 
of awareness that it would seem to be a more fruitful ap-
proach to accept this as fundamental and interpret our 
knowledge of physcial objects in terms of this. We do ac-
cept the partial manifestation of a physical object in a 
perceptual situation as evidence for the existence of the 
actual physical object. This, however, does not make the 
notion of a physical object a hypothesis to explain corre-
lations between perceptual situations. It merely means 
that the claim to be aware of a p~sical object is a hypo-
thesis, which is verified in subsequent perceptions. 
The whole notion of a persistent object being pre-
sented to a person in various situations is denied by 
Broad. Instead, he defines the object in reference to his 
successive perceptions. But it seems to me that one is 
not just aware of qualities exhibited in successive per-
ceptions, but that one is aware of objects such as doors 
and chairs, the manifest properties of which one can be-
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come more aware of on further inspection. One is always 
investigating something, not just entertaining a series of 
perceptions. Broad began his analysis from this fact, but 
ended up by denying the fact as a result of his analysis. 
I do not think, then, that the incompleteness of a 
single perception is sufficient grounds for denying that a 
bell or a chair exists when one can verify that he heard a 
bell or sees a chair. The peculiar! ty of Broad's view can 
be pointed out in another quotation, I believe. He says, 
We must remember tha't; although no amount of 
perceptual verification can prove that the 
objective constituent of a perceptual situa-
tion is a part of a physical object of a cer-
tain specified kind, complete failure of such 
verification may make the contradictory of 
this almost certain.l 
I know this view is a common one, and yet it does 
strike me as peculiar. Certainly no one can "prove" in a 
logically conclusive sense (i.e., that it is inconceivable 
to think otherwise) that a perceived physical object ac-
tually exists. But this sense of "prove" is not appropri-
ate to empirical ver i fication. One verifies or "proves" 
the existence of a physical object by observing and handl-
ing it (i.e., the book, or ball, or paper). If one is in 
doubt as to whether the object he sees is a hallucination 
or a real object he looks at it, handles it, smells it, and 
1. MPN, 154. 
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asks others if they can see and handle it. If the answers 
to these investigations are negative, then he is convinced 
he is having an hallucination. If the answers are posi-
tive then he concludes he is seeing a real object. This is 
the only kind of proof which has any meaning in this situa-
tion. And it is perfectly adequate. People do not wander 
around asking themselves whether such-and-such an object 
exists, because they can settle the doubt by empirical in-
vestigation, providing the object is susceptible to fur-
ther observation and handling. 
Furthermore, I do not see why a type of verification 
which would render a view almost certainly false, would 
not also render the view almost certainly true, in the 
event that it turned out to be true. That is, if one can 
by observation and handling determine almost conclusively 
that a perception is delusive, then I should think the same 
credibility should be attributed to a veridical perception 
since the means of determining its validity are the same. 
Here reciprocity of credibility seems obvious. But I shall 
labor the point no further. 
To return to the exposition, Broad has not positively 
asserted that the objective constituent could not be a 
spatial-temporal part of a larger whole which could be a 
1. The necessary reference to "it" here is significant. 
One does not just have successive experiences which he cor-
relates by reference to a physical object. Rather, he ex-
amines an object which is the unitary center or subject of 
his successive perceptions. 
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physical object. But as we have pointed out, he does not 
think that this could be proved, or that such a claim or 
conviction is based on an inference. He does not say on 
what it is based because, as we shall find, he is more in-
clined to deny that there are physical objects of which 
the objective constituent could be a spatio-temporal part. 
But at this point he has not denied the possibility. He 
says, 
I have shown only (a) that this LPhysical7 ob-
ject, as such, is never a constituent of the 
LPerceptua!7 situation; (b) that the claim can 
never be accepted at its fact-value, because 
it is certainly sometimes false in situations 
which differ in no relevant internal respect 
from those in which it might be true Las in a 
hallucinatiog!; and (c) that the claim cannot 
be proved to be true, as it stands, by logical 
inference from any premises which are available 
to us. It now remains to iee whether we can 
hold that it is ever true. 
This leads us, then, to the question whether the objective 
constituent ever is an actual part (i.e., part of a larger 
whole) of a physical object. More simply, do we ever per-
ceive physical objects, accepting as the meaning of "phys-
ical object" the ordinary one? 
4. The Sensible Appearance of Physical Objects. 
We turn now to the kinds of arguments with which we 
have become familiar in our discussion of the views of 
1. MPN, 158. 
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Moore and Russell. They center on the variability and dis-
crepancies between the perceptions of one individual at 
different times, and different individuals at the same time. 
Because of such discrepancies in what is seen under dif-
ferent conditions it is wondered whether the physical ob-
ject as such is ever seen at all. 
The difficulty arises because of the group of 
facta which we sum up by saying that it is nec-
ecessary to distinguish between things as they 
are and things as they seem to us, or between 
physical reality and sensible appearance. Dif-
ficulties always arise when two sets of prop-
erties apparently belong to the same object, 
and yet are apparently incompatible with each 
other. Now the difficulty here is to recon-
cile the supposed neutr·ali ty, persistence, and 
independence of a physical object with the ob-
vious differences between its various sensible 
appearances to different observers at the same 
moment, and to the same observer at different 
moments between which it is hetd not to have 
undergone any physical change. 
Thus the difficulty in trying to maintain the common 
sense view that the physical object is always perceived as 
it really is arises from the supposed incompatibility be-
tween the apparent shapes and the real shape, and between 
the changes in the appearances a~d assumed per.mancy in the 
characteristics of the physical object. For instance, the 
common sense notion of a dime is that of a round, flat, sil-
very object whose color, size, and shape are independent of 
the observer, his position, and his movements. But on close 
inspection it will be found that the "objective constituent" 
1. Broad, Scientific Thought, 234-235 
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(i.e., that which is actually presented in any sensory ex-
perience according to Broad) of a perceptual situation does 
vary with the observer, his position, and his movements. 
For example, if one looks at a dime at an oblique angle the 
visual objective constituent is elliptical while the tac-
tual objective constituent is still round; i.e., the dime 
looks elliptical but feels round. This would also be the 
case if one person were looking directly down on the round 
surface of the penny while another person were looking at 
it from an oblique angle. The shape of the objective con-
stituent of the perceptual situation of the former person 
would be round while that of the second person would be 
elliptical. The question, then, is whether the penny is 
round or elliptical, or both? (Russell argued that it was 
sheerly arbitrary to accept any "objective constituent," 
to use Broad's term, as the true one.) 
The common sense notion of a penny, then, is that it 
has a definite and constant size, shape, and color. How-
ever, it is equally common to .observe that the apparent 
size, shape, and color of the penny changes under different 
conditions. This inconstancy is usually expressed by say-
ing that the object appears so.,.aiid-so from such-and-such a 
place, or under such-and-such condi tiona. This difference 
in appearance raises no problem for the common person or 
even for the scientist. For them an adequate explanation 
of variant appearances would consist in stipulating the 
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conditions (physical, psychological, physiological, optical, 
e t c.) under which the object is seen. But this explanation 
is not accepted by Broad. 
The difficulty is to reconcile the different 
appearances with the supposed constancy of the 
penny, and the ellipticity of most of the ap-
pearances with the supposed roundness of the 
penny. It is probable that at first sight the 
reader will not see much difficulty in this. 
He will be inclined to say that we can explain 
these various visual appearances by the laws of 
perspective, and so on. This is not a relevant 
answer. It is quite true that we can predict 
what particular appearance an object will pre-
sent to an observer, when we know the shape of 
the object and its position with respect to 
the observer. But this is not the question 
that is troubling us at present. Our question 
is as to the compatibility of these changing 
elliptical appearances, however they may be 
correlated with other facts in the world, 
with the supposed co~stancy and roundness of 
the physical object. 
Broad seems to want to preserve his question whether 
it can be answered or not. Later we shall try to show that 
the incompatibility of appearances is merely a matter of 
approach; i.e., that the only "relevant" explanation is the 
one Broad refuses to accept. 
As Broad understands the perceptual problem it is · . 
this. Every perceptual situation contains an "objective 
constituent" which has characteristics which vary with the 
individual and with the conditions of perception. Not all 
of these characteristics can be identified with what is 
1. Broad, Scientific Thought, 235-236. 
commonly believed to be the physical object. ~hen two 
people look at a dime the objective constituent of one may 
be elliptical in shape whereas that of another may be round. 
Even for one person a dime may at the same time feel round 
and look elliptical. These facts allow of three interpre-
tations according to Broad, two of which try to maintain 
some semblance of the common sense view of direct percep-
tion of physical objects which do have definite independent 
properties, and the third deviating from the common sense 
view almost entirely. 
According to Broad, if we retain the common sense no-
tion of perception then we must do one of two things: (1) 
we must hold that the objective constituents of some per-
ceptual situations have qualities which differ from and 
are inconsistent with those they seem on careful inspec-
tion to have (as when one looks at a penny under ideal 
conditions); or (2) we must hold that the same surface can 
vary and keep constant in size and shape at the same. time, 
but from different places. 
I think I have now proved that we are tied down 
to three alternatives, each almost as distaste-
ful to common-sense as the others. (1) We may 
try to keep the common-sense view that the 
objective constituents of some visual situa-
tions are literally spatio-temporal parts of a 
certain physical obj.ect, which we are said to be 
"seeing". But, if we do this, we must hold 
either (a) that this physical object can be 
both constant and variable in its spatial char-
acteristics within the same stretch of time; or 
(b) that the objective constituents of the 
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visual situations can have qualities which 
are different from and inconsistent with 
those which they seem on careful inspection to 
have. Or {2) we may Qrop the common-sens e view 
that the objective constituent of a visual 
situation may be, and in some cases actually 
is, literally a spatio-temporal part of a cer-
tain physical object which we are said to be 
"seeing."l 
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Broad discusses three philosophical views of perception based 
on each of these alternatives, each of which we shall take 
up in the next chapter. 
1. MPN, 160-161. 
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CHAPTER V 
THREE THEORIES OF PERCEPTION 
1. Introduction. 
In the last chapter Broad's analysis of perceptual sit-
uations was discussed. A distinction was made between the 
"epistemological object" and the "objective constituent." 
The objective constituent has only those qualities actually 
presented in the perceptual situation, while the claim to 
be in cognitive contact with a real object refers to the 
epistemological object -- which may or may not have an 
ontological object coinciding with it. Even in veri-
dical perceptions the objective constituent cannot be iden-
tified with the epistemological object, since the latter 
represents more qualities than are presented in the former. 
This analysis led Broad to conclude that if there were 
an ontological object corresponding to the epistemological 
object, at best the objective constituent only could be 
identified with a spatio-temporal fragment of the object. 
The notion of a persistent physical object became a hypo-
thesis to account for the correlations between perceptions. 
In this chapter Broad discusses the way in which the 
objective constituent becomes qualified, and the relation 
of the objective constituent to the physical object. He 
concluded, in the last chapter, that a physical object 
as such was never a constituent of the perceptual situa-
tion. However, he did not eliminate the possibility of a 
part of a physical object being a constituent of the per-
ceptual situation; i.e., the objective constituent being 
identified with part of the physical object. In this 
chapter he discusses the arguments which are usually ad-
vanced for not identifying the objective constituent with 
the physical object. First, he discusses two theories of 
perception which try to synthesize common sens~with the 
data of delusive perceptions. And finally, he discusses a 
theory which abandons common sense completely. 
2. The Theory of Multiple Inherence 
The three theories of perception to be discussed are 
all concerned with the variability of perceptions. That 
is, the objective constituent seems to vary independently 
with the conditions of perception, whereas the character-
istics of the physical object are bel i eved to be permanent 
or constant. The theory of multiple inherence tries to 
bridge this difference between permanent and variable 
characteristics by maintaining that a physical object can 
be both constant and variable in appearance within the 
same stretch of time providing one makes certain assump-
tions regarding the relation of qualities and properties 
to the object. 
Accordingly, there are two aspects to the problem of 
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perception with which the theory of multiple inherence 
proposes to deal. The first aspect, or "logical aspect" 
as Broad calls it, concerns the "formal characteristics" 
the perceptual situa t ion must have in order that the per-
ceived characteristics of an object be not incompatible. 
The second, or "casual aspect," concerns the physical 
conditions under which the same object can appear differ-
ent. We shall begin discussion of the multiple inherence 
theory by considering the formal characteristics of the 
perceptual situation according to which the same object 
may appear different under different conditions. 
The theory of multiple inherence is based on the 
notion that a physical object can be both constant and 
variable in its qualitative and spatial characteristics 
within the same stretch of time, "if and only if what we 
commonly regard as pure qualities are really relational 
1 properties." That is, this theory (supposedly) alters 
the common sense view to the extent that it does not hold 
that qualities inhere in objects simply, but that they in-
here in objects relative to certain conditions. It also 
holds that the objecti ve constituent though not the sur-
face of a physical object is a certain region of physical 
space. In other words, it holds 
that the objective constituent of a visual sit-
uation can be regarded as a certain region of 
physical space which is pervaded by a certain 
determinate shade of colour at a certain time, 
provided that we recognize that the relation 
1. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, 161. (Hence-
forth.~~. all references to this work will be abbreviated 
"MPN.") 
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of "pervasion" is of a peculiar kind. It must 
not be a two-term relation, involving only the 
pervading colour and the pervaded region, as 
we commonly suppose. It must be at least a 
three-term relation, involving the pervading 
colour, the pervaded region, and another re-
gion which we might call "the region of 
projection. ttl 
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According to this theory, the objective constituent can 
be regarded as a certain region of physical space which is 
pervaded by an expanse of color. This pervasion is not a 
dyadic relation, however. The region has the color it has 
not only because of the region of pervasion, but also be-
cause of the region of projection, or more simply from the 
place from which it is seen. The color "inheres-in-a-
place-from-a-place." It is l~gicallz impossible for a 
color to inhere in a place simply, but the same region of 
physical space can be pervaded at the same time by dif-
ferent determinate shades of one color from different 
places. That is, it is logically possible that the deter-
minate shades s 1 inhere in the place p from the place pl 
at the time t, and that the shade s 2 inhere in the place 
p from the place p2 at the time t. What would be logical-
ly impossible would be the inherence of different shades 
of the same color at the same place and time from the same 
place. On this view (which is quite similar to Russell's) 
1; MPN, 161-162. 
the statement "s is physically colored" means "from every 
place wher e there is a normal brain and nervo.us sys tern 
near enough to s some shade of the color sensibly inheres 
"1 in s. 
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Thus the formal characteristics of the perceptual sit-
uation require that a distinction be made between the 11 sen-
sible" and the "physical" inherence of a color in a place. 
The former is fundamental and irreducibly triadic, involv-
ing reference to the pervading shade of color, the region 
of physical space pervaded, and the region of projection. 
The latter is a two term relation defined in terms of the 
former. The physical inherence of a color is defined in 
ter•ms of the "colour under which all the determinate shades 
which sensibly inhere in it from a certain set of places 
fall." 2 For example, a book may appear different shades of 
green under different conditions. The physical color of 
the book is the determinable color green, while the sen-
sible colors are the determi~ shades of green seen under 
the different condi tions. The determinable shade is de-
fined in terms of the determinate shades of color inhering 
in a particular place. Thus the same object can appear 
permanent and variable as regards its qualities: it is con-
stant as regards its physical or determinable color and 
variable as regards i t s sensible or determinate shades of 
1. MPN, 163. 
2. Ibid., 164. 
color. 
With these definitions we could perfectly well 
maintain the common-sense view that a physical 
object cannot have two different colours at 
once, and yet admit that it does have differ-
ent colours at once. We should simply need to 
clear up the ambiguities of our statements. 
~ne truth will be (1) that two different 
colours cannot sensibly inhere in the same 
place from the same place at once; (2) that 
two different colours cannot physicallt in-
here in the same place at once; but (3 that 
different colours or different shades of the 
same colour can sensibly lnhere in t£e same 
place from different places at once. 
Thus far we have discussed the for-mal characteristics 
of the perceptual situation only in terms of secondary qua-
lities. Can this characterization of the perceptual si tua-
tion also apply to the variability of primary qualities, 
such as shape and size? Broad believes that it can, pro-
viding we make a distinction between a "sensible form" and 
-· 
a "geometrical property." The distinction is based on the 
fact that while geometrical circularity can be defined, 
sensible circularity must be experienced to be understood. 
Broad says, 
it remains a fact that all sensible forms are 
indefinable, whilst mant of the geometrical 
properties which are ca~ed by the same name 
are definable. It is therefore certain that 
geometrical properties and the sensible forms 
which are called by the same names must be 
distinguished.2 
1. MPN, 164. 
2. Ibid., 172. 
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How, then, does this distinction enable one to solve 
the problem of the variability of the sizes and shapes of 
objective constituents? The geometrical shape is the in-
herent property whereas the sensible shape is the "informed" 
property of an object. It is impossible for a geometrical 
shape to vary since it is what it is by definition, but the 
same objective constituent can be ~informed" by different 
sizes and shapes from different places, just as different 
colors can "inhere" in it from different places. From one 
place the sensible form may be the same as the geometrical 
form, whereas from other places it may not be. It is pos-
sible for an objective constituent to be informed of dif-
ferent sensible shapes and sizes from different places, 
even though it has only one inherent geometrical form • 
• • • since geometrical shape and sensible 
form must always be distinguished, it does not 
follow that the sensible form of an area is 
an intrinsic property of it. It may be that 
one and the same area is "informed" by one 
sensible form from one place and by a differ-
ent sensible form from another place. The 
relation of "informing" may be irreducibly 
triadic, as we have suggested that the rela-
tion of "pervading" is. If this be so, it 
may be that it is only from one place or one 
series of places that an area with a certain 
geometrical shape is informed by that sensi-
ble form which has the same name as the geo-
metrical shape. A like distinction will have 
to be1drawn between geometrical and physical size. 
Thus the multiple inherence theory "solves" the "logi-
1. MPN, 173. 
156. 
cal" aspect of the problem of the difference between the 
permanen t and variable si zes, shapes, and colors of objects 
by introducing the r e l a tion of "pervading" and 11 inherence,n 
and by distinguishing between the physical color and geo-
metrical size and shape of a region of physical space, and 
the sensible color and shape the same region may be seen to 
have from different places. The physical color and geo-
metrical size and shape remain permanent while the sensible 
shapes and colors can vary from place to place. 
The multiple inherence theory agre es with common sense 
in holding that what is seen does have permanent character-
istics, and also has the qualities and characteristics it 
appears to have under different conditions. This is ex-
pressed by saying tha t different qualities "inhere" in the 
same region of space from different places, and that dif-
ferent sl!l.apes and sizes "inform" the same physical space 
from different places. Thus the qualities and characteris-
tics an object appears to have under different conditions 
do literally pervade the region of space occupied by the 
objective constituent, and are not incompatible, providing 
that one remembers that they "pervade" or "inform" the ob-
jective constituent from different places. Knowledge of 
the permanent or inherent characteristics of objects is 
derived from or based upon the inherent qualities and 
1 informed characteristics. 
1. The theory disagrees with common sense in holding that 
the objective constituent is a region of space rather than 
the surface of an object. This w111 be discussed later. 
What, then, can one say about the formal characteriza-
t ion of the perceptual situation off ered by the multiple 
inherence theory to solve the logical aspect of the problem 
of perception? The logical aspect, we recall, concerns the 
formal characteristics the perceptual situation must have 
in order that different qualities may appear to belong to 
the same object. 
rt is quite apparent that the solution offered by the 
multiple inherence theory is merely verbal. It is not a 
theory at all in the sense of offering a new explanation 
as to why the different qualities an object appears to have 
are not logically incompatible. The formal characteris-
tics distinguished by the. theory are no different from 
the formal characteristics of the common sense view. The 
multiple inherence theory points out that there is no in-
compatibility in holding that different qualities or charac-
teristics can occupy the same area from different places, 
and that this is also compatible with the object having a 
permanent shape and color de~ermined under ideal conditions. 
But who disagrees with this, or who does not already know 
this? To say that "a color inheres-in-a-place-from-a-
place" telis us no more about the formal characteristics 
of the relation between color, object, and place then to 
say that "an object has a particular color under such-and-
-
such conditions," or "that an object appears such-and-such 
a color from a particular place." Under the . title of the 
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multiple inherence theory Professor Broad has merely re-
phrased the obvious characteristics of perception in a 
less familiar way. But this characterization does not 
show why it is not logically incompatible for the same ob-
ject to appear different to different people, or for dif-
ferent qualities to appear at the same place under differ-
ent conditions. This judgment is also shared by Martin 
Lean. 
• • • the Multiple Inherence Theory • . • • is 
clearly not an explanation at all. It is not 
even an ad hoc hypothesis. For an ad hoc 
hypothesis at least invents or invokes a dis-
tinct entity or process which will account for 
a given phenomenon; while . the Multiple Inher-
ence Theory merely legislates the alleged 
problem out of existence. In effect, it 
merely allows that the qualities of physical 
objects may appear differently to different 
observers at the same time, and that they 
may appear differently to the same observer 
from different vantage points. It does not 
say anything about such qualities and spatial 
characteristics as colour, shape, and size 
except that this is true of them. But this 
was precisely the fact with which we started.l 
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Thus the theory of multiple inherence is really no the-
ory at all, in the sense of providing an explanation of 
certain data. The terms "pervade" and "inform" denote sit-
uations but there is no more meaning to the terms than the 
situation itself supplies. That is, the terms do not help 
to enlighten us as to how an object can appear to have 
different colors. It is common knowledge that an object 
1. M. Lean, Sense - Perception and Matter,l25-126. (Hence-
forth all references to this work will be abbreviated "SPM.") 
can appear different under different conditions, even 
though these conditions are not usually stipulated. And 
more sophisticated people realize that there are theories 
of perspective (in the genuine sense of theory) to account 
for the differences in perception. 
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In an earlier quotation we pointed out that though 
Broad admitted that "we can predict what £_articular ap-
pearance an object will present to an observer" by the laws 
of perspective, yet he held that this was "not a relevant 
1 
answer." His question is "as to the compatibility of the 
changing elliptical appearances, however they may be cor-
related with other facts in the world, with the supposed 
constancy and roundness of the physical object. 112 It is 
strange that Broad should reject a theory which he admits 
will even predict the kinds of appearances objects will 
have under certain conditions for a view which is riot even 
a true theory but merely a restatement of the original 
fact. One would suppose that the adequacy of a theory would 
be determined by its success in explaining and correlating 
facts. But Broad will not have it so. It is not logically 
inconsistent for an object to retain its independent shape 
and size(determined under certain conditions} and yet ap-
pear different from different points of view. It would, as 
Broad implies, be logically impossible for an object to re-
1. MPN, 235-236. 
2. Ibid. 
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main constant and appear different under identically the 
same conditions. But no one ever believes that it does, 
and whatever superficial incompatibility one seems to find 
can be explained in terms of the perceptual condi ti·ons 
themselves • 
It is significant, I believe, that the average person 
does not find the incompatibility which Broad claims to 
find. People are able to attribute the differences in per-
ceptions to the way the light strikes the surface of the 
object, or to his own peculiar visual position. It would 
seem that if the qualities were as incompatible as Profes-
sor Broad seems to think, one should often be perplexed as 
to what actually are the true qualities of an object. But 
this is not the case. If one wonders what the real color 
or shape of an object is then he inspects the object 
closely under normal conditions of lighting. Under these 
conditions he can state what the qualities of an object are 
because the sense of such statements are determined by just 
such conditions. He is not surprised that the object ap-
pears different under different conditions, and in fact, 
he might be surprised if it were otherwise. To. expect that 
an object would always look the same in spite of the light 
surrounding it is to take a very abstract view of percep-
tion. There is nothing incompatible in an object (i.e., 
bell, desk, ball, etc.) appearing one shade of color under 
certain conditions of lighting and a different shade of 
color und er different conditions. And in spite of this 
differ ence one usually has little difficulty identifying 
the true color of the object. 
Nor is there any real inconsistency with regard to 
t h e diff erent shapes of objects in different perspectives 
eith er. Even though from an oblique angle a penny may ap-
pear elliptical, one is not misled into thinking that the 
object has changed its shape, or that another entity has 
suddenly come into existence which is incompatible iri 
shape with the penny. If there were such an entity then 
there would be a problem. But there is no inconsistency 
in a penny looking elliptical from a certain angle when 
it can be ascertained that the light reflected from the 
penny makes an elliptical pattern on the retina. As 
Martin Lean points out, saying that "an object looks 
elliptical 11 is somewhat ambiguous. For it does not mean 
that it looks as an elliptcal object does, because it 
does not. It looks like a round object does from that 
particular angle. An elliptical object placed in the 
same position as the penny would not look elliptical and 
thus would not be confused with the penny • 
• • • when it is said of a round penny that it 
looks elliptical, I want to suggest that it 
is an open question whether the words "looks 
elliptical" are · being used in their ordinary 
sense ••• the truth is that the round penny 
looked at in this way does not actually look 
as though it were elliptical, but rather it 
looks, as Professor G. E. Moore has put it, 
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like an ellipse, only with something peculiar 
aoout it. And this peculiarity, I venture to 
say, is that its surface "looks elliptical" 
only to the familiar degree and in the fami-
liar way that we expect an actual round penny 
to look when viewed from that general posi-
tion, and it does not look either the way 
the surface of an elliptical disc of that de-
gree of eccentricity ought to look when viewed 
from tilat distance and perspective, or even 
the way it looks when viewed head-on. 
There is, consequently, not the inconsistency or in-
compatibility between the different appearances of an ob-
ject that Broad insists tha t there is. And this is what 
one would expect on the basis of' experience . As Martin 
Lean says, 
we see that t he various appearances of the 
penny, though different, are not, as Dr. Broad 
holds, inconsistent, either with each other 
or with the actual shape of' the penny. They 
are perfectly consistent in view of' the 
nature of' light, the principles of geometric 
perspective, ,and the nature of the hpman eye. 
Quite the contrary, what would be inconsistent, 
in view of' these facts, would be for t~e pen-
ny to present the same appearance regardless 
of the dis~ance and angle from which it is 
inspected. · 
One attributes a certain size, shape, and color to an 
object because the object does have tha t size, shape, and 
color under most conditions. Further, one can correlate 
the differences with the constant properties, whereas it 
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would be difficult to correlate the constant quality with 
the variable quality. Supposing, for example, one accepted 
1. M. Lean, SPM, 138. 
2. Ibid., 141. 
the elliptical appearance of a penny as the standard, how 
would one correlate the feel of an object with the ellip-
tical appearance? Why does the object feel elliptical and 
not round? Whereas one can explain the elliptifal appear-
ance of the object as due to a reflect ion of 1 ight from a 
particular angle, it would be hard to account for the 
measurable size of the object and round "feel" if one took 
the elliptical shape as the standard. 
Similarly, even though an object appears a different 
color under different lighting conditions one can correlate 
this difference with the nomal color of' an object. :·· As a 
matter of fact, the normal color of an object often deter-
mines the apparent color; i.e., if the book is yellow and 
the light is green, the book does not look green, but ap-
pears a blend of the two colors--perhaps a shade of blue. 
There is a certain conventi'Jn regarding the accep-
tance of normal or permanent characteris t ics and quali-
ties, but I d o not see that this should lead us to deny 
that objects do have cha racteristics a .nd qualities. 
Science makes us aware that the conditions are much more 
complex than common sense ordinarily assumes, but this should 
not lead to the conclusion that .the perceived physical 
object does not have certain characteris·t ics and colors. 
And there is no logical incompatibility in an object having 
certain characteristics or colora under certain 
164. 
conditions, and appearing different under different condi-
tions. It is only if one attends to the characteristics 
apart from the conditions that there seem to be incompati-
bilities. 
For example, if one thinks of the elliptical appear-
ance of an object as a kind of entity, and compares this 
with the round penny, then there does seem to be an incon-
sistency. But the elliptical appearance is not an entity; 
it is the way the round penny looks from that angle. 
Broad rejects this explanation, but it is a satisfactory 
one as indicated by the fact that scientists dealing with 
optical phenomena do not find the various appearances of 
an object incompatible. It seems to me if there is a 
discrepancy in data but an empirical theory to account 
for the discrepancy, there is no point in rejecting the 
theory and holding the discrepancy. 
This concludes, then, the discussion of the "logical" 
question regarding the formal characteristics the percep-
tual situation must possess for the same object to have 
permanent and variable characteristics under different con-
ditions. Actually, there is no logical question but only 
the empirical problem as to what conditions must be ful-
filled for different appearances of the same object to oc-
cur. Logically, the difference between the permanent and 
variable characteristics of an object can be expressed as 
well in terms of the language of common sense as it can in 
Broad's more esoteric terms. 
This leads us next, to the "causal" question; i.e., 
the question of the experiential conditions under which an 
object will have such-and-such an appearance. Here Broad 
is concerned to know what are the "necessary" and "suffi-
cient" conditions for an object to possess the perceptual 
qualities it has; i.e., what are t~e necess ary conditions 
for the objective constituent of a perceptual situation 
to look as it does? To facilitate answering this ques-
tion Broad draws three distinctions within the percep-
tual situation between what he calls "a region of projec-
1 tion, 11 a "pervaded region," and an "emitting region." 
The "region of projection" is the region close to and in-
cluding the percipient. It would include the light which 
strikes the eyes of the percipient as well as his body. 
The "pervaded region" is the region of space-time occupied 
by the objective constituent; i.e., it is an extended 
patch of color with a certain shape and size. The emitting 
region is where it is believed a physical object (atomic, 
microscopic, macroscoptic, etc.) exists which roughly co-
incides with the pervaded region. 
Professor Broad draws these distinctions to show that 
the independent necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
occurrence of a pervaded region are contained in the region 
of projection. He cites three different kinds'of evidence 
1. Cf. MPN, 168. 
165. 
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in support of this conclusion. (1) . In the case of mirror 
images, the region of pervasion does not coincide with the 
emitting region. That is, what one sees appears behind 
the surface of the mirror while the object mirrored is be-
hind the percipient, or in front of the mirror. 
In the cases that arise most often in every day 
practical life the pervaded region and the emit-
ting region roughly coincide. But, in the case 
of mirror-images and the visual situations which 
arise when we are surrounded by non-homogeneous 
media, the pervaded region and the emitting re-
gion cease to coincide and may be very distant 
from each other. The pervaded region may then 
contain no physical events at all; fDd, . if it 
does they will be quite irrelevant. 
From this Broad con cludes "that the position of the pervad-
ed region is immediately determined by events in or close 
to the region of projection;"2 i.e., the light reflected 
by the mirror onto the retina. 
(2) On the basis of the facts concerning the velocity 
of light, it can be pointed out that some of the stars we 
now see may have ceased to exist thousands of years ago, 
or at least that the date of emission of the light oc-
curred thousands of years prior to the time that we see 
it. Thus, since the date of the pervaded .region and the 
date of the region of projection temporally coincide, 
while the date of emission may precede the other dates by 
thousands of years, Broad again concludes that the region 
1. MPN, 169. 
2. MPN , 166. 
of projection is the independent and necessary condition 
for the occurrence of the region of pervasion. 
(3) The third evidence Broad points to is the familiar 
data of errant perceptions due to physiological causes. 
Lastly ••• we must notice that the particular 
colour and the particular shade of it which 
sensibly pervade an external place from a re-
gion of projection are almost certainly deter-
mined by specific events in the eyes, optic , 
nerves, and brain which now physically occupy 
this region of projection. Facts about colour-
blindness, about the effects of drugs · like 
santonin, and of morbid bodily states like 
jaundice, make this practically certain.l 
Thus Broad finally offers physiological data to show that 
the independently necessary and sufficient conditions 
"which determine that such and such an external place shall 
be pervaded by such and such a shade of colour from a cer-
tain region of projection are physically present within or 
close to that region. 112 
And so Broad refers to mirror-images, the difference 
between the time of perception and the date of the emission 
of light from stars, and the physiological determinants of 
perception to show that what one percei. ves, although nec-
essarily dependent upon the stimulation of the percipient, 
can be independent of the supposed physical cause. Broad 
acknowledges that in "the cases that arise most often in 
everyday life the pervaded region and the emitting region 
1. MPN, 167. 
2. Ibid. 
roughly coincide"; i.e., that the pervaded region is phys i-
cally occupied in same sense at least. But he says that 
this "sweet simplicity" is unfortunately not the rule and _ 
any theory must be adequate to take into account exception-
al cases too. It is a character is tic of Broad that he 
seems to make the exception the rule and reinterprets 
normal perception in terms of the abnormal, rather than 
interpret the abnormal in reference to the normal. Thus 
he refers to the familiar data of optics and visual phys i-
ology to support his view that the physical object is only 
incidentally efficacious in perception, when he previously 
denied the relevancy of such explanations regarding the 
supposed incompatibility of perception. As M. Lean points 
1 
out, this seems to be "a clear case of special pleading." 
We shall now take up the three different kinds of evi-
dence which Broad offers to support his view that the "nec-
essary and sufficient" conditions of perception are con-
tained in or near the region of projection. To begin with 
mirror-images, Broad argues that since a mirror-image ap-
pears in a place (or in his terms pervades a region of 
space) where there is no physical object (not even a mir-
ror, since the reflection in the mirror appears to be be-
hind the mirror}, the existence of the physical object for 
the perception of it is not necessary. In other words, 
1. M. Lean, SPM, 144 
168. 
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since we may see an object where it does not exist, its ex-
istence is not essential for the seeing of it. 
But this argument plainly overlooks one important fact. 
Even in the perception of mirror-images the existence of 
the physical object is necessary to cause the reflection of 
the mirror ... image. Common sense errs, according to Broad, 
in that 
it believes that the colours which it sees are 
quite literally spread out over the surfaces of 
the physical obfects which it sees and touches. 
In view of the acts about mirror-images, etc., 
we can admit only that colours pervade regions 
of Space. The latter may or may not contain 
those microscopic physical things and events 
which are the dependently necessary conditions 
of the pervasion of this region by this 
colour. Even when this is so, i.e., when 
there is an emitting as well as a pervaded re-
gion and the two coincide, we cannot say that 
the microscopic events and objects have the 
same colour; we can say only that the region 
which contains them is pervaded by this 
colour.l 
There are two arg~1ents contained in this quotation which, 
I think, need questioning: (1) does the fact of mirror-
ima~es justify the inference that colours can only pervade 
regions of space: and (2) does the fact of abnormal per-
captions justify the conclusion that even in veridical 
cases the most that one can say is that colours pervade 
only regions of space, and are not literally "spread out" 
over physical objects? 
1. MPN, 174. 
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In answer to the first question, I can do no more than · 
quote Martin Lean. He points out 
the obvious fact that when, owing to mirror , 
reflections, a coloured object appears to be at 
a place where in actual fact no such object exist~ 
what appears to be in that place is not merely a 
colour, but a coloured object. Vfilen I see the 
reflection of a rose in a mirror, for example, 
what appears to me to be behind the mirror, as 
it were, is not merely a vaporous patch of red 
colour, but a red rose whose colour is "spread 
out over its surface" in the same apparent man-
ner in which this is true when I see the rose 
directly. Of course, there is actually no such 
object at that place, when what I am seeing 
is merely a mirror reflection; but then neither 
is there actually such a colour there. There 
appears to be such a colour there, it is true; 
but then there also appears to be such an ob-
ject there. It seems to me, therefore, that 
there is no more justification to be found in 
the phenomena of mirror-reflection for saying 
that colours only pervade regions of space 
than there is for saying fhat objects only 
pervade regions of space. 
Perhaps some of the difficulty arises from the ambi-
guity of the statement "there is an object at that place" 
or "there is a color at that place." In one sense, there 
is an object at the place indicated by the mirror-image, 
namely the object we see. But by walking up to the mirror, 
or behind it, we can ascertain that there is no object at 
the place indicated by the mirror-image. That is, there 
is no physical object at the place indicated by the mirror-
image, although there is a reflected object. 
There is a sense, then, in which it is possible to deny 
1. :M . Lean, SPM, 150. 
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that there is an object where the mirror-image is, whereas 
one cannot deny that there is an image of a certain color 
appearing in the mirror. This is what Broad finds signifi-
cant. Since one can separate the appearance of an object 
from the existence of the object, or the location of the 
appearance, from the location of the object, it seems that 
we can deal with the appearance alone. If one concentrates 
only on the appearance, then, one is led to say that it is 
extended in space, as if it were as existent in its own 
right. But what does it mean to say that color is extended 
in space? If it only meant that the colored image ap-
pears extended or is extended in form, like an after-image, 
this would not be misleading. But if it means that the 
color is spread out on physical space like a dab of paint 
is spread on a board, then this is misleading. One does 
not find colors just spread out in space. Even the mirror-
image is correlated with the surface of the mirror although 
it appears behind it. But this can be explained by the 
laws of the reflection of light. 
To account for perceived objects in terms of colors 
extended over regions of space seems to me a poor hypothe-
sis. It is much more intelligible to say that we see a 
mirror-image of an object because there really is an ob-
ject possessing the qualities it appears to have, and when 
the light reflected from this object strikes a mirror which 
in ter~ reflects the light onto an eye, then we see the re-
'--' • 
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fleeted image of the object. There seems to be little jus-
t ification for saying tha t because an appearance of an ob-
ject can occur at a place where the object is not, the ob-
ject does not really have the appearance or . qualities we 
attribute to it. I think that it is significant that al-
though an image could not cause a mirror reflection, a 
physical object can. If objects did not literally have the 
qualities they appear to have under normal conditions, it 
is difficult to see how we could i dentify a mirror-image 
as being the reflection of such-and-such-an object. I 
think the difficulty occurs in treating the reflected image 
as if it were the real thing, forg e tting tha t if there 
were not physical objects with certa i n qualities t h ere 
would be no mirror-images. That is, there are cases of 
phys i cal obje cts without mirror images, but there are no 
mirror images without physical obje cts. It hardly seems 
likely, therefore, tha t the latter are the real objects 
whereas the former do not really exist as such. 
I t s eems to me that Broad finds this conclusion con-
vincing because he has a picture or model of perception 
possessing the formal characteristics we mentioned earlier. 
That is, Broad thinks of color being extended at-a-place-
from-a-place. Thus the color in the mirror is extended at-
a-place-from-a-place. And this is all that Broad thinks 
is necessary for ther e to be colors and even colored ob-
jects. In fact, he f inds the existence of mirror- i mages 
a verification of his view. On this model vision occurs 
analogously to a movi e projection. Physical space serves 
as the screen on which visual images are projected. And 
just as the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
projection of a movie are dependent upon the · movie pro-
jector, so Broad thinks the necessary and sufficient con-
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ditions of vision are contained in the region of projection. 
This view of vision coupled with an assumed nature of the 
physical object which Broad inadvertently revealed, lends 
itself to the view that colours extend over regions of 
space which are not literally occupied by the surfaces of 
physical objects. This model of perception is clear from 
a pre viously quoted passage: 
It [Comrnon sans~ believes tha t the colours 
which it sees are quite literally spread out 
over the surfaces of the physical objects which 
it sees and touches. In view of the facts a-
bout mirror-images ••• we can admit only 
that colours pervade certain refions of Space. 
The latter may or may not conta n those micro-
scopic physical things and events which are 
the dependently necessary conditions of the 
pervasion of this region by this colour. 
Even when this is so, i.e., when there is an 
emitting as well as a pervaded region and the 
two coincide, we cannot say that the micro-
scopic event and objects have the colours; we 
can say only that the region whi!h contains 
them is pervaded by the colours. 
Thus we see that Broad's conclusion that physical ob-
jects are not literally colored is based on the assumption 
that the real physical object is a "microscopic object," 
1. YPN, 174-175. 
as he calls it. Microscopic objects certainly are not 
colored in the way that we believe that perceived objects 
are. But, perceived objects such as chairs, tables, etc. 
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which we believe are literally colored are also not micro-
scopic objects. Broad's use of the term "physical objectn 
is ambiguous because one does not know whether he is re-
ferring to the ordinary physical object, or the microscopic 
object. But, it must be noted, it is the ordinary physical · 
object whose appearance is reflected in the mirror. 
Broad's view of the perception of physical objects 
consis ts of the projection of an extended color on a region 
of physical space roughly occupied by a microscopic object. 1 
And since one does not think of atomic objects as being 
colored, extended, or shaped the way perceived objects are, 
one concludes that the color does not coincide with the 
sUl•face of the object. But this is not to say that physical 
objects such as chairs, tables, houses are not colored or 
shaped as they appear to be, and it is just such objects as 
these which are reflected in mirrors. Broad is saying that 
there are no physical objects in the sense that we usually 
use the term. There are only expanses of color and micros-
copic objects or events. But it seems to me that there is 
considerable justification for retaining the usual meaning 
of "physical objects," though for scientific purposes one can 
think of the physical object in terms of microscopic atoms 
1. Unfortunately, Broad does not define what he means by 
such an objec t . He refers to the microscopic object only 
in the passage that has been quoted. But I think he has 
in mind an atomic object. 
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or molecules. The chair and table as I perceive them do 
exist, and they are not just expanses of color as mirror-
images are. To say that they are is to say something which is 
both misleading and unempirical. 
We turn next to Broad's argument regarding the physio-
logical determinants of perception. Broad points out that 
since a person with jaundice sees things yellow while other 
people see them as they normally are, the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for seeing the object exist in the re-
gi~n of projection. And the f a ct that a color-blind per~ 
son does not sea colors at all is offered as even stronger 
evidence for this conclusion. The argu~ment rests on the 
view that since physiological or neurological conditions can 
influence and distort perception, there is no reason for 
thinking that objects possess sensory qualities independent-
ly of a perceiver. However, we .£E:Q point out that one person 
is color-blind and another is seeing things with a jaundiced 
eye because we do know that things have certain intf'ineic prop-
erties. One might as well argue that stJe color-blindness 
" 
is taken as evidence against the independent existence of 
colored objects, then blindness should be taken as evidencs 
against the independent existence of any objects. But clear-
ly this is false. Nor is the fact that one can have a very 
convincing hallucination evidence for the conclusion that the 
existence of physical objects is incidental to perception. 
The very f a ct that a hallucination\is different from a per-
ception of a physical object indica tes , the necessity of 
certain physical conditions being fulfilled before a normal 
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perception can be had. Martin Lean puts this point quite 
clearly I think. 
Granting that ther e is a purely technical sense 
in which the conditions within the region of 
projection may be held ••• to be "sufficient" 
for a 'given place to appear to be pervaded, 
there is still a very important difference be-
tween an hallucinatory experience and a veri-
dical one. There is a sense in which it is 
true that the conditions and events within 
the region of projection are suff icient for 
the occurrence of an hallucinatory visual ex-
perience of a given external place as being 
occupied, but in which it is not likewise 
true for the occurrence of1a veridical ex-perience of the same type. 
For the occurrence of a veridical perception 
it is not enough that the observer be in a cer-
tain condition in the region of projection. It 
is essential that there be an actual "emitting 
region" containing a physical object, and that 
light from its surface reach his eyes in the 
normal fashion •••• And this clear~y takes us 
outside the region of projection. 
We turn now to the third argument that Broad advances 
to prove that the sufficient and necessary conditions of 
perception occur at the region of projection. This argu-
ment rests on the difference between the date of emission 
of light from a star and the time at which the star is 
seen. Common sense is in error, according to Broad, when 
it always assumes that the relevant physical events in 
the emitting region are contemporary with the pervasion; 
1. M. Lean, SPM, 161-162. 
2. Ibid, 162. 
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whereas, they are always earlier and may be earlier by 
thousands of years due to the velocity of light. Thus when 
one looks at a star there may be no star physically occu-
pying the region where the star is seen. 
Does the finite velocity of light, then, justify one 
in concluding that the independently necessary and suffici-
ent conditions for the pervasion of a certain region are 
contained in the region of projection? I do not believe 
that it does. For the fact that the date of our perception 
may occur considerably later than the emission of light 
from the object does not mean that the original date of 
reflection is irrelevant, or unnecessary to our seeing 
the star. Quite the contrary. The time at which the 
light was emitted from the star still determines the date 
at which the star appears to the observer. If the star had 
been even further away we would have seen it at a propor-
tionally later date; or, if there had been no star then we 
would not have seen it at all. For us to see the star 
there certainly must be the emission of light from the 
star. 
These considerations show that while it may be 
true enough that the events in the region of 
projection are the immediately necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the observer to see 
a certain region as pervaded, it is still also 
true that they are themselves (in non-
hallucinatory cases) ultimately determined by 
the actual events in the emitting region. No 
matter what happens to the light from the 
distant star during its journey to earth and 
into the region of projection, and no matter 
' . . ' 
how long this journey may take, the final ap-
parent characteristics of the light and the 
date at which the distant region will appear 
to be occupied by this particular star are 
as much the resultant of the subsequent e-
vents in the emitting region as of the subse-
quent events in the region of projection. 
The psycho-physical process of perception is 
a continuo~s one and cannot plausibly be 
separated. 
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Of course, in the case of distant stars it is true that 
what is seen cannot be the surface of the star as it is at 
the time/one sees it, but only as it was. This seems to 
warrant the conclusion that the stimulation of the retina 
by light waves is a sufficient and necessary condition for 
seeing the stars. But this is a pre-shortened view of per-
ception because it leaves out of account the origin of the 
light waves. No doubt common sense ordinarily discounts the 
importance of the velocity of light in its perception of 
objects. And for most cases the difference in time is so 
minute that it can be ignored. In the case of stars it can-
not. But this merely means that one must then take into ac-
count the velocity of light -- not that the object reflect-
ing the light may be left out of account altogether. It is 
true that we are seeing the star as it was, but it is not 
true that we are not seeing the star, but seeing another 
entity which never was nor never could be the star. 
Once again I think Broad is misled in believing that 
the exceptional case requires a philosophical interpreta-
tion, whereas it merely requires closer attention to the 
1. M. Lean, S~I , 166. 
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ordinary data of perception. 
The essence of Broad.' s argument is that we can account 
for the facts of perception wholly in terms of the perci-
pient and the light . that immediately strikes his eyes • 
. Given this kind of percipient and stimulation we can account 
for all the data of perception. The evidence for this is 
that there are instances when we seem to be seeing an actual 
surface of a physical object when on subsequent investiga-
tion we find that we are only seeing a mirror-image, or 
only having a hallucination, or seeing something at a time 
when the object itself may have ceased to exist. There are 
numerous instanc es, then, when we seem to be directly and 
simultaneously seeing the surface of a physical object when 
we are not. Consequently, it is argued, it may be the case 
tha. t we never do perceive the surfaces of physical objects 
at all. 
But there are two weaknesses to this rather powerful 
argument, I believe. In the first place, to consider light 
as it strikes the retina without relating it to its cause 
is to take an abstract view of perception. The light as it 
strikes the retina. is an "independent and sufficient cause" 
according to Broad, while the object which reflects the 
light is only a remote and "dependently necessary cause." 
But this seems to me to be just a matter of terminology. 
If for z to occur, it must have been preceded by x and y, 
the f .act that x is more remote than y in the causal sequence 
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does not make it a less necessary cause. If it could be 
proven that y could cause z completely independently of x, 
though .x did as a matter of fact usually accompany it, then 
one could say that y was the sufficient and necessary cause 
while x would not even be dependently necessary. But 
Broad has not shown that the existence of physical objects 
are completely unnecessary for normal perception. He has 
only shown that in cases of delusive, abnormal, or unusual 
instances of perception the physical cause may be different 
from the usual one (e.g., mirror-reflec tions, disease ef-
fecting the nervous system, etc.), and may be located with-
in the region of projection in some cases, but he has not 
shown that normal perception can occur completely independ-
ently of physical objects. And as we pointed out earlier, 
one cannot generalize from the instance of relatively few 
delusive perceptions to t he conclusion that all perceptions 
are delusive. As a matter of fact, it would be quite strange 
if delusive perceptions did not resemble veridical ones 
since they do depend upon the same organs of perception or 
nervous mechanism and do have physical causes. Thus Broad's 
arg1.llTlent rests on what M. Lean calls a nf'oreshortened11 view 
of perception. 
Common sense would not deny that the independent-
ly necessary conditions -- in the sense that Dr. 
Broad apparently intends -- for a region to ap-
pear to be occupied by a certain colour are con-
tained in or near the region of projection. Nor 
is Dr. Broad's argument that if the light from the 
emitting region does reach the eyes of the ob-
server with normilij functioning visual appara-
tion, this is sufficient for the observer to 
see a given place as occupied, in any way con-
trary to common sense. Common sense would 
insist, it is true,tbat such a foreshortened 
view of the normal perceptual process is arti-
ficial; because when we do perceive an object 
under normal conditions and see it where and 
as it is, the conditions and events in the 
region of projection are obviously not the 
whole story. The light emitted from the ob-
ject in the emitting region is indispensably 
necessary to produce and determine thatpartic-
ular visual situation, even though the visual 
situation of dreams or those of drunkard and 
his pink rats do have their causally suffici-
ent conditions entirely within the region of 
projection.l 
It is not agreed, therefore, that the sufficient and 
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necessary conditions for normal perception lie entirely with-
in the region of projection. But it is clear why Broad 
should have wished to prove this conclusion. If the physi-
cal object could be proven to be unnecessary to perception 
then what I have called his "projection view" of perception 
would have clear sailing. Given absolute space as the re-
gion of projection, one could account for perception entire-
ly in terms of the perceiver and the immediate stimuli a-
round him. But it does not seem to me that Broad's account 
holds true of normal perception. 
3. The Multiple Relation Theory of Appearing. 
We turn now to the second theory which Broad considers 
1. M. Lean, S~I , 163. 
to be a possible solution to the problems of perception . 
~~is theory i s only briefly discussed by Broad because it 
is quite similar to the theory of multiple inherence. 
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Both the multiple relation and multiple inherence the-
ories assume a fund~~ental relation which is at least tri-
adic. The multiple inherence theory holds that colors in-
here triadically in places from places and that sensible 
forms triadically inhere regions from regions. The mul-
tiple relation theory holds that if a color really did 
inhere in anything, it would inhere in it dyadically, as 
common sense supposes, but that the fundamental relation is 
of appearing, and this is triadic. It holds that one can 
assert two propositions with regard to colors and shapes. 
One is of the form nThis is red," and the other of the form 
tt •fuis looks red from here. " It assumes, therefore, "that 
the objective constituent of a visual situation can seem 
from different places to have characteristics which are 
other than and incompatible with the characteristics which 
. 1 
it does have." 
Thus if the top of a dime is literally a certain shade 
of silver, it can have only this one color . But from dif-
ferent places occupied by different observers it certainly 
seems to have different shades of color and may even seem to 
1. MPN, 179. 
have a number of different colors under different condi-
tlons of lighting. (It is significant to not e that the 
color the object appears to have under these abnormal con-
ditions is influenced by the color the object is normally 
said to havel) Thus if a dime possesses a color dyadically, 
the color it has must differ from all but one of the colors 
it seems to have, and may differ from all. And the same 
remarks apply to shape, size, and position. 
So far there does not seem to be the slightest differ-
ence between this theory and the common sense view of per-
ception. Even with regard to the use of the term ttappear-
ing" it agrees with common sense. For it is common knowl-
edge that an object with a particular color may appear dif-
ferent under different conditions. But the conclusion the 
theory draws from this fact is at variance with common 
sense. For common sense does believe that by careful in-
spection one can ascertain the true color of an object, but 
according to the multiple relation theory, this may not be 
the case. 
On this theory then we may be acquainted in a 
perceptual situation with a spatio-temporal 
part of' a certain physical object which we 
are said to be perceiving. But we learn only 
about the characteristics which it seems to 
have; and t he more carefully we inspect the 
objective constituent the more we learn of its 
appar ent properties only. And it is certain 
that it either does not actually have proper-
ties of this kind at all; or that;-TI it does, 
the apparent and the real properties can be 
identical only in one special favoured percep-
··; · 
tual situation. And there is of course noth-
ing in any perceptual situation, taken by it-
s elf, to tell us that in it and it alone the 
apparent and the real char acteristici of the 
objective constituent are identical. 
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It is hard to see how tlus theory differs from the mul-
tiple inherence theory except in terminology. They both a-
gree that although an object possesses certain inher·ent 
characteristics, the objec t can appear different under dif-
ferent conditions. According to the multiple relation the-
ory this difference is expressed in the phrase "this object 
looks or appears red from here." According to the theory of 
multiple inherence this would be expressed by the phrase 
"this color inheres in the object from a particular place." 
The essential difference, if there is one, seems to depend 
upon a difference in meaning between 11 inherine" and nappear-
ing." 
The Multiple Inherence Theory allows that the 
objective constituent really does have those 
characteristics which it seems on careful in-
spection by each observer to have. But it can 
allow this only by supposing that these charac-
teristics inhere in the objective constituent 
in a way never contemplated by common~sense, 
viz., triadically. The Multiple Relation 
Theory of Appearing allows that, if the objec-
tive constituent did have such characteristics 
as it seems to have, they would inhere in it 
in the ordinarily dyadic way which common-
sense recognizes.2 
This quotation is cited not in the expectation that it 
1. MPN, 179. 
2. Ibid., 180. 
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will clarify the distinction between "inherence" and "appear-
ing," but to shoVI how unclear the dis tine tion actually is. 
One theory asserts that a color inheres in-a-place-from-a-
place, the other that a place appears a particular color 
from a place (Broad's sta_tement "This looks red from here"). 
Both theories assert that under ideal conditions the in-
hering color and shape as well as the apparent color and 
shape may be identical with the physical color and shape 
(although Broad thinks this is quite implausible in either 
easel). But it seems to me that there is no essential dif-
ference between the theories. Both presuppose, according 
to Broad (although he offers an alternative "difficult to 
believe" for the multiple relation theory), a view of Ab-
solute Space-Time, since sensible colors and shapes inhere 
in or appear in regionsof space.2 
It seems to me that Broad has tried to maintain the 
following difference between the two theories. With regard 
to the multiple inherence theory, he has tried to maintain 
that a certain region of space actually is colored, even by 
different shades of the same color, providing one takes into 
account the region of projection; i.e., the same region may 
be colored or shaped slightly different from different 
places. But the pervaded region actually does have this 
color. 
1. Cf. MPN, 192. 
2. Cf. Broad, MPN, 186-190. 
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The multiple relation theory asserts that a certain re-
gion of space appears to have different color s from differ-
ent places, and that it may have one color apart from any 
reference to a place. The multiple relation theory seems to 
deny t hat colors do inhere in a place, but to assert that if 
they did, reference to the place of projection would be un-
necessary. The converse is asserted by the multiple in-
herence theory. ButT cannot see · that the difference be-
t ween the theories is anyt hing more than verbal, or that 
either theory differs in essence from the common sense view. 
The multiple relation theory does hold that we can never be 
certain as to just what qualities do belong to an object, 
but I think this is false. We do know that the paper be-
fore us is white, tha t the color of the chair is brown, that 
t he walls are painted green, etc. The shades of color that 
we see under different conditions may vary, but even this 
variance is influenced by the constant color of the objects. 
It is true that when referring to the constant proper-
ties of an object we have to refer to the conditions (ideal 
one's as we say} under which it is seen. But this is merely 
to take into account the empirical context of perception. 
Perception does not occur in a vacuum apart from light, the 
organism, or the object. To leave either of these condi-
tions or entities out of account is to take a very abstract 
or partial view of perception. Perception is a complex 
affair depending upon each of these constituents contribu-
ting to an experience which can be ascertained as veridical . 
or delusive. The meaning and validity of our material ob-
ject language is based on just such experiences. For con-
venience, one thinks and speaks of perception as if the ob-
server or the conditions of light were unimportant. We say 
"the milk is white,n "the water .is blue," "the flower is 
red'' as if these colors inhered in the object apart from 
any conditions whatever. However, to conclude from the 
complexity of the perceptual process that we do not know 
what physical objects are like in themselves, is to suggest 
that all our language is false (or that we could know ob-
jects in a way different from the way we do) since the terms 
would not truly denote the actual qualities of things. But 
this is not true. Our language denotes common objects and 
can be verified in terms of just these objects. 
To be sure, the world may be quite different from the 
way we experience it, and a wholly different language might 
be required to describe this other world. The symbolism of 
science is a partial attempt to describe a world analogous 
in same respects to the common sense world, but different 
in other respects. However, it is not such a world which 
Broad attempts to describe. He would intend to reinterpret 
the meaning of "physical object," and describe . perception 
by referring to regions of pervasions, regions of projection, 
and emitting regions. But since the facts remain the same and 
Broad merely suggests a different way of expressing these 
facts, I see no advantage in his linguistic mode of expres-
sion. It implies that the common sense way of thinking 
about, and talking about the perceptual world is false, but 
I hope I have given sufficient reasons to show why I do not 
believe this is the case. 
r_ should like, before turning to the final theory of 
perception, to consider a further difficulty in both the 
theories of perception so far discussed. On several occa-
sions Broad has drawn a distinction between the apparent 
characteristics or the characteristics an object seems to 
have under certain conditions, and the characteristics an 
object has when we inspect it more carefully under more 
normal condi tiona. One of the supposed incompa ti bili ties 
of percep t ion was the fact that an object could appear to 
have different characteristics than it was supposed to have 
under careful inspection. 
It seems to me that if a distinction can be made be-
t ween apparent characteristics and those characteristics 
discovered on more careful inspection, then this assumes 
that one can ascertain the true characteristics of an ob-
ject, ~nd that the object actually does possess these 
characteristics. But it also assumes that the characteris-
-
tics do not merely inhere in a place, or appear at a place, 
by virtue of a region of projection alone, since if that 
were the case, "careful inspection" would merely replace 
one pervading characteristic by another, rather than enable 
188. 
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one to ascertain the objective characteristics of the object. 
That is, if one consistently held a "projection" view 
of perception, it would make no sense to distinguish one 
pervading color from another on the basis of careful in-
spection since there would only be successive projections 
of different colors from different places. But if it is 
assumed that an object does possess certain constant quali-
ties (which does not deny ·that it possesses these qualities 
under certain conditions), then it does make sense to s.ay 
that those qualities ascer t ained by careful inspection can 
be distinguished from characteristics the object seems to 
have under less normal or less ideal conditions. And this 
also points out why the seeming or apparent characteristics 
are not incompatible with the true characteristics. The 
apparent characteristics are determined in reference to 
conditions which are not the same as those determined by 
careful inspection. Thus there is no logical incompa tibil-
ity in an object appearing to have different qualities 
under different conditions. A. J. Ayer makes this point 
also. 
We use such sentences as "The curtains look 
green in this light, but they are really bluen; 
"The penny looks elliptical from this angle, 
but it is really round". But this doe~r not 
mean that we speak as if every perception were 
delusive. V'!e assume, in fact, that some of' our 
perceptions are veridical and others are not . 
And in this there is no contradiction. There 
would be a contradiction only if' the same ap-
pearances were held to be both veridical and 
delusive in the same sense; and this is not the 
ca.se.l 
To talk about "apparent qualities" at all presupposes that 
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there are qualities which can be ascertained by careful in-
spection which are not apparent. 11Real 11 and "apparent" are 
logically polar with respect to each other, and hence 
. 2 
neither has any meaning without the other. 
This point is particularly important with regard to the 
conclusion asserted in the multiple relation theory. This 
theory asserts that though we may be acquainted in a percep-
tual situation with a spatio-temporal part of a certain 
object, we can only learn about the characteristics which 
it seems to have, and more careful inspection only reveals 
other apparent characteristics since "there is ••• noth-
ing in any perceptual situation, taken by itself Lftalics 
mini/, to tell us that in it and it alone the apparent and 
the real chare.cteristics of the objective constituent are 
3 identical." But what, then, is the basis of the dis tinc-
tion between the "the apparent and the real characteris-
To be sure, if we are restricted to "the perceptual 
situation, taken by itself, 11 then there is nothing to enable 
1. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, 31. 
2. Cf. M. Lean, SPM, 130. 
3. Broad, MPN, 179. (My attention was direct.ed to this 
quotation by Martin Lean.) 
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us to distinguish between the apparent and the real charac-
teristics. One would merely concentrate on the character-
istics of that percep t ion. But if this were the whole 
story then the difference between real and apparent charac-
teristics would never have arisen. Some qualities of an 
object are called "apparent" because one can contrast what 
he sees when he looks at an object from a peculiar angle, 
or from the distance, with what he sees when he .inspects 
the object more closely. If one were always restricted to 
a .glimpse of an appearance of an object, and never saw 
the surface, then there would be no grounds for drawing a 
distinction between the real characteristics and the appear-
ance. But this clearly is not the case. 
A careful inspection of the surface of the penny 
itself, it is clear, could not justifiably be 
limited to the single original perspective from . 
which we first happened to see it. One would 
have to approach closely, handle it, and look 
at it from various angles, especially head-on, 
before he could be said to have made a "care-
ful inspection." In that case, however, it 
would not be true that the "objective constit-
uent" -- i.e., the penny-- had characteris-
tics different from a.nd incompatible with those 
which it seemed on careful inspection to have. 
For careful inspection would reveal that the 
penny was actually round. In fact, the ob-
server would not find that the penny had charac-
teristics other than it seemed on careful in-
spection to have; for how else could he deter-
mine what characteristics the penny actually 
had, save by careful inspection?· What other 
meaning can be given to the words: "the 
characteristics which the penny actually has?"l 
• . 
l. M. Lean, S~l , 134. 
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Thus it seems to me that by careful inspection we can as-
certain the true as opposed to the apparent characteristics 
of an object. The very distinct i on between true and apparent 
characteristics presupposes this. And it also presupposes 
that some of the qualities of an object do not just inhere 
in it from a pla.ce, but are intrinsic to the object, even 
though this intrinsicality depends upon certain constant or 
normal conditions. But this is merely to refer to the in-
terdependence and interrelatedness of things. It is pre-
cisely this content of experience which provides the stabili-
ty, structure, and contrasts which makes a language possible. 
4. The Sensa Theory of Perception. 
We turn now to the third and last theory which Broad 
offers as a possible, and for him the most tenable, solution 
of the problem of perception. As was suggested earlier, the 
initial characterization of the perceptual situation lends 
itself quite easily to the adoption of a sensa theory. 
In distinguishing the objective constituent of the per-
ceptual situation, Broad held that this constituent . could 
not literally be identified with a whole physical object 
since the characteristics of physical objects are more than 
are ever presented in any single perceptual situation. It 
remained possible, however, that this objective constitu-
ent, although not a whole physical object, could be identi-
fied with an actual surface of a physical object. But in 
our discussion of the multiple inherence theory we considered 
the reasons why Broad believed this to be highly improbable. 
He summarizes these reasons in the discussion of the sensa 
theory. 
I profess to have proved ••• (a) that, even if 
there had been no delusive perceptual situa-
tions, it is certain from the nature of the case 
that no perceptual situation could contain lit-
erally as its objective constituent thephysi-
cal object which we are said to be perceiving 
in that situation. (b) That the existence of 
totally delusive situations shows that the ob-
jective constituent cannot always be even a 
spatio-temporal part of the physical object 
which we are said to be perceiving. Hence 
even this modified claim can never be accept- · 
ed at its face-value, since it is made as 
strongly in the perceptual situati~ns which are 
certainly delusive as in those which are not 
knovm to be so. · (c) That, in view of the dis-
crepancies whi ch careful inspection discovers 
between the objective constituents of percep-
tual situations when one observer is said to 
be seeing and touching the same object or when 
several observers are said to be seeing the 
same object, even this modified claim cannot 
be true except on the very special assumpt1ons 
of the Theory of Multiple Inherence or the 1 Theory of a Multiple Relation of Appearing. 
Thus Broad concludes that "on any view ••• the claim of 
the individual perceptual situation to reveal a certain 
physical object and to guarantee its existence must be 
attenuated to a mere shadow. 112 
We found that the multiple inherence and the multiple 
relation$ theories were attempts to correlate the discre-
pancies or incompatibilities of perception with the "sweet 
1. MPN, 190-191. 
2. MPN, 191. 
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But it seems to me that this conclusion merely fol-
lows from Broad's way of analyzing the perceptual situa-
tion. He maintained that since not all of the character-
istics of the physical object are manifested in single per-
ceptual situations, one cannot admit that the object is 
bodily a constituent of the situation, or that substantive 
terms denote whole objects. This leaves Broad with a 
"apatio-temporal fragment of the object." However, since 
successive perceptual situations only reveal different 
"spatia-temporal fragments,'' how does one justify the be-
lief that there are, and that one sees, persistent, com-
plete, physical objects? But Broad cannot answer this. 
In other words, his analysis cannot account for the common 
notion and belief in physical objects. And if his analysis 
of perception were the correct one, I do not see how the 
common notion and belief in a physical object could have 
arisen. The notion of a persistent physical object is not 
just an intellectual conviction -- an hypothesis -- but 
a fact encountered in experience. 
Even though all of the characteristics of an object 
are not presented in a single perceptual situation, this 
does not mean that a real physical object (not just a 
"spatia-temporal fragm~nt") is not present. It may not be, 
as in the case of mirror-images and hallucinations, but if 
in subsequent verification one finds the characteristics of 
the object verified, then one is justified in claiming that 
139. 
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he is aware of a real physical object, and that such an ob-
ject is "bodily" presented in his perceptual situation. It 
seems to me that this is an empirical fact which cannot 
be denied by analysis. One can only clarify our understand-
ing of the fact. Broad's analysis, however, leads him to 
deny the fact. 
That is, the tendency to accept something as a sign 
of something else, or the predisposition to identify some-
thing on the basis of a partial clue is so characteristic 
of awareness that it would seem to be a more fruitful ap-
proach to accept this as fundamental and interpret our 
knowledge of physcial objects in terms of this. We do ac-
cept the partial manifestation of a physical object in a 
perceptual situation as evidence for the existence of the 
actual physical object. This, however, does not make the 
notion of a physical object a hypothesis to explain corre-
lations between perceptual situations. It merely means 
that the claim to be aware of a pby.sical object is a hypo-
thesis, which is verified in subsequent perceptions. 
The whole notion of a persistent object being pre-
sented to a person in various situations is denied by 
Broad. Instead, he defines the object in reference to his 
successive perceptions. But it seems to me that one is 
not just aware of qualities exhibited in successive per-
ceptions, but that one is aware of objects such as doors 
and chairs, the manifest properties of which one can be-
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come more aware of on further inspection. One is always 
investigating something, not just entertaining a series of 
perceptions. Broad began his analysis from this fact, but 
ended up by denying the fact as a result of his analysis. 
I do not think, then, that the incompleteness of a 
single perception is sufficient grounds for denying that a 
bell or a chair exists when one can verify that he heard a 
bell or sees a chair. The peculiarity of Broad's view can 
be pointed out in another quotation, I believe. He says, 
We must remember tha~ although no amount of 
perceptual verification can prove that the 
objective constituent of a perceptual situa-
tion is a part of a physical object of a cer-
tain specified kind, complete failure of such 
verification may make the contradictory of 
this almost certain.l 
I know this view is a common one, and yet it does 
strike me as peculiar. Certainly no one can "prove" in a 
logically conclusive sense (i.e., that it is inconceivable 
'to think otherwise) that a perceived physical object ac-
tually exists. But this sense of "prove" is not appropri-
ate to empirical verification. One verifies or "proves" 
the existence of a physical object by observing and handl-
ing it (i.e., the book, or ball, or paper). If one is in 
doubt as to whether the object he sees is a hallucination 
or a real object he looks at it, handles it, smells it, and 
1. MPN, 154. 
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asks others if they can see and handle it. If the answers 
to these investigations are negative, then he is convinced 
he is having an hallucination. If the answers are posi-
tive then he concludes he is seeing a real object. This is 
the only kind of proof which has any meaning in this situa-
tion. And it is perfectly adequate. People do not wander 
around asking themselves whether such-and-such an object 
exists, because they can settle the doubt by empirical in-
vestigation, providing the object is susceptible to fur-
ther observation and handling. 
Furthermore, I do not see why a type of verification 
which would render a view almost certainly false, would 
not also render the view almost certainly true, in the 
event that it turned out to be true. That is, if one can 
by observation and handling determine almost conclusively 
that a perception is delusive, then I should think the same 
credibility should be attributed to a veridical perception 
since the means of determining its validity are the same. 
Here reciprocity of credibility seems obvious. But I shall 
labor the point no further. 
To return to the exposition, Broad has not positively 
asserted that the objective constituent could not be a 
spatial-temporal part of a larger whole which could be a 
1. The necessary reference to "it" here is significant. 
One does not just have successive experiences which he cor-
relates by reference to a physical object. Rather, he ex-
amines an object which is the unitary center or subject of 
his successive perceptions. 
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physical object. But a8 we have pointed out, he does not 
think that this could be proved, or that sue~ a claim or 
conviction is based on an inference. He does not say on 
what it is based because, as we shall find, he is more in-
clined to deny that there are physical objects of which 
the objective constituent could be a spatia-temporal part. 
But at this point he has not denied the possibility. He 
says, 
I have shown only (a) that this /Physical! ob-
ject, as such, is never a constituent of the 
LPerceptuaf7 situation; (b) that the claim can 
never be accepted at its fact-value, because 
it is certainly sometimes false in situations 
which differ in no relevant internal respect 
from those in which it might be true Lis in a 
hallucinatiog7; and (c) that the claim cannot 
be proved to be true, as it stands, by logical 
inference from any premises which are available 
to us. It now remains to iee whether we can 
hold that it is ever true. 
This leads us, then, to the question whether the objective 
constituent ever is an actual part (i.e., part of a larger 
whole} of a physical object. More simply, do we ever per-
ceive physical objects, accepting as the meaning of "phys-
ical object" the ordinary one? 
4. The Sen8ible Appearance of Physical Objects. 
We turn now to the kinds of arguments with which we 
have become familiar in our discussion of the views of 
1. MPN, 158. 
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Moore and Russell. They center on the variability and dis-
crepancies between the perceptions of one individual at 
different times, and different individuals at the same time. 
Because of such discrepancies in what is seen under dif-
ferent conditions it is wondered whether the physical ob-
ject as such is ever seen at all. 
The difficulty arises because of the group of 
facta which we sum up by saying that it is nec-
ecessary to distinguish between things as they 
are and things as they seem to us, or between 
physical reality and sensible appearance. Dif-
ficulties always arise when two sets of prop-
erties apparently belong to the same object, 
and yet are apparently incompatible with each 
other. Now the difficulty here is to recon-
cile the supposed neutrality, persistence, and 
independence of a physical object with the ob-
vious differences between its various sensible 
appearances to different observers at the same 
moment, and to the same observer at different 
moments between which it is hetd not to have 
undergone any physical change. 
Thus the difficulty in trying to maintain the common 
sense view that the physical object is always perceived as 
it really is arises from the supposed incompatibility be-
tween the apparent shapes and the real shape, and between 
the changes in the appearances a~d assumed permancy in the 
characteristics of the physical object. For instance, the 
common sense notion of a dime is that of a round, flat, sil-
very object whose color, size, and shape are independent of 
the observer, his position, and his movements. But on close 
inspection it will be found that the "objective constituent" 
1. Broad, Scientific Thought, 234-235 
(i.e., that which is actually presented in any sensory ex-
perience according to Broad) of a perceptual situation does 
vary with the observer, his position, and his movements. 
For example, if one looks at a dime at an oblique angle the 
visual objective constituent is elliptical while the tac-
tual objective constituent is still round; i.e., the dime 
looks elliptical but feels round. This would also be the 
case if one person were looking directly down on the round 
surface of the penny while another person were looking at 
it from an oblique angle. The shape of the objective con-
stituent of the perceptual situation of the former person 
would be round while that of the second person would be 
elliptical. The question, then, is whether the penny is 
round or elliptical, or both? (Russell argued that it was 
sheerly arbitrary to accept any "objective constituent," 
to use Broad's term, as the true one.) 
The common sense notion of a penny, then, is that it 
has a definite and constant size, shape, and color. How-
ever, it is equally common to .. observe that the apparent 
size, shape, · and color of the penny changes under different 
conditions. This inconstancy is usually expressed by say-
ing that the object appears so~and-so from such-and-such a 
place, or tmder such-and-such. conditions. This difference 
in appearance raises no problem for the common person or 
even for the scientist. For them an adequate explanation 
of variant appearances would consist in stipulating the 
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conditions (physical, psychological, physiological, optical, 
etc.) under which the object is seen. But this explanation 
is not accepted by Broad. 
The difficulty is to reconcile the different 
appearances with the supposed constancy of the 
penny, and the ellipticity of most of the ap-
pearances with the supposed roundness of the 
penny. It is probable that at first sight the 
reader will not see much difficulty in this. 
He will be inclined to say that we can explain 
these various visual appearances by the laws of 
perspective, and so on. This is not a relevant 
answer. It is quite true that we can predict 
what particular appearance an object will pre-
sent to an observer, when we know the shape of 
the object and its position with respect to 
the observer. But this is not the question 
that is troubling us at present. Our question 
is as to the compatibility of these changing 
elliptical appearances, however they may be 
correlated with other facts in the world, 
with the supposed co~stancy and roundness of 
the physical object. 
Broad seems to want to preserve his question whether 
it can be answered or not. Later we shall try to show that 
the incompatibility of appearances is merely a matter of 
approach; i.e., that the only "relevant" explanation is the 
one Broad refuses to accept. 
As Broad understands the perceptual problem it is · . 
this. Every perceptual situation contains an "objective 
constituent" which has characteristics which vary with the 
individual and with the conditions of perception. Not all 
of these characteristics can be identified with what is 
1. Broad, Scientific Thought, 235-236. 
commonly believed to be the physical object. ~hen two 
people look at a dime the objective constituent of one may 
be elliptical in shape whereas that of another may be round. 
Even for one person a dime may at the same time feel round 
and look elliptical. These facts allow of three interpre-
tations according to Broad, two of which try to maintain 
some semblance of the common sense view of direct percep-
tion of physical objects which do have definite independent 
properties, and the third deviating from the common sense 
view almost entirely. 
According to Broad, if we retain the common sense no-
tion of perception then we must do one of two things: (1) 
we must hold that the objective constituents of some per-
ceptual situations have qualities which differ from and 
are inconsistent with those they seem on careful inspec-
tion to have (as when one looks at a penny under ideal 
conditions); or (2) we must hold that the same surface can 
vary and keep constant in size and shape at the same. time, 
but from different places. 
I think I have now proved that we are tied down 
to three alternatives, each almost as distaste-
ful to common-sense as the others. (1) We may 
try to keep the common-sense view that the 
objective constituents of some visual situa-
tions are literally spatio-temporal parts of a 
certain physical obj.ect, which we are said to be 
"seeing". But, if we do this, we must hold 
either (a) that this physical object can be 
both constant and variable in its spatial char-
acteristics within the same stretch of time; or 
(b) that the objective constituents of the 
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visual situations can have qualities which 
are different from and inconsistent with 
those which they seem on careful inspection to 
have. Or (2) we may drop the common-sense view 
that the objective constituent of a visual 
situation may be, and in some cases actually 
is, literally a spatio-temporal part of a cer-
tain physical object which we are said to be 
"seeing."l 
148. 
Broad discusses three philosophical views of perception based 
on each of these alternatives, each of which we shall take 
up in the next chapter. 
1. MPN, 160-161. 
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CHAPTER V 
THREE THEORIES OF PERCEPTION 
1. Introduction. 
In the last chapter Broad's analysis of perceptual sit-
uations was discussed. A distinction was made between the 
"epistemological object" and the "objective constituent." 
The objective constituent has only those qualities actually 
presented in the perceptual situation, while the claim to 
be in cognitive contact with a real object refers to the 
epistemological object -- which may or may not have an 
ontological object coinciding with it. Even in veri-
dical perceptions the objective constituent cannot be iden-
tified with the epistemological object, since the latter 
represents more qualities than are presented in the former. 
This analysis led Broad to conclude that if there were 
an ontological object corresponding to the epistemological 
object, at best the objective constituent only could be 
identified with a spatio-temporal fragment of the object. 
The notion of a persistent physical object became a hypo-
thesis to account for the correlations between perceptions. 
In this chapter Broad discusses the way in which the 
objective constituent becomes qualified, and the relation 
of the objective constituent to the physical object. He 
concluded, in the last chapter, that a physical object 
as such was never a constituent of the perceptual situa-
tion. However, he did not eliminate the possibility of a 
part of a physical object being a constituent of the per-
ceptual situation; i.e., the objective constituent being 
identified with part of the physical object. In this 
chapter he discusses the arguments which are usually ad-
vanced for not identifying the objective constituent with 
the physical object. First, he discusses two theories of 
perception which try to synthesize common sensewith the 
data of delusive perceptions. And finally, he discusses a 
theory which abandons common sense completely. 
2. The Theory of Multiple Inherence 
The three theories of perception to be discussed are 
all concerned with the variability of perceptions. That 
is, the objective constituent seems to vary independently 
with the conditions of perception, whereas the character-
istics of the physical object are believed to be permanent 
or constant. The theory of multiple inherence tries to 
bridge this difference between permanent and variable 
characteristics by maintaining that a physical object can 
be both constant and variable in appearance within the 
same stretch of time providing one makes certain assump-
tions regarding the relation of qualities and properties 
to the object. 
Accordingly, there are two aspects to the problem of 
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perception with which the theory of multiple inherence 
proposes to deal. The first aspect, or "logical aspect" 
as Broad calls it, concerns the "formal characteristics" 
the perceptual situation must have in order that the per-
ceived characteristics of an object be not incompatible. 
The second, or "casual aspect," concerns the physical 
conditions under which the same object can appear differ-
ent. We shall begin discussion of the multiple inherence 
theory by considering the formal characteristics of the 
perceptual situation according to which the same object 
may appear different under different conditions. 
The theory of multiple inherence is based on the 
notion that a physical object can be both constant and 
variable in its qual i tative and spatial characteristics 
within the same stre t ch of time, 11 if and only if what we 
commonly regard as pure qualities are really relational 
1 properties." That is, this theory (supposedly) alters 
the common sense view to the extent that it does not hold 
that qualities inhere in objects simply, but that they in-
here in objects relative to certain conditions. It also 
holds that the objective constituent though not the sur-
face of a physical object is a certain region of physical 
space. In other words, it holds 
that the objective constituent of a visual sit-
uation can be regarded as a certain region of 
physical space which is pervaded by a certain 
determinate shade of colour at a certain time, 
provided that we recognize that the relation 
1. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, 161. (Hence-
forths all references to this work will be abbreviated 
" MPN.") 
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of "pervasion" is of a peculiar kind. It must 
not be a two-term relation, involving only the 
pervading colour and the pervaded region, as 
we commonly suppose. It must be at least a 
three-term relation, involving the pervading 
colour, the pervaded region, and another re-
gion which we might call "the region of 
projection."l 
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According to this theory, the objective constituent can 
be regarded as a certain region of physical space which is 
pervaded by an expanse of color. This pervasion is not a 
dyadic relation, however. The region has the color it has 
not only because of the region of pervasion, but also be-
cause of the region of projection, or more simply from the 
place from which it is seen. The color "inheres-in-a-
place-from-a-place." It is logically impossible for a 
color to inhere in a place simply, but the same region of 
physical space can be pervaded at the same time by dif-
ferent determinate shades of one color from different 
pla~es. That is, it is logically possible that the deter-
minate shades s 1 inhere in the place p from the place pl 
at the time t, and that the shade s 2 inhere in the place 
p from the place p2 at the time t. What would be logical-
ly impossible would be the inherence of different shades 
of the s~~e color at the same place and time from the same 
place. On this view (which is quite similar to Russell's) 
1; MPN, 161-162. 
the statement "s is physically coloredtt means "from every 
place where there is a normal brain and nervo.us system 
near enough to s some shade of the color sensibly inheres 
"1 in s. 
Thus the formal characteristics of the perceptual sit-
uation require that a distinction be made between the "sen-
sible" and the "physical" inherence of a color in a place. 
The former is fundamental and irreducibly triadic, involv-
ing reference to the pervading shade of color, the region 
of physical space pervaded, and the region of projection. 
The latter is a two term relation defined in terms of the 
former. The physical inherence of a color is defined in 
terms of the "colour under which all the determinate shades 
which sensibly inhere in it from a certain set of places 
fall." 2 For example, a book may appear different shades of 
green under different conditions. The physical color of 
the book is the determinable color green, while the sen-
sible colors are the determinate shades of green seen under 
the different conditions. The determinable shade is de-
fined in terms of the determinate shades of color inhering 
in a particular place. Thus the same object can appear 
permanent and variable as regards its qualities: it is con-
stant as regards its physical or determinable color and 
variable as regards its sensible or determinate shades of 
1. MPN, 163. 
2. Ibid., 164. 
color. 
With these definitions we could perfectly well 
maintain the common-sense view that a physical 
object cannot have two different colours at 
once, and yet admit that it does have differ-
ent colours at once. We should simply need to 
clear up the ambiguities of our statements. 
~ne truth will be (1) that two different 
colours cannot sensibli inhere in the same 
place from the same place at once; (2) that 
two different colours cannot physicallt in-
here in the same place at once; but {3 that 
different colours or different shades of the 
same colour can sensibly inhere in tf-e same 
place from di.fferent places at ·once. 
Thus far we have discussed the formal characteristics 
of the perceptual situation only in terms of secondary qua-
lities. Can this characterization of the perceptual situa-
tion also apply to the variability of primary qualities, 
such as shape and size? Broad believes that it can, pro-
viding we make a distinction between a ''sensible form" and 
a "geometrical property." The distinction is based on the 
fact that while geometrical circularity can be defined, 
sensible circularity must be experienced to be understood. 
Broad says, 
it remains a fact that all sensible forms are 
indefinable, whilst man~f the geometrical 
properties which are cal.ed by the same name 
are definable. It is therefore certain that 
geometrical properties and the sensible forms 
which are called by the same names must be 
distinguished.2 
l. MPN, 164. 
2. Ibid., 172. 
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How, then, does this distinction enable one to solve 
the problem of the variability of the sizes and shapes of 
objective constituents? The geometrical shape is the in-
herent property whereas the sensible shape is the "informed" 
property of an object. It is impossible for a geometrical 
shape to vary since it is what it is by definition, but the 
same objective consti tuent can be ~informed" by different 
sizes and shapes from different places, just as different 
colors can "inhere" in it from different places. From one 
place the sensible form may be the same as the geometrical 
form, whereas from other places it may not be. It is pos-
sible for an objective constituent to be informed of dif-
ferent sensible shapes and sizes from different places, 
even though it has only one inherent geometrical form • 
• • • since geometrical shape and sensible 
form must always be distinguished, it does not 
follow that the sensible form of an area is 
an intrinsic property of it. It may be that 
one and the same area is "informed" by one 
sensible form from one place and by a differ-
ent sensible form from another place. The 
relation of "informing" may be irreducibly 
triadic, as we have suggested that the rela-
tion of "pervading" is. If this be so, it 
may be that it is only from one place or one 
series of places that an area with a certain 
geometrical shape is informed by that sensi-
ble form which has the same name as the geo-
metrical shape. A like distinction will have 
to be1drawn between geometrical and physical size. 
Thus the multiple inherence theory "solves" the "logi-
1. MPN, 173. 
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cal" aspect of the problem of the difference between the 
permanent and variable sizes, shapes, and colors of objects 
by introducing the relation of "pervading" and "inherence," 
and by distinguishing between the physical color and geo-
metrical size and shape of a region of physical space, and 
the sensible color and shape the same region may be seen to 
have from different places. The physical color and geo-
metrical size and shape remain permanent while the sensible 
shapes and colors can vary from place to place. 
The multiple inherence theory agrees with common sense 
in holding that what is seen does have permanent character-
istics, and also has the qualities and characteristics it 
appears to have under different conditions. This is ex-
pressed by saying tha t different qualities "inhere" in the 
same region of space from different places, and that dif-
ferent shapes and sizes "inform" the same physical space 
from different places. Thus the qualities and characteris-
tics an object appears to have under different conditions 
do literally pervade the region of space occupied by the 
objective constituent, and are not incompatible, providing 
that one remembers that they "pervade" or "inform" the ob-
jective constituent from different places. F~owledge of 
the permanent or inherent characteristics of objects is 
derived from or based upon the inherent qualities and 
1 informed characteristics. 
1. The theory disagrees with common sense in holding that 
the objective constituent is a region of space rather than 
the surface of an object. This w~ 1 be discussed later. 
Wbat, then, can one say about the formal cha.racteriza-
t ion of the perceptual situation offered by the multiple 
inherence theory to solve the logical aspect of the problem 
of perception? The logical aspect, we recall, concerns the 
formal characteristics the perceptual situation must have 
in order that different qualities may appear to belong to 
the same object. 
It is quite apparent that the solution offered by the 
multiple inherence theory is merely verbal. It is not a 
theory at all in the sense of offering a new explanation 
as to why the different qualities an object appears to have 
are not logically incompatible. The formal characteris-
tics distinguished by the theory are no different from 
the formal characteristics of the common sense view. The 
multiple inherence theory points out that there is no in-
compatibility in holding that different qualities or charac-
teristics can occupy the same area from different places, 
and that this is also compatible with the object having a 
permanent shape and color de~ermined under ideal conditions. 
But who disagrees with this, or who does not already know 
this?' To say that "a color inheres-in-a-place-from-a-
place" tells us no more about the formal characteristics 
of the relation between color, object, and place then to 
say that 11 an object has a particular color under such-and-
such conditions," or "that an object appears such-and-such 
a color from a particular place." Under the . title of the 
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multiple inherence theory Professor Broad has merely re-
phrased the obvious characteristics of perception in a 
less familiar way. But this characterization does not 
show why it is not logically incompatible for the same ob-
ject to appear different to different people, or for dif-
ferent qualities to appear at the same place under differ-
ent conditions. This judgment is also shared by Martin 
Lean. 
• • • the Multiple Inherence Theory • . • • is 
clearly not an explanation at all. It is not 
even an ad hoc hypothesis. For an ad hoc 
hypothesis at least invents or invokes a dis-
tinct entity or process which will account for 
a given phenomenon; while the Multiple Inher-
ence Theory merely legislates the alleged 
problem out of existence. In effect, it 
merely allows that the qualities of physical 
objects may appear differently to different 
observers at the same time, and that they 
may appear differently to the same observer 
from different vantage points. It does not 
say anything about such qualities and spatial 
characteristics as colour, shape, and size 
except that this is true of them. But this 
was precisely the fact with which we started.l 
Thus the theory of multiple inherence is really no the-
ory at all, in the sense of providing an explanation of 
certain data. The terms "pervade" and "inform" denote sit-
uations but there is no more meaning to the terms than the 
situation itself supplies. That is, the terms do not help 
to enlighten us as to how an object can appear to have 
different colors. It is common knowledge that an object 
1. M. Lean, Sense - Perception and Matter,l25-126. (Hence-
forth all references to this work Will be abbreviated "SPM.") 
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can appear different under different conditions, even 
though these conditions are not usually stipulated. And 
more sophisticated people realize that there are theories 
of perspective (in the genuine sense of theory) to account 
for the differences in perception. 
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In an earlier quotation we pointed out that though 
Broad admitted that "we can predict what particular ap-
pearance an object will present to an observer" by the laws 
of perspective, yet he held that this was "not a relevant 
1 
answer." His question is "as to the compatibility of the 
changing elliptical appearances, however they may be cor~ 
related with other facts in the world, with the supposed 
2 
constancy and roundness of the physical object." It is 
strange that Broad should reject a theory which he admits 
will even predict the kinds of appearances objects will 
have under certain conditions for a view which is not even 
a true theory but merely a restatement of the original 
fact. One would suppose that the adequacy of a theory would 
be determined by its success in explaining and correlating 
facts. But Broad will not have it so. It is not logically 
inconsistent for an object to retain its independent shape 
and size(determined under certain conditions) and yet ap-
pear different from different points of view. It would, as 
Broad implies, be logically impossible for an object to re-
1. MPN, 235-236. 
2. Ibid. 
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main constant and appear different under identically the 
same conditions. But no one ever believes that it does, 
and whatever superficial incompatibility one seems to find 
can be explained in terms of the perceptual conditions 
themselves. 
It is significant, I believe, that the average person 
does not find the incompatibility which Broad claims to 
find. People are able to attribute the differences in per-
ceptions to the way the light strikes the surface of the 
object, or to his own peculiar visual position. It would 
seem that if the qualities were as incompatible as Profes-
sor Broad seems to think, one should often be perplexed as 
to what actually are the true qualities of an object. But 
this is not the case. If one wonders what the real color 
or shape of an object is then he inspects the object 
closely under normal conditions of lighting. Under these 
conditions he can state what the qualities of an object are 
because the sense of such statements are determined by just 
such conditions. He is not surprised that the object ap-
pears different under different conditions, and in fact, 
he might be surprised if' it were otherwise. To expect that 
an object would always look the same in spite of the light 
surrounding it is to take a very abstract view of' percep-
tion. There is nothing incompatible in an object (i.e., 
bell, desk, ball, etc.) appearing one shade of color under 
certain conditions of' lighting and a diff'erent shade of 
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simplicity" of common sense. These so-called perceptual 
incompatibilities were "solved" by the multiple inherence 
theory by stating that different colors could "inhere," 
and different shapes and sizes could "inform" the same ob-
jective constituent providing one took into account there-
gion of projection. Thus different qualities and charac-
teristics could inhere in-a-place-from-a-place. In its 
turn, the multiple relation theory solved the incompatibili-
ties by asserting tha t the objective constituent could 
seem to have qualities incompatible with those that it 
actually has, provided one realizes that these qualities 
are only apparent and not inherent or intrinsic. That is, 
these qualities do not actually inhere in the object on the 
multiple relation theory, as they do on the other theory, 
but only appear to inhere in it under certain conditions. 
Both theories held that an objective constituent often 
is the same for different percipients, and that it has in-
trinsic qualities of its. own which could (but presumably do 
not) coincide with the inherent or apparent qualities seen 
under certain conditions, and which are defined in terms 
of the apparent characteristics. Both theories disagreed 
with common sens e in holding that the objective constituent 
was a region of physical or absolute space, ra ther than an 
aotual surface of a physical object; e.g., colors pervade 
or appear in regions of space which are not the suri'aces 
of objects. We tried to show that all differences other 
than the latter one between these theories and common sense 
were merely verbal. And, finally, we tried to point out 
that the both theories were unnecessary since the supposed 
incompatibilities of perception could be explained by re-
ferring to the theories of optics, psychology, and the laws 
of perspective. 
The last theory to be discussed makes no pretence of 
trying to preserve. common sense. As a matter of fact, 
Broad is quite certain that nothing very substantial can b e 
said in defence of common sense anyway. 
sense 
It is ••• in my opinion, simply waste of time 
to try to rehabilitate naive realism; or to re-
gard it as any serious objection to a theory 
of the external world and our perception of 
it that it is "shocking to common-sense." Any 
theory that can possibly fit the facts is 
certain to shock common-sense somewhere; and 
in face of the facts we can only advise common-
sense to follow the example of Judas Iscariot, 
and "go out and hang itself.ul 
The sensa theory -- the last attempt to hang common 
follows the lead of the other two theories in de-
nying that colors are literally spread over the surfaces of 
physical objects as common sense believes, and in denying 
that physical objects have the shapes they are believed to 
have. It disagrees with the other two theories, however, 
in holding that colors do inhere in the objective constit-
uent in a simple dyadic way, and in asserting that the ob-
jective constituent actually is shaped as it appears to be 
in every perceptual situation . It disagrees with the two 
1. MPN, 186. 
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philosophic theories and common sense in denying that the 
objective constituent can ever be observed by more than one 
person, and in denying that the tactual and visual objective 
constituent can be identical. In addition, it disagrees · 
wi th the two philosophic theories in denying that the ob-
jective constituent is a region of absolute space; the ob-
jective constituent on the sensa theory is a particular 
existent private to each perceptual situation, and neither 
1 
mental nor physical. 
Thus, on this view, when one is supposed to be seeing 
a physical object what he is actually seeing is an objec-
tive constituent (or sense datum) which literally has the 
qualities it appears to have. Successive perceptions 
reveal successive objective constituents or sensa, each 
different from the other. 
The objective c onstituents of perceptual sit-
uations are, on this . view, particular exis-
tents of a peculiar kind; they are not physi- . 
cal, as we have seen; and their is no reason 
to suppose that they are either states of 
mind or existentially mind dependent. In 
having spatial characteristics, colours, etc., 
they resemble physical objects, as ordinarily 
conc.ei ved; but in their privacy and their 
dependence on the body, if not the mind, of 
the observer they are more like mental states. 
I give the name of "sensa" to the objective 
constituents of perceptual sitautions, on the 
supposition that they are not literally parts 
of the physical object which we are said to be 
11 percei ving, n and that they are transitory 
1. MPN, 184. 
particulars of the peculiar kind which I 
have just been describing. And I call the 
theory which assumes the existence of such 
particulars "The Sensum Theory." 1 
It is apparent that the essence of the sensa theory 
consists in hypostatizing into an actual entity what is 
usually called an "appearance" of an object. This is even 
true of veridical per c ~ptions since the objective constit-
uent, loosened from t h e actual surface of the physical ob-
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ject by Broad's argument that it does not exhibit all the 
characteristics of the physical object, is subsequently 
entirely freed from the physical object via the data of 
delusive perceptions. The perceptual situation having been 
~ 
at the same time pr~mptied of the physical object, in the 
form of a microscopic entity, one is thus left with an ob-
jective constituent intrinsically having all the charac-
teristics it appears to have, but having none of the more 
stable or objective characteristics of the cormnonly desig-
nated "physical object." 
As regards this theory, no more can be said than has 
already been pointed out with regard to Broad's original 
characterization and analysis of the perceptual situation 
and his formulation of the theories of multiple inherence 
and multiple relation. As regards the characterization of 
1. MP N, 181-182. 
' · 
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the perceptual si tua.tion, we pointed out that even though all 
the characteristics of a physical object were never exhibit-
ed in any one perceptual situation, this is not to say that 
the substantive term (e.g., 11 bell 11 ) in the phrase denoting 
the perceptual situation (e.g., "I see a bell") does not 
denote a physical object contained in the situation. On the 
basis of a single perceptual situation one cannot be certain 
that such an object is contained in it, but subsequent veri-
fication can relieve any doubt. 
In the discussion of the multiple inherence and mul-
' 
tiple relation theories, we pointed out that the logical 
discrepancies which Broad found in the perception of the 
srune object by differ ent people, or by the same person at 
differen t times, could be explained scientifically by 
referring to the physical or optical conditions under which 
the object was perceived. That is, there is no "logical 
discrepancy" in the same object appearing different under 
different conditions . To quote lViartin Lean, 
There is no need for, nor is there any unambig-
uous evidence to support, the view that our per-
ception of physical objects is mediated by sensa. 
Instead of adopting an object type of mediation, 
we may simply recognize that our perception is a 
process involving the reflection of light; and 
this is sufficient to account adequately for all 
those peculiar phenomena of perception to which 
Dr. Broad calls our attention. We have thus up-
rooted Dr. Broad's fundamental argument for the 
Sensum Theory by explaining i n familiar common-
sense terms the supposed occurrence of "discrep-
ancy" in our perception of physical objects. There 
is nothing for the Sensum Theory to explain that 
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can't be adequately handled by a scientific inves-
tigation in a way wholly compatible with common 
sense and hence the theory is gratuitous.l 
This conclusion also applies to the "causal aspect" of 
the problem of perception. -Although certain psychological, 
physiological, and physical conditions influence perception, 
this is not to say that normal perception can be explained 
or accounted for in terms of either of these factors alone; 
e.g., physiological. It is true that objects may appear when 
and where they are not. But the explanation of this fact 
does not require that physical objects as commonly conceived 
be forsaken and the appearance reified into an entity; these 
aberrant experiences can be given scientific explanations 
which are elaborations of the common sense view, but which 
do not require philosophic interpretation. The fact that an 
object appears slightly different under different conditions 
can be explained by the laws of perspective without making 
the appearance itself into a distinct entity called a "sense 
datum." 
To be sure, an after-image, a hallucinatory datum, a 
double image are all particulars, as Broad points out, but 
they are certainly different kinds of particulars from phys-
ical objects. They do exemplify the characteristics Broad 
assigns to the objective constituent; e.g., they are private, 
transient, they res~mble states of mind, and they do have 
spatial characteristics. But it is precisely becau~e they 
1. SPM, 182. 
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do have these characteristics that they are classified as 
delusive to distinguish them from physical objects normally 
perceived. It makes no sense, therefore, to say that in 
normal perceptions we are only c ognitively in contact with 
objective constituents having the properties of these de-
lusive objects. To say this is to say that we are contin-
ually deluded as regards our normal perceptions. But if 
this were the case we should no more be able to communicate 
the details of our experiences in a way susceptible to pub-
lic verification , then the drunkard perceiving pink rats can 
receive public confirmation of his tipsy experience. 
If one could conclude from the basis of the partial re-
semblance of delusive perceptions to normal ones that there 
were no physical objects as ordinarily conceived, then one 
could argue with equal justification that delusive per-
ceptions themselves are physical objects. That is, because 
mirror-Lmages or hallucinatory data resemble perceived sur-
faces of physical objects there is no more justification for 
saying that nonnal or veridical perception of physical ob-
jects involve the mediation of an image-like sense-datum, 
then there is for saying that the mirror-image and hallu-
cinatory datum are themselves physical objects. The mere 
resemblance does not determine the case either way. Only 
subsequent verificati on can do this. The point is tha t the 
components of experience are not exclusive alternates; i.e., 
201. 
they do not fit into the logical scheme of either physical 
objects or delusive data, and not both. The components of 
experience are joined conjunctively: there e.re chair•s, and 
mirror images, and shadows, and hallucinations, and feelings, 
and mountains , and after-images, etc. To deny this is to 
deny the facts of experience, and also to deny to language 
its denotative significance. 
Thus I would conclude that Broad's arguments are not 
sufficient to lead one to believe that the common sense view 
of the world is erroneous, and that the language based on 
this view of the world is either insufficient or misleading. 
On the contrary, with the assistance of Martin Lean, I 
have tried to show that the "perceptual discr·epancies" which 
led Broad to reject common sense in favor of a philosophic 
view of perception can readily be explained by the usual 
scientific emendations of common sense. In the light of 
such explanations, the so-called discrepancies. lose much, 
if not all, of their epis temic puzzlement. I would say of 
Broad's arguments against the reality of physical objects 
what he, curiously enough, says about the arguments against 
the reality of spatial characteristics. 
As I have said, the arguments against the reality 
of spatial characteristics seem to me plainly 
fallacious; but, if I could see nothing wrong 
with them, I should still venture to think it 
much more likely that an argwnent is invalid, 
though it seems to me to be sound, than that 
the objective constituent of visual and tac-
tual situations are unextended, though they 
seem to have shapes, sizes, and pos ition. 
For I know from sad experiences that I can be 
taken in by plausible but fallacious arguiilents, 
whilst I have no reason to think that the objec-
tive constituents of my tactual and visual sit-
uations could seem to have shapes, sizes, 1and positions if they were really unextended.. 
202 ·. 
It has been my contention that Broad has been "taken in 11 
by the familiar philosophical arguments regarding the natt~e 
of perception. If I may be allowed to paraphrase the above 
quotation it will serve to point out the essential difference 
between Broad's view and mine. 
As I have said, the argument against the reality 
of ;physical characteristics7 seem to me plain-
ly fallacious; but, if I coUld see nothing wrong 
with them , I should still venture to think it 
much more likely that an argument is invalid, 
although it seems to be sound, than that the 
/physical objects7 of visual and tactual situa-
tions are unextended, though they seem to have 
shapes, sizes, and positions. For T know from 
sad experience that I can be taken in by 
plausible but fallacious arguments, whilst I 
have no reason to think that the Lphysical 
objecti7 of my tactual and visual situations 
could seem to-Lbe public, independent, self-
existent, etc~ and have shapes, sizes, and 
positions if they were really unextended 
Ltransient, private, peculiar entities more 
like mental states than physical object~. 
That is, I do not see how perceived physical objects 
such as chairs, tables, bodies . could have the kinds of 
characteristics they have, namely, objectivity, publicity, 
causal efficacy, spatial dimensions, independent existence, 
qualitative characteristics if instead they were'particular 
1. MPN, 202. 
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existents of a peculiar kind," "not physical, 11 11 trans i-
tory," and "in their privacy and dependence on the body • 
• • more like mental states." To define "chair" in terms of 
such ephemeral characteristics seems to me to empty the 
term of any empirical meaning and significance. But more 
than this, it leads one to suspect the world of common s ens e, 
and wonder if all is not illusion. The point, however, is 
that the only world that we can definitely experience and 
describe in ordinary language is the world as ordinarily 
perceived. 
Scientists give us a model of a somewhat different 
world, and philosophers, especially metaphysicians, supply 
us with innumerable other's. But the world we awake to each 
morning, live in during the day, and die in at the end of 
life is the common sense world that we experience. However 
we may wish to leave it, practically or theoretically, it 
is the world in which we live, and sanity requires that we 
adjust to it. 
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CONCLUSION 
Having analyzed our way throu gh the sensa theories of 
Moore, Rus sell, and Broad we now find ourself at the con-
clusion. Knowing where we have been, can we say where we are? 
As a result of the analysis and criticism can an approach be 
suggested to the problem of discrepant perceptions which is 
more fruitful? Do the limitations of the previous theories 
suggest a more adequate solution? Adverse criticism is not 
difficult to present; the measure of achievement is not crit-
icism, but solution. 
There is no need, I think, to summarize or recapitulate 
the argument as it has progressed in the preceding chapters; 
I hope this has been done at the appropriate stages in the 
discussion itself. Instead., I should like to crystalize some 
kind of solution from the criticisms and suggestions ~hich 
have so far been left in suspension in the discussion • . Some-
thing should ha ve been learned from each of the theories dis-
cussed. 
From Moore I think one gains a greater insight into the 
integral position, and pervasiveness of the point of view and 
language of common sense, and the dtrfficulty in developing a 
consistent position whtch denies or reinterprets the fundamen-
t~! features of experience. The difficulty consists in recon-
ciling a theoretical revision of ordinary experience with the 
categories of language and one's habitual attitudes and beliefs. 
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Experience exhibits a particular structure which is reproduced, 
to some extent at least, in ordinary language, a.nd aven though 
one can construct theories about the world different from the 
world we perceive, when one tries to fit the theory to experi-
ence then the difficulties arise. This is especially so when 
one trias to express the theory in ordinary language. Althou gh 
ordinary language is vague and impreoise, it does provide a 
loose symbolic system in terms of which ordinary experience 
can be conceptua lized a nd expressed. A revision of some terms 
generally encounters resistance in the form of inconsistencies 
since meanings are interdependent and interpenetrating. 
However, even the point of view and lan guage of common 
sense is not static, but grows by insight and addition. Sci-
ence especially has contributed to, and amended, common sense. 
Since science depends to a great extent upon observati9n--often 
developing more precise and exact means of observa tion--it does 
not in principle conflict with common se nse. Relying, for the 
most part, on the common categories of experience it widens 
the perceptual horizon of common sense while offering theoret-
ical explanations of experience which facilita tes control over 
events and objects, and introduces one to a wider conceptual 
world. Russell's knowledge of, and respect for, science made 
one aware of the limitations of common sense, and the impor-
tance of making a place for science in a world view. However, 
in attempting a philosophical interpretation of the world be-
cause of perceptual inconsistencies and a supposed conflict 
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between science and common sense, Russell raised even more 
problems than he solved. This suggests that a revision of 
common sense comes by way of science, rather than philosophy. 
Broad's analysis showed both the contingency and the 
limitations of the common sense view and ordinary language. 
In his analysis of perception, Broad showed that both recog-
nition and identification proceed by partial clues, not by 
complete knowledge. Common sense assumes knowledge of a com-
plate object, when usually partial evidence is given. But 
this does not require a conversion of the notion of a physical 
object to a · hypothetical correlate of perceptions. Nor do 
the f ,;:t cts of delusive perceptions r e quire a denial of per-
ceived physical objects, or a reinterpretation of the perceived 
object in terms of sense-data. One does perceive physical ob-
jects having the qualities usually attributed to them, although 
common sense and ordina ry language is too simple in its char-
acterization of the object. 
Broad's reference to delusive experiences and the phys-
ical and physiological conditions of perception show that per-
caption is a much more complex process than is _ordinarily be-
lieved. One talks as if physical objects were colored and 
shaped simply; that is, independently of any conditions. This 
is natural since for most purposes objects do have constant 
qualities and prop~erties superficially appea r ing to be inde-
pendent of any conditions. But this appears to be so only be-
L\ 
cause the conditions are us,..ally constant. Ordinary language v 
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assumes the constancy of conditi ons for its validity. Stand-
ard lighting and physiological conditi J ns are assumed for the 
truth of the statement, "grass is green." Ordinary language 
is based on this experience, under these conditions. 
Abnormal occurrences, however, such a s color-blindness, 
or alter~atl:ms in lighting, or microscopic dimensio ns of per-
ception point out the conventional nature of ordinary experi-
ence, a nd the language based on this expe~ience. Scientific 
.explanations are required at this point to exhibit and explain 
the c onditions of the occurrences of phenomena;. e.g., the func-
tion of the co ne s in color vision, the absorbtion a nd reflec-
tion of diff erent light waves from objects, and the effect of 
optical lense s on vision. 
Thus marg inal ca ses of aberrant experiences require in-
terpretation a nd explana.tion which diminishes the assumed ab-
soluteness of ordinary experience. This shows that experience 
has many dime nsions, only one of which is usually realized in 
ordinary perception. Common s e nse is a name for the most in-
tegral and common dimension, and ordinary language is the 
means of its expression. Science introduces other dimensions 
requiring an extension of, and revision of, ordinary language. 
It coins new terms, and develops different models of inter-
pretation. 
This, however, does not prove tha t common sense is fal se, 
nor that ordinary language is inadequa te. It merely shows 
that common sense is restricted in scope, and ordinary lan-
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h guage limited in ruction. For example, such statements as 
" "this paper is white" are true with certainty, as M:>ore point-
ed out, because they completely express the conventions of 
their intelligible application. The conditions upon which 
their truth rely may be ignored. However, when one says "the 
star is silvery," this is not unequivocally true, because one 
may not be seeing the star. Here the conditions upon which 
the statement is based undermine the truth of the statement. 
It is true in a s ense; that is, it reports what one sees, but 
it aay be false in implying that what one sees now exists. 
The former statement is true in both senses. 
Similarly, there appears to be a conflict between the 
appearance of an object under a microscope and the appearance 
of the sa me object to the naked eye. But different appear-
ances are due to different conditions of observation. There 
seems to be no point in asking which is the true object, or 
in maintaining that there is a discrepancy in the appearances. 
One is the true appearance under certain conditions, a nd the 
other is the true appearance under the other conditions. Blood 
is said to be "red" because under most conditions it looks red, 
and "red" denotes that particular color. If one normally saw 
things with microscopic vision, one would not say "the blood 
is red, 11 but would describe it as it appeared under those con-
ditions. These new conditions would determine the accepted 
description of the appearance of blood. 
Thus the appearances do not seem to be inconsistent, nor 
does one seem to be more real than another. The distinction 
between reality and appearances assumes:. one condition as ab-
solute (e.g., the common sense view, or the sceintific ac-
count, ate.), but the selection of any set of conditions is 
a matter of convention: "truer than" merely reflects one's 
interest or point of view. 
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The solution to the problem of discrepant perceptions 
suggested in this conclusion is a causal one. That is, it 
assumes that there is no logical incompatibility between dif-
ferent perceptions of the same object if a causal explanation 
can be given. But this assumption is both empirically and 
theoretically justified. That is, what is a puzzling phenom-
enon is made clear by a theory which takes into account the 
empirical data and provides an explanation of such data which 
has predictable consequences. One can not only explain why 
the phenomena occur as they do, but on the basis of the theory 
one can also predict the future occurrence of phenomena. 
Sensa theories, such as Broad's, which find the causal 
explanation of discrepant perceptions beside the point, in-
sisting that there is still a logical incompatibility to be 
accounted for, rest on a very abstract approach to the problem~ 
Such an approach, while stressing the different characteristics 
of what is seen under different conditions~ refuses to consider 
the relevancy of the conditions. If one ignores the conditions . 
under which an object is seen, and merely compares the charac-
teristics of what is seen, it appears that what is seen is in-
compatible in the way in which two snapshots of the same ob-
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ject from diffe r ent angles cannot be superimposed one on the 
other. But just as two snapshots are not incompatible pictures 
of the same object if one takes into account the different con-
ditions, so two glimpses of the same object are not incompat-
ibile providing one takes into account the two perspectives. 
Thus because what one sees varies with the conditions 
this does not mean tha t one cannot be seeing the same obje6t 
on the grounds that some of the characteristics of what is 
seen are incompatible. The characteristics are only incom-
patible as long as one ignores the relevant conditions. When-
ever one sees an object from different points of view the over-
all characteristics remain the same, and it is usually with 
regard to detail that there appears to be a change. Unless 
objects possessed certain independent and constant character-
istics it would be impossible to designate individual objects. 
It is also pointed out by supporters of sensa theories 
that one must take cognizance of the ontological status of 
the different appearances of an object in relation to the on-
tolog ical status of the unchanging object. That is, although 
a penny appears elliptical under certain conditions, it is be-
lieved to be round, and while one person can see it as round, 
another can see it as elliptical. If the penny is taken to 
be round, then this requires attributing some status to the 
elliptical appearance. But again it seems to me that the 
force of this argument is a function of the approach; that is, 
it depends upon overlooking the conditions of perception. It 
is true that at the same time that two people are seeing the 
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same penny one may be seeing it as round, and the other as el-
liptical. And as far as this statement of the situation goes, 
it would have to be assumed that both parsons were seeing two 
different things. But if it is remembered that perception al-
ways occurs under different c ~nditions, and that the way an 
object looks can be correlated with reference to the conditions, 
then an explanation of the difference between the penny sean 
as elliptical, and the penny sean as round, does not require 
reifying the two different appearances, only one of which is 
said to be identical with the object. Rather, referring to 
the different conditions explains the dif~erence in what is 
seen c~nsistent with the belief ths t one is seeing the same 
object. 
That is, if one can show that different appearances are 
not incompatible, then there is no need to hypostatize the 
appearances into separate entities. Instead, one can take 
the usual point of view that he is seeing the object itself, 
and that the difference in what he sees from different points 
of view can be explained in reference to the different condi-
tions. As was pointed out earlier, some conditions are taken 
as standard because they are more permanent, and because the 
varying appearances can be correlated with them. The varying 
appearances, however, are the way the object looks under dif-
ferent conditions and do not have an independent ontological 
status. Their ontolog ical status is coincident with that of 
the physical object relative to the conditions under which it 
is seen. This approach would seem to eliminate the ontological 
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problem. 
Thus the mai n diffe r ence between the solution to dis-
crepant perceptions suggested in this dissertation and the 
sensa approach is this. The sensa approach depends upon ig-
noring the different conditions of perception, while at the 
same time stressing the diffe r ent chara cteristics of what is 
seen under different conditions. This suggests that different 
data are seen under these diff erent c ~ nditions, which leads 
to rajecting the objective idantity of the object seen. How- ~ 
ever, if one takes cognizance of the diffe rent c~nditions un-
der which an object is seen, then the different qualities do 
not appear incompatible, which eliminates the necessity of hy-
postatizing into sense-data what is seen, and preserves the 
identity of the object. 
From this point of view, objects are perceived as they 
are, although always under certain conditions. One can ex-
plain and predict the differences in appearances of the same 
obj e ct from this point of view, while the sense-data theories 
only acknowledge the difference. The view that one sees the 
object and not just an appearance rests on the recognition 
that reality has many dimensions, only a few of which are ex-
perienced. Common sense a nd its l a nguage is based on the 
most integral and prevalent set of perceptual conditions. Dis-
crepancies make us aware of these conditions, while science 
describes a nd explains them, thereby introducing us to the 
possibility of other conditions. 
The difficulty with the sense-data theory was exposed 
by the fact that there were no means of verifying whether 
sense-data exist or not. Their existence depended upon ac-
ceptlng a particular definition, and the definition was al-
tered to meet any contingencies, so that the adherents of 
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the theory would accept no conditions as falsifying the 
theory. The sensa theory is a hypothesis adjusted to meet 
all objections and suit all needs. As such, however, it 
ceases to be an empirical hypothesis which is explanatory of 
a definite set of conditions. This is why sensa-theories are 
not like scientific hypotheses which recognize the necessity 
of a set of confirmatory or disconfirmatory conditions. 
I do not wish to maintain, however, that sense-data 
theories, or the language of sense-data have no utility what-
soever. As a matter of fact, the reduction of physical object 
statements to statements referring to immediate sensory ex-
perience does elucidate the structure of knowledge and lan-
guage. However, I do wish to deny that the language of sense-
data is a more adequate langua ge than ordinary physical object 
language, and that physical objects can be reconstructed in 
terms of sense-data. Neither pragmatic nor theoretical con-
siderations seem to warrant such a conclusion. 
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ABSTRACT 
I 
When I look at my ha nd, am I seeing my ha nd, or am I 
seeing sense-data of my hand? When one looks at a penny 
from an oblique angle, does he see an elliptical appearance 
of the penny, or does he see the actual surface of the penn·y? 
From a distance, an object will look small and less differ-
entiated. Does this mean that one is not seeing the object, 
but seeing instead an appearance of the object? What is the 
object? a nd what is the appearance? 
The qualitative similarity between delusive and verid-
ical perceptions and the apparent incompatibility between 
the way an object looks under different conditions has led 
to a distinction between the object, per se, and the appear-
ance. That is, since the way an object looks can be made to 
vary independently of the object (by changing the lighting, 
for example), a distinction is ma de between the variable 
looks, or appearances. and the object itself. Then, on the 
view here adopted, either linguistic habits or the demands 
of ontology a:ncourages treating the appearance as an entity. 
This, in turn, alters the cognitive sta tus of the physical 
object, and raises ontological a nd epistemological questions 
concerning the status of sense-da ta and the ir relation to the 
physica l obj e ct and minds. 
The purpose of this disserta tion is to examine t h is ap-
proach to the problem of delusive a nd vary i ng perceptions to 
determine whether it is the most .adequate approach consistent 
with the data of perception. The problem is to determine 
whether varying and delusive perceptions require explanation 
by a theory of perception incorporating the notion and lan-
guage of sense-data. The sense-data theories of Moore, Rus-
sell, and Broad are taken as test cases. 
II 
The dissertation be gins with an analysis of Moore's "A 
Defence of Common Sense," in which Moore does two main things. 
First, he claims to know with certainty the truth of ordinary 
propositions expressing fundamental f a cts (e.g., spatial, tem-
poral, physical, and psychological) about the world and expe-
rience. Secondly, analyzing such propos 1 t ions as 11 th is is a 
ha nd," he concludes tha t such propositions refer to, or have 
a s their "ultimate" subjects, sense-data. Furt her, Moore be-
lieves that there are good raa.s ons for thinking that sense-
data a re never actual parts of the surface of the physical 
object, and discusses three theories attempting to explain 
the rela tion between the two. Moore finds "very grave dif-
ficulties11 in each theory. 
However, since Moore's analysis of ordinary propositions 
undermines the truth of such propositi~ns, there are also 
grave difficulties in Moore's position. For if the proposi-
tion "this is a hand" does not designate a ha nd, but refers 
to sense-data which may not be identical with the hand, then 
it is difficult to see how the proposition could be true with 
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certainty as it is ordinarily understood. Moore concedes this 
difficulty in his paradoxical admission that he is "both feel-
ing sure of and doubting the very same proposition at the 
same time." Thus an analysis of propositions into sense-data 
leads one to doubt the truth of such propositions, the very 
point against which Moore wrote his 11 Defence." 
A further difficulty in Moore's argument is his defini-
ti on of sense-data. At first Moore seemed to think tha t 
sense-data could be picked out, as _a ny object might, but later 
he defines s a nse-data in such a wa y that "seeing" a physical 
object logically entails "directly seaing" a sensa-datum. A 
sense-datum is "directly seen" in the way an after-image or 
hallucinatory datum is seen. However, it is oot at all cl aar 
t hat when one is seeing a physical object he is also "dire ctly 
seeing" an ima ge or datum of some kind, in spite of Moore's 
definition. 
III 
Russell's theory of neutral monism is an attempt to re-
construct the world in terms of sense-data. Russell continues 
the long line of distinguished British Empiricists which ac-
cepts the indubitable data of sense as the foundation for the 
interpretation of rea lity. Three fundamental raasons motivate 
Russell in this attempt. (1) He beliaves that the similarity 
of sensory expariences requires accepting all sensed data as 
equally veridical, and necessitates reinterpreting expariance 
in terms of such data. (2) He believes that the scientific 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities also in-
dicates the primacy of sensory experience for a theoretical 
reconstruction of tha world. (3) He balievas that the recant 
methodological devel~pments in the philosophy of mathematics 
and in logic point to the elimination of inferred or postu-
lated entities in favor of a more empirical and economical 
system based on immediate sensory data. 
However, in spite of its theoretical simplicity, Rus-
sell's thaory of neutral monism provides little insight into 
the structure of· physical obja cts and experience. Ra thar, it 
offers a reinterpretation of the physical object and experi-
ence from which it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to deduce the common characteristics of both. For example, 
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it is difficult to account for the unity of the physical ob-
ject on Russell's view that the physical object exists at 
every place whare it has an effact. In addition, Russell's 
elimination of inferred entities tends to a depreciation of 
scientific theories which lead to an understanding and control 
of physical phenomena not provided by philosophical theories 
such as Russell's. 
Furthermore, the scientific distinction betwean primary 
and secondary qualities should not be takan as evidence against 
the reality of ordinary objects of perception. That bricks 
are red and grass is green is not disproved by the physiol-
ogist's discovery that color vision depends upon certain chem-
icals in the cones. Nor does the physicist's descripti~n of 
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physical objects as sub-microscopic molecules or atoms prove 
that perceived macroscopic objects do not have the shapes and 
properties they are perceived as having, since no theory can 
change the data of perception. Rather, scientific theories 
of perception and of matter provide both an explanation and 
a theoretical model for interpreting ordinary experience which 
can be verified by perception. 
rv-
Broad's acceptance of sense-data follows from his anal-
ysis of perceptual situations. According to Broad, since all 
of the characteristics of a physical bbject are never pre-
sented in a single percep t ion, the physical object as such 
is never "literally contained" in the perceptual situat i on. 
What is contained is an "objective constituent" which at most 
could only be a spatial-temporal part of the physical ob ject. 
However, Broad concludes tha t the "objective constituent" 
can never be identified with the physica l object. According 
to Broad, the neces sa ry and sufficient conditions of percep-
tion lie in t he imme d iate area of the percipient. Consequently, 
the physical object is only an incidental cause in perception. 
Such evidence as (a) delusive perceptions, (b) the physiolog-
ical conditions of percepti~n, and (c) the temporal disparity 
between the emission of light and the perception of distant 
objects lead Broad to this c:mclusion. He discusses three 
philosophica l theories, the "Theory of Multiple Inherence," 
the "Multiple Relation Theory of Appearing, 11 and the "Sensum 
Theory," which attempt to account for the so-called discrep-
ancies between varying perceptions. 
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A close analysis of the three theories reveals, however, 
that they do not expla in why different perceptions of the same 
object are not incompatible, but merely restate the facts of 
perception. As such, they are not as scientific theories, ad 
hoc explanations of phenomena, but are merely linguistic al-
ternatives. But they are not innocuous alternatives for they 
imply that ordinary perceptual objects such as chairs and 
stones do not exist with the properties we perce ive them as 
ha ving. Instead, a perceived object is said to be a colored 
segment of absolute s pace, or a sense-datum. The difficulty 
is that neither segments of space nor sense-data (which are 
priva te, transient, and unsubstantial by definition) have the 
qualities or properties we verify perceived objects as having. 
Furthermore, science offers explanations as to why dif-
ferent appearances of an object are not incompatible; namely, 
because the conditions under which the object is perceived a re 
different. There is no incompatibility in an object appear-
ing elliptical from one po i nt of view and round from another 
when one takes into account the angle of reflection of the 
light. And the physica l object is not incidental to perception 
since removal of the perceived object elimina tes perception of 
it. 
v 
In conclusion, then, delusive and variant perce ptions do 
not require . a philosophica l expl anation in terms of sense-
da ta, but can be expla ined scientifically in general agree-
ment with common sense. However, such aberrant perce ptions 
do expose the limitations and conventionality even of verid-
ical perceptions, a nd the language based on such perceptions. 
The langua ge a nd point of view of common sense cannot be 
accepted as an infallible oracle. In fact, their utility 
depends upon an over-simplification of the conditions of per-
ception. When a quality or property is predicated of an ob-
ject the conditions facilitating this predication are ignor-
ed. However, marg inal cases of delusive perceptions expose 
the conditi~ns of perception, and stimula te scientific expla-
nati~n. Thus the temporal disparity between the exi stence 
and perce ption of a distant ob ject reveals the function of 
the emission of light in perception. Color-blindness led to 
an investigation of the physiological conditions of percep-
tion, and microscopic observation introduced other dimensions 
of perception. Such da ta exhibit the conditions and limita-
tions of ordinary experience on which ordinary la ngu~ge is 
based. But they do not require befurcating experi e nce into 
appearances a nd rea lity. Reality, if anything, is percep-
tually multi-dimensional. This suggests a stratification of 
languages to avoid pseudo questions and unnecessary epistemic 
and ontologica l commitments. 
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